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SOME LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR E.U.BASED MNES CONTEMPLATING HIGHRISK FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN
THE ENERGY SECTOR AFTER KIOBEL V.
ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM AND
CHEVRON CORPORATION V. NARANJO
Jeffrey A. Van Detta*
INTRODUCTION
In a two-year span, two major multinational enterprises (MNEs)
in the energy-sector—Chevron and Royal Dutch Petroleum—have
experienced the opposite ends of a similar problem: The impact of
civil litigation risks on foreign direct investments.1
For Chevron, it was the denouement of a two-decade effort to
defeat a corporate campaign that Ecuadorian residents of a polluted
oil-exploration region waged against it since 1993 and its
predecessor, Texaco, first in the U.S. federal courts, then in the
Ecuadorian courts.2 After putting all of its litigation resources into
ousting the jurisdiction of U.S. courts through a forum non
* Professor of Law & Associate Dean for Scholarship, Atlanta’s John
Marshall Law School (AJMLS), Atlanta, Georgia. Associate Dean Van
Detta teaches courses in both International Business Transactions and
International Civil Litigation. He expresses his appreciation to the Miami
Business Law Review for permission to adapt for this article portions of his
article, Politics and Legal Regulation in the International Business
Environment: An FDI Case Study of Alstom, S.A., in Israel, 21 MIAMI BUS.
L. REV. 1 (2013). He also expresses his appreciation to the incredibly
talented Michael Lynch, Mary Wilson, Mark Durbin, Morteza Parvin, and
Susan Risher of the Michael J. Lynch Library at AJMLS, whose tireless
reference, acquisition, and inter-library loan assistance to faculty is
invaluable. The author dedicates this article to the memory of the late Dean
John E. Ryan (1937–2008).
1
See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, The Chevron-Ecuador Case:
Three Dimensions of Complexity in Transnational Dispute Resolution, 106
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 425 (2012).
2
Judith Kimberling, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in
Amazonia: The Case of Ecuador, Chevron-Texaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco,
38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 413 (2006).
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conveniens dismissal conditioned on Chevron submitting to litigation
in Ecuador, 3 Chevron’s odyssey through the Ecuadorian court
system resulted in a $19 billion judgment, 4 which Chevron has
fought as hard against in the Southern District of New York as it
once did in that same court to get into Ecuador5—only to have the
Second Circuit rebuff Chevron’s effort to use New York’s enactment
of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act
(UFMJRA)6 as a sword rather than a shield and the U.S. Supreme
Court decline to take up the case.7
3

Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Justice Restored: Using a Preservation-ofCourt-Access Approach to Replace Forum Non Conveniens in Five
International Product-Injury Cases, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 53, 96–98
(2003); Jennifer K. Rankin, Note, U.S. Laws in the Rainforest: Can a U.S.
Court Find Liability for Extraterritorial Pollution Caused by a U.S.
Corporation? An Analysis of Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 18 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 221, 223–24 (1995). As another commentator described the
impact of oil exploration and exploitation:
The boom of the petroleum industry was also not without
environmental and human costs, which have led to the
instant lawsuit. Estimates place pipeline spills at 16.8
million gallons of crude oil emptying into the Amazon
River Basin. Additionally, almost 30 billion gallons of
toxic by-products of the petroleum extraction were
released into the environment.
Lisa Lambert, Case Note, At the Crossroads of Environmental and Human
Rights Standards: Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. Using the Alien Tort Claims Act
to Hold Multinational Corporate Violators of International Laws
Accountable in U.S. Courts, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 109, 113 (2000)
(footnotes omitted) (noting that “an unpublished study's preliminary findings
state the overall rate of cancer in the Oriente [where oil exploration and
exploitation occurred] is 2.3 times higher than residents of Ecuador's capital,
Quito”).
4
Charles N. Brower & Diane Brown, From Pinochet in The House of
Lords to the Chevron/Ecuador Lago Agrio Dispute: The Hottest Topics in
International Dispute Resolution, 26 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV.
L.J. 1, 27–31 (2013).
5
Compare Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998), and
Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994), with Chevron
Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d sub nom.,
and Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 423 (2012).
6
N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5301–5309. While New York’s law is an
enactment of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act
(UFMJRA), promulgated by the Uniform Law Commissioners in 1962, the
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For Royal Dutch Petroleum, a litigation odyssey started after
victims and families of victims of torture, extrajudicial—and even
judicially-sanctioned—killing in the Niger delta filed lawsuits in the
U.S. federal courts. It all but came to an end—simply awaiting
transmission of the appellate mandate—after the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (the Alien Tort Statute) did not apply
extraterritorially to alleged torts “in violation of the law of nations”
that are alleged to have transpired “outside the United States.”8
These cases hold lessons for both outside and in-house corporate
counsel, yet they also deserve further scrutiny and integration into
the business decision-making process that underlies foreign direct
investments. This is particularly true for companies located in the
euro zone today, which are challenged truly to “think outside of the
box” 9 —and outside of the European Union 10 —in structuring
New York Legislature in 1970 denominated the law as the “Uniform Foreign
Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act,” which is in fact the title of a
new 2005 uniform law that New York has yet to adopt. Compare Uniform
Law
Commission,
Foreign-Country
Money
Judgments
Recognition Act, available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.asp
x?title=Foreign-Country%20Money%20Judgments%20Recogniti
on%20Act, with Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 234, 239–40 and N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5301
(captioned “Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments”), § 5309
(“This article may be cited as the “Uniform Foreign Country MoneyJudgments Recognition Act.”). Unfortunately, the usually astute Professor
David Siegel did not comment upon this anomaly in his PRACTICE
COMMENTARIES, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5301, C53101:1 (2013), and even the
astute Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals has not picked up on
the anomaly. See Galliano, S.A. v. Stallion, Inc., 15 N.Y.3d 75, 79–80, 904
N.Y.S.2d 683, 930 N.E.2d 756 (2010).
7
Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012).
8
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660 (2013).
9
See Patrick R. Hugg, Redefining the European Union's Position in the
Emerging Multipolar World: Strong Global Leadership Potential,
Restrained by Asymmetry of Power and Dissonant Voices, 20 TUL. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 145 (2011); Inese Vaidere, The Impact of Regional and Cohesion
Policy on the Economic Development of the EU, ISSN 1822–8402 European
Integration Studies, No. 5 (2011), available at http://www.eis.ktu.lt/
index.php/EIS/article/view/1092/1168; Daniel Daianu, Euro Zone Crisis and
EU Governance: Tackling a Flawed Design and Inadequate Policy
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international growth from a now suddenly unstable home base. 11
Thus, the time is ripe to re-consider how E.U.-based multinationals
might modify their decision-making templates for identifying and
undertaking opportunities for foreign direct investment (FDI), 12
while tempering that perspective with an analysis of the potential for
litigation over certain kinds of FDI—whether in the courts of the
United States or in tribunals elsewhere.
Effective evaluation of FDI requires more than the application of
business modeling and economic theory. 13 It requires critical
evaluation of legal issues raised not only under the regulatory
environment of the host state, but also under the legal system of the
FDI investor’s home state, and third-states to which the FDI investor
has substantial connections. This inquiry is both inductive and

Arrangements, CASE Network Studies and Analyses No. 433 (2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1991162; Stefano Micossi, Misguided
Policies Risk Breaking up the Eurozone and the EU (Centre for European
Policy Working Paper No. 260, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1996457.
10
See Hugg, supra note 9; see also Vaidere, supra note 9; Daianu,
supra note 9; Micossi, supra note 9.
11
See, e.g., Alfredo Jimenez & Juan Bautista Delgado-Garcia,
Proactive Management of Political Risk and Corporate Performance: The
Case of Spanish Multinational Enterprises, 21 INT’L BUS. REV. 1029 (2012),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2011.11.008 (noting that
Spanish MNEs have displayed “a proactive use of political risk in the
internationalization strategy . . . by taking advantage of their political
capabilities in certain locations”).
12
For examples of how the EU has benefitted from foreign trade even
in the face of the Euro Zone crisis, see Rajnish Tiwari, Bilateral Business
Defies Financial Crisis and Economic Slowdown, INDO-GERMAN ECON.,
May 2012, at 19–21, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2083082; Julien
Chaisse, Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign
Investment—How Will the New EU Competence on FDI Affect the Emerging
Global Regime?, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 51, 52 (footnotes omitted), available at
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/15/1/51.
13
See JOHN W. HEAD, GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW: THE BUSINESS AND
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE AND INVESTMENT 384 (Carolina
Academic Press 2d ed. 2007). For an examination of the importance of FDI
within a broader legal environment, see Kenneth C. Randall & John E.
Norris, A New Paradigm For International Business Transactions, 71 WASH.
U. L.Q. 599 (1993).
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deductive. 14 It must also encompass the vantage points that the
divergent experiences of the Chevron-Ecuador and Royal Dutch
Shell-United States litigations—each having arisen from FDI
projects—embrace.
To demonstrate critical evaluation of FDI-generated legal issues,
we hypothesize for study in that one of the world’s largest MNEs,
France’s Alstom, S.A., is considering an FDI in Israel’s Golan
Heights for one of Alstom’s leading businesses: the manufacture,
installation, and operation of wind-powered generation of
electricity.15 In Part I, this article explores some of the legal risks
MNEs face from FDI-related issues, particularly litigation under
municipal human rights-related laws of various jurisdictions, as
related laws in France and the United States illustrate. 16 Political
risks of Alstom’s hypothesized Golan Heights wind project, and the
availability of insurance against those risks, are also discussed in Part
I. In Parts II and III, we examine the divergent experiences of the
fourth and second largest energy companies in the world—Royal
Dutch Shell and Chevron—as defendants in precedent-changing
litigation under America’s Alien Tort Statute (Shell’s Nigerian FDI)
and under the civil-law legal tradition in Ecuador (Texaco’s FDI in
Ecuador before its Chevron merger). In that discussion, we will
examine two of the most recent developments in attempted FDI
litigation-risk management. We will contrast Royal Dutch Shell’s
(surprisingly) successful defense of ATS litigation that has resulted
in a landmark Supreme Court precedent that will effectuate a major
14

There are, of course, even more detailed ways to express this
paradigm. See, e.g., Conceptual Outline And Checklist Of Foreign Direct
Investment Issues, in DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES & MATERIALS,
446–47 (Aspen 2d ed. 2010).
15
This hypothetical, and the business reasoning behind it, are fully
discussed in Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Politics And Legal Regulation in the
International Business Environment: An FDI Case Study of Alstom, S.A., in
Israel, 21 MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 11–36 (2013).
16
One of the most notable expressions of business community angst is
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING
MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 (Policy Analysis No. 70, Inst.
for Int’l Econ., 2003) (note especially Ch. 1, entitled “Nightmare Scenario”).
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curtailment of ATS suits against MNEs in the U.S. courts, with
Chevron’s unsuccessful initial effort to defeat enforcement of the
huge environmental tort judgment rendered against it by Ecuador’s
Lago Agrio court—and Chevron’s current efforts to defeat
enforcement of that judgment by U.S. federal court litigation against
the Ecuadorian plaintiff’s American lawyer.17

I.

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF LEGAL ISSUES

A. THE ROLE OF LITIGATION RISK IN FDI DECISIONS—WITH A
PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON MUNICIPAL COURTS AND CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IMPLICATIONS
Litigation is a tool of strategic business management, capable of
deployment as a tool by which private parties or organizations use
the municipal courts of various countries to control the activities of
MNEs, including hobbling or even stopping particular FDI projects.
This has certainly proven to be the case with FDIs in the Occupied
Territories of Israel.18 Such litigation is often viewed as a peculiarly
American phenomenon; but other nations and their court systems are
now among the forums hosting such disputes.19
In the following subsections, litigation in municipal courts of
France and the United States arising from MNE activity, including

17

See, e.g., Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal Of Fortune: A Crusading
Lawyer Helped Ecuadorians Secure A Huge Environmental Judgment
Against Chevron. But Did He Go Too Far?, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2012,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/01/09/120109fa_
fact_keefe.
18
See, e.g., Yishai Blank, Legalizing The Barrier: The Legality and
Materiality of the Israel/Palestine Separation Barrier, 46 TEX. INT'L L.J.
309, 311 & n.8 (2011) (analyzing the “legal campaign against” the wall
erected in the Occupied Territories).
19
Indeed, a court in the Netherlands recently exercised what amounts
to universal jurisdiction of the kind sought by foreign plaintiffs in American
court cases. See Dutch Courts Compensate Palestinian For Libya Jail, BBC
NEWS, Mar. 28, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east17537597.
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FDIs, in other nations is examined, and the impact of such lawsuits
on Alstom’s hypothesized FDI in the Golan Heights is assessed.20
1.

ALSTOM’S VULNERABILITY TO SUITS AT HOME OVER ITS FDI IN
ISRAEL

An FDI factor that may not immediately come to mind is
lawsuits in the home state(s) of an MNE. For an MNE that has the
span of Alstom, this translates into legal entanglements in countries
other than the host state. These entanglements portend both prolixity
and costliness. The costs include not only the potential litigation, but
also the difficulties that such lawsuits create for the MNE with
investors and the public at-large, not to mention politicians in the
home states who may seek to use the stage created by litigation
against the MNE to pursue legislative or regulatory investigations.
Alstom’s exposure to such suits is worth considering,
particularly in light of a case brought in France against Alstom for
alleged violations in Alstom’s participation in the Jerusalem Light
Rail Project.21 The Association France Palestine Solidarité (AFPS)
and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) sued Alstom and
Veolia Transport, another contractor working on the Jerusalem Light
Rail Project, in the French Courts, contending that they were
collaborating, in violation of international law, through their work on
building a tramway through the occupied territories in Israel.22 The
papers initiating the legal action in the French Court of Grand
20

For an examination of this hypothesized MNE from the perspective
of possible litigation in Québec Province, Canada, see Van Detta, supra note
15.
21
See, e.g., Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet To Rumsfeld: Universal
Jurisdiction in Europe 1998–2008, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 927, 972 & n.307
(2009). The railway opened in August 2011. See Harriet Sherwood,
Jerusalem’s Long-Awaited Light Railway Splits Opinion, THE GUARDIAN,
Aug. 17, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/17/jerusalemlight-railway-opinion?INTCMP=SRCH.
22
Kaleck, supra note 21, at 972 n.307; see also Aurine Crémieu,
Rubrique
“En
Mouvement”
Israel
et
Territoires
Occupes,
LA CHRONIQUE, Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.amnesty.fr/index.php/amnesty/s_i
nformer/la_chronique/mars_2006_sommaire/israel_et_territoires_occup.
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Instance at Nanterre sought “to cancel the Israeli contract given to
Alstom, which will provide the train carriages, and to Veolia
Transport, the public transport operator.”23 The French appeals court
(cour d’appel) affirmed an interlocutory decision of the Nanterre
court that the courts of France had subject matter jurisdiction over
the claims asserting violation of international law, as well as over the
claims asserted under France’s Civil Code;24 that in and of itself is
quite an important ruling, for it opens the French courts to future
cases filed against Alstom and other MNEs alleging violations (or
complicity in violating) international legal norms.
The litigation before the Nanterre court went on for four years,
and while the court ultimately ruled that “neither the signature of the
concession agreement by these companies and their subsidiaries, nor
the route and operating conditions of the light rail system constituted
a fault under Article 1382 of the French Civil Code,”25 the significant
fact is that the court viewed that it had jurisdiction over the case.26
23
Rory McCarthy & Angelique Chrisafis, PLO Disputes Jerusalem
Rail Plan, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 23, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2007/oct/26/france.israel?INTCMP=SRCH.
24
See French Appeals Court Confirms Jurisdiction over Alstom Case,
BDS MOVEMENT (Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.bdsmovement.net/2009/fr
ench-appeals-court-confirms-jurisdiction-over-alstom-case-617.
25
August & Debouzy Advise Veolia Transport on the Lawsuit Between
Veolia, Alstom and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, AUGUST &
AVOCATES,
http://www.august-debouzy.com/en/495/augustDEBOUZY
debouzy-advise-veolia-transport-lawsuit-between-veolia-alstom-andpalestine-liberation-or (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
26
In March 2013, the Cour d'appel de Versailles affirmed this ruling of
the Nanterre court. See Eugene Kontorovich, Landmark French Ruling on
West Bank Construction and International Law, OPINIO JURIS (May 1, 2013,
10:30 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/05/01/guest-post-landmark-frenchruling-on-west-bank-construction-and-international-law/.
Some scholars
have read the decision—currently available only in its original French—as
holding “that construction of a light rail system in the Israeli-controlled West
Bank by a French company does not violate international law” and “that only
the Government of Israel, and not private parties, can violate the relevant
provisions of the Geneva Convention.” Id. Other commentators read the
decision more narrowly—“as international law orthodoxy a la Oppenheim—
‘states only and exclusively are subjects of international law.’” Id. Among
those commentators, some see the ruling as technical, as well as narrow:
[V]arious French and Israeli companies formed an Israeli
corporation, which won a bid to build the light rail.
There were thus two layers of contracts: the concession
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contract between the State of Israel and the Israeli
corporation (Citypass), and the agreements that existed
between the Israeli corporation and the Israeli and
French companies as shareholders in Citypass. The
action in this case was brought against the French
corporate shareholders. Very importantly, this was NOT
a case of damages alleging the French shareholders’
secondary liability for acts undertaken by Israel. Rather,
this was a case to annul the contracts. Under French law,
a contract can be annulled if its “cause” is illicit.
According to the French court, the primary
prohibition of non-transfer applies to the occupying
power. Thus, even assuming that the cause was illicit, it
could only annul the concession contract between the
State of Israel and the Israeli corporation. The Court
refused to pierce the corporate veil and rule that that the
shareholders
agreements
were
invalid
by
“contamination.”
Thus, this case is interesting for its refusal to pierce
the corporate veil. It does not, however, have any
relevance to the issue of whether natural or legal persons
can be secondarily liable for acts of occupation. Given
that the claim concerned the annulment of contract, the
issue of secondary liability simply wasn’t before the
Court.
Id. In accord, another commentator has observed that the Cour d’appel
“determined that because the State of Israel was not a party to the present
litigation, the Court had to limit itself to the examination of contracts signed
by Alstom itself (the construction contracts) and could not rule on the
legality of the concession contract to which Israel was a party,” and thus the
Cour d’appel “refused to comment on the alleged illicit contractual purpose
(the illegal occupation and ‘colonization’ of the West Bank), imputed to
Israel by the plaintiffs.” Milena Sterio, French Companies May Build in the
West Bank—An Assessment of the Versailles Court of Appeals Case, OPINIO
JURIS (May 8, 2013, 4:39 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/05/08/guest-postfrench-companies-may-build-in-the-west-bank-an-assessment-of-theversailles-court-of-appeals-case/. That commentator also noted that the Cour
d’appel “analyzed the plaintiffs’ argument that, under customary law, multinational corporations should be held liable for violations of human rights,”
and “referred to American Alien Tort Claims Act litigation, and specified
that these cases were not relevant for the purposes of the French case as they
discuss the application of American, domestic law, and because some of
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However, activists against Alstom still celebrated because the
Jerusalem FDI recently claimed that the publicity and debate
generated by their opposition were the cause of a failed Alstom bid to
“build a high-speed railway on the Muslim pilgrim[age] route
between Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia,” a project claimed to be
worth $10 billion.27
2.

ALSTOM’S VULNERABILITY TO INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN COURTS

Alstom’s greatest American litigation is an opaque and longobscure law originating in the Judiciary Act of 1789 that established
the federal court system. The law, now codified and known
colloquially as the “Alien Tort Statute” (ATS), tersely provides that
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”28 The ATS has become a
rallying point for anti-corporate activists seeking a forum for
litigation against MNEs in U.S. federal courts, 29 and a bane of
business organizations, who see the law being used as a stage upon
which activists wage costly and protracted public relations
campaigns against MNEs. These campaigns have created “a new

them have ‘penal’ aspects.” Id. Obviously, more work remains for scholars
seeking to understand the Cour d’appel’s decision within the context of the
French civil-law tradition and present-day legal system.
27
BDS Claims Victory After Alstom Project Derails, MA’AN NEWS
AGENCY (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.maannews.net/eng/viewdetails.asp
x?id=433036. The activists also claim “Alstom suffered blows when a
Swedish pension fund excluded it from its investment portfolio, as did the
Dutch ASN Bank, due to involvement in Israel’s occupation of Palestinian
land.” Id.
28
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (captioned “Alien’s Action for Tort). The
U.S. Supreme Court has consistently appellated the statute “the Alien Tort
Statute,” beginning with Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 436 (1989), and continuing with Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974,
979 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007).
29
Part II: The ATS In The Modern Era—Corporate Accountability For
Aiding And Abetting, THE CENTER FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY,
http://www.cja.org/article.php?id=435 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
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form of political risk” 30 to enterprises such as Alstom’s East
Jerusalem Light-Rail Project, as well as our hypothetical Golan
Heights wind farm project. “As a practical matter, plaintiffs choose
to sue under the ATS to forum shop their way into a U.S. court in
hopes of finding a more favorable forum in which to litigate their
case,”31 even if the litigation serves only to generate publicity.32 For
example, in Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 33 bulldozer sales to Israel
were attacked under the ATS as allegedly aiding and abetting alleged
human rights violations in the Occupied Territories when the
bulldozers were used in constructing and expanding settlements. 34
While the courts ultimately dismissed the complaint against
Caterpillar, they did not find (1) that corporations were inappropriate
ATS defendants; (2) that the FDI of Caterpillar in Israel was outside
of the ATS; or (3) that the ATS is inapplicable to extraterritorial
conduct. Instead, solely because the U.S. government actually paid
for Caterpillar’s sale of equipment to Israel, the federal court
concluded that it could not “intrude into our government's decision to
grant military assistance to Israel, even indirectly by deciding this
challenge to a defense contractor's sales.”35 Corrie, therefore, offers

30

Geoffrey Jones, Multinational Strategies and Developing Countries
in Historical Perspective 34–35 (HARVARD BUS. SCHOOL, Working Paper
No. 10-076, 2010), available at www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/10-076.pdf
(noting that “[t]he Act lay dormant for almost two hundred years, until in
1979 it was used against a Paraguayan police inspector living in the United
States, who was accused of torturing and killing the son of a Paraguayan
dissident in Paraguay,” to win “a $10 million judgment, which was never
paid”).
31
Donald Earl Childress, III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and
the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 723 (2012).
32
Id. at 725; see, e.g., Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d 909 (9th
Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied by a divided court, 676 F.3d 774 (9th Cir.
2011) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), petition
for cert. filed sub nom. DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, 80 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S.
Feb. 06, 2012) (No. 11-965).
33
503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007).
34
Id. at 1023–24.
35
Id. at 983 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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little comfort to Alstom.36 A lawsuit challenging a Golan Heights
wind farm project might well get more traction under the ATS, and
subject Alstom to the considerable transactional costs attendant to
American-style discovery and civil practice, the generation of
negative public opinion and negative opinion among investors and
analysts, and the costs of settlement—which corporate ATS
defendants have incurred in more than a few cases—just to bring the
legal proceedings to a definitive close. 37 Some U.S. courts have
expressed concern that such use of ATS litigation “coerce[s] the
payment of tens of millions of dollars in settlement, even where a
plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits is zero,” and “[c]ourts
should take care that they do not become instruments of abuse and
extortion.”38
Indeed, the objective, it seems, of more than a few ATS suits
filed against MNEs is to reset the context and terms of activism
against the FDIs of those MNEs.39 The effect of the ATS-litigation
36
Indeed, the Corrie family then unsuccessfully sued the state of Israel
in the courts of that country. See, e.g., Harriet Sherwood, Rachel Corrie's
Death Was An Accident, Israeli Judge Rules—Judge Finds No Fault In
Military Investigation That Cleared Defence Force Of Responsibility For
Protester Being Killed By Bulldozer, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 28, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/28/rachelcorrie-verdict-accidentjudge.
37
And, as Professor Childress has noted recently, there have been ATS
cases against corporations that have been tried to plaintiff’s verdicts. See
Childress, supra note 31, at 713 n.25.
38
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.
2011) (Jacobs, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing); accord, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 116 (“Such civil lawsuits,
alleging heinous crimes condemned by customary international law, often
involve a variety of issues unique to ATS litigation, not least the fact that the
events took place abroad and in troubled or chaotic circumstances. The
resulting complexity and uncertainty—combined with the fact that juries
hearing ATS claims are capable of awarding multibillion-dollar verdicts—
has led many defendants to settle ATS claims prior to trial.”) Only a few
ATS cases against corporations have been tried to plaintiff’s verdicts.
Childress, supra note 31, at 713 n.25.
39
Childress, supra note 31, at 725–26 (noting “the signaling value that
is offered when bringing suit against a corporation for alleged violations of
international law” because “no corporation wishes to be known as a humanrights abuser or violator of international law”); see also Julian Ku, D’Amato
Sues Hungarian Railways for Holocaust-Era Complicity, OPINIO JURIS BLOG,
(Feb, 17, 2010, 3:24 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/02/17/damato-sues-
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risk on MNEs—whether U.S.-based40 or foreign-based—is more than
de minimis, and creates considerable problems for the United States,
as well as for the MNEs.41
Thus, the Corrie case does not by any means preclude viable
ATS lawsuits against other corporations, such as Alstom, which are
working on projects sited in the Occupied Territories. 42 To the
contrary, we need to place that case within a context that provides a
perspective from which to assess the litany of claims that plaintiffs
and their lawyers, along with persons and groups who advocate for
human rights and environmental causes, and legal academics, have
imagined in the thirty-three words of the ATS.
Indeed, a
commentator noted, “in the past [twenty] years, there have been 150
[ATS] lawsuits filed against corporations over their activities in
about [sixty] countries.”43 Examining just a small sampling of these
suits shows just how attenuated they are, particularly in comparison
to the increasingly scarce judicial resources available to handle those
cases in either our federal or state courts, both systems overflowing
with burgeoning civil, and constitutionally prioritized criminal,
domestic dockets:

hungarian-railways-for-holocaust-era-complicity/ (with link to the
complaint); cf. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
368 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
40
Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, Commentary, Lex Loci Delictus
and Global Economic Welfare: Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV.
L. REV. 1137, 1137 (2007); see also Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174
F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the place of a foreign tort, not a
U.S. courtroom, “is the place that has the greatest interest in striking a
reasonable balance among safety, cost, and other factors pertinent to the
design and administration of a system of tort law”).
41
Kiobel, 642 F.3d at 270.
42
See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, No.
11-649, 2013 WL 1704704 (Apr. 22, 2013).
43
Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court May Consider Whether
Companies Can Be Sued Over Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/08/11/11greenwire-supreme-courtmay-consider-whether-companies-c-23629.html.
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(1) Burmese villagers sued over various human
rights violations arising from the construction of
the Yadana gas pipeline project in Myanmar;44
(2) Nigerian domiciliaries sued over events that
occurred on a Chevron offshore drilling platform in
1998, when Nigerian soldiers suppressed a protest
against Chevron's environmental and business
practices;45
(3) Nigerian relatives of poet and activist Ken
Wiwa sued Royal Dutch Petroleum over his arrest,
prosecution, show trial, and execution in the wake
of his opposition to Shell’s oil exploration
activities in the Niger Delta;46
(4) Sudanese citizens’ made allegations against a
Canadian oil company concerning its purported
assistance to the government in Sudan in the forced
movement of civilians residing near oil facilities;47
(5) Papua New Guinea residents sued an AngloAustralian mining conglomerate over a 1988 revolt
on the island of Bougainville in which Rio Tinto
allegedly provided helicopters and vehicles to the

44
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (denying
motion to dismiss ATS claims against Unocal), aff’d in part & rev’d in part,
395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir.
2003), appeal dismissed upon settlement, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005),
vacating, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (which had granted
summary judgment to Unocal on plaintiffs’ ATS and RICO claims).
45
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming
defense judgment upon jury verdict finding no liability on ATS and other
claims). Bowoto is the rare instance of an ATS case making it to trial.
46
See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.
2000). Wiwa is notable for almost making it to trial; the lawyers settled the
case on the eve of a jury trial in the Southern District of New York. See Jad
Mouawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 2009, at B1; Jad Mouawad, Oil Industry Braces for Trial on Rights
Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2009, at B1.
47
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d
244 (2d Cir. 2009).
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Government, which is alleged to have killed 15,000
people;48
(6) Peruvian residents and representatives of
deceased residents sued an American mining
company alleging that pollution from mining
company's Peruvian operations had caused severe
lung disease;49
(7) Columbian citizens, the family members of
trade unionists, banana-plantation workers,
political organizers, social activists, and others
tortured and killed by paramilitary organizations
operating in Colombia, sued an American MNE for
made-payments
to
Colombian
terrorist
organization in exchange for protection of workers,
thereby providing the terrorist organization with
weapons, ammunition, and other supplies;50
(8) Relatives of alleged victims of extrajudicial
killings in Sri Lanka brought action against sitting
President of Sri Lanka;51
(9) Victims and families of victims of terrorist
attacks committed in Israel sued a Jordanian bank
for allegedly providing financial services to
terrorist organizations;52
(10) Mexican citizens sued MNEs over workplace
safety violations arising from methane explosion at

48
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, No. 11649, 2013 WL 1704704 (Apr. 22, 2013).
49
Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003).
50
In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute and Shareholder
Derivative Litigation, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
51
Manoharan v. Rajapaksa, 711 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Although
brought under TVPA, rather than ATS, the allegations here are like those
brought in ATS cases involving sitting members of foreign governments.
52
Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 706 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013).
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Pasta de Conchos mine in the State of Coahuila,
Mexico;53
(11) Holocaust survivors and heirs of other
Holocaust victims sued banks alleging that the
banks participated in expropriating property from
Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust;54
(12) Holocaust survivors and heirs of other
Holocaust victims sued Hungarian National
Railways alleging that Railways participated in
expropriating property from Hungarian Jews
during the Holocaust;55
(13) Widows of former Presidents of Rwanda and
Burundi, who were killed during their presidencies
when surface-to-air missiles brought down aircraft
carrying them over Rwandan capital, sued the
President of Rwanda, seeking to hold him liable;56
(14) Columbian
citizens
sued
Coca-Cola
Corporation alleging Coca-Cola bottlers in
Colombia
collaborated
with
Colombian
paramilitary forces in "the systematic intimidation,
kidnapping, detention, torture, and murder of
Colombian trade unionists";57
(15) Allegations by family, formerly citizens of
Egypt and now emigrated to Canada, that CocaCola had been making millions of dollars annually
in profits by exploiting, through "Coca-Cola
Egypt," property that Coca-Cola had, before 1965,
leased from the Bigio family, at which time the
property was confiscated by the Egyptian
government in Nasser's anti-Jewish program of
53

Diaz v. Grupo Mexico Inc., 487 Fed. Appx. 366 (9th Cir. 2012); see
also Brief of Appellants, Diaz v. Grupo Mexico Inc., 487 Fed. Appx. 366
(9th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-15848), 2011 WL 3019825.
54
Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2012).
55
Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2012).
56
Habyarimana v. Kagame, 696 F.3d 1029 (10th Cir. 2012).
57
Sinaltrainal v. Coca–Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009),
abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S.Ct.
1702, 1706 & n.2 (2012).

2013]

SOME LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EU-BASED
MNES CONTEMPLATING HIGH-RISK FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENTS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR AFTER KIOBEL
V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM AND CHEVRON
CORPORATION V. NARANJO

177

religious persecution, used by a government-owned
company called ENBC that purportedly leased it
from a government-owned insurance company,
and, in 1994, placed under Coca-Cola’s control
when Coca-Cola purchased a substantial interest in
ENBC and promptly renamed it, "Coca-Cola
Egypt";58
(16) Citizens of South Africa sued multinational
corporations that purportedly collaborated with the
government of South Africa in maintaining
apartheid, including claims filed against the three
automakers—Daimler, Ford, and GM—alleging
that they aided the apartheid regime by selling
armored military vehicles that the Apartheid
government used to violently suppress and
terrorize South Africa’s black population.
Furthermore, the citizens claim that the
corporations collaborated with South African
security forces, providing information that was
used to facilitate arrests, harassment, and torture of
employees who were active in the struggle against
apartheid and claim that IBM provided the
Apartheid government with the equipment to
generate race-based identity documents that
stripped black South Africans of their nationality
and citizenship;59
(17) Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia
Tymoshenko and political allies sued a Swiss
corporation which allegedly—as retribution for
Tymoshenko’s eliminating the corporation from
the Ukrainian natural gas trade—paid illegal
kickbacks to the Yanukovich government in
Ukraine to file criminal charges against
58

Bigio v. Coca–Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Bigio
v. Coca–Cola Co., 448 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2006); Bigio v. Coca–Cola Co., 675
F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2012).
59
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
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Tymoshenko and other former government
officials, to subject her to a politically-motivated
“show trial” in Ukraine, and to incarcerate her in
Ukraine since August 2011;60
(18) A Chinese dissent sued the Communist Party
of China, People's Republic of China, and
individual Chinese officials, claiming injury “with
regard to the Tiananmen Square massacre,
Defendants' policies towards overseas dissidents, . .
. the alleged repressions of Wang Bingzhang and
Yang Gianli,” the “abridgement of his ‘free
association’ right with Wang, who is imprisoned,”
and “allegations of harassment, violation of his
free-speech rights, and interference with his family
relationships.”61
Commentators have expressed even more ambitious plans for
using the ATS in ways that are even further afield—as the basis for
internationalizing environmental law; 62 as a basis for transnational

60

Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11–CV–2794 (KMW), 2013 WL
1234943 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2013); see also Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11–
CV–2794 (KMW), 2013 WL 1234821 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013);
Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., 588 F. Supp. 2d 375
(E.D.N.Y. 2008). In Chowdhury, the individual plaintiff and his corporate
employer, and its corporate shareholder, all citizens of Bangladesh, allege
that the defendants—a Mauritius corporation and an individual U.S. citizen
“with a role in [the Mauritius corporation] that he has variously described as
chairman of the board, owner, or representative”—“to gain an advantage in a
business dispute between the parties, made a false complaint of criminal
conduct by plaintiffs to the Bangladeshi police,” as a result of which the
individual plaintiff was arrested, incarcerated, and tortured by Bangladeshi
police authorities in Bangladesh. Id. at 377–78.
61
Yaodi Hu v. Communist Party of China, No. 1:12–CV–1213, 2013
WL 634719 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 20, 2013), adopting report &
recommendation of magistrate judge reported at 2012 WL 7160373 (W.D.
Mich. Nov. 20, 2012).
62
See Sarah M. Morris, The Intersection of Equal and Environmental
Protection: A New Direction for Environmental Alien Tort Claims after
Sarei and Sosa, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275, 275 (2009); Xiuli Han,
ATCA As An Avenue Of Overseas Environmental Protection And Its
Implication To China’s Overseas Investors, 6(2) FRONTIERS OF LAW IN
CHINA 219 (June 2011).
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product liability law; 63 as a means of creating a transnational civil
cause of action that parallels the criminal sanction of the Foreign
Corrupt Practice Act; 64 as a vehicle for bringing claims against
religious institutions (such as the Roman Catholic Church by persons
claiming to be aggrieved by sacerdotal sexual abuse allegedly
tolerated by the Church) 65 or against secular institutions over
religious issues66 (such as claims by Guantanamo detainees that they
have been subjected to religious harassment while in custody);67 as a
platform for child-soldiers in foreign conflicts to sue arms
manufacturers, 68 for Korean and other Asian women forced into
sexual slavery by the occupying Japanese Imperial Army during
World War II, 69 for foreign workers in “sweatshops” located in
foreign countries,70 and for Iraqis to sue the U.S. government and
private contractors in Iraq for denying “Iraqis the same freedom of

63

See Joel Slawotsky, International Product Liability Claims under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 157 (2007); Joel
Slawotsky, Liability For Defective Chinese Products Under The Alien Tort
Claims Act, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 519 (2008).
64
Matt A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether
Transnational Corporations Are Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the Alien
Tort Statute, 31MICH. J. INT’L L. 385 (2010).
65
Rodriguez v. Mahony, No. CV 10–02902–JST (JEMx), 2012 WL
1057428 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).
66
See, e.g., Chad G. Marzen, Religion and the Alien Tort Statute, 1
CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L.J. 55 (2011).
67
See Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
68
See Nancy Morisseau, Note, Seen But Not Heard: Child Soldiers
Suing Gun Manufacturers Under The Alien Tort Claims Act, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1263 (2004).
69
See Susan Jenkins Vanderweert, Comment, Seeking Justice For
“Comfort” Women: Without An International Criminal Court, Suits Brought
By World War II Sex Slaves Of The Japanese Army May Find Their Best
Hope Of Success In U.S. Federal Courts, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
141 (2001).
70
See Debra Cohen Maryanov, Note & Comment, Sweatshop Liability:
Corporate Codes Of Conduct And The Governance Of Labor Standards In
The International Supply Chain, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 397 (2010).
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the press that their American counterparts enjoy;” 71 as a tool for
addressing “egregious international corporate fraud,” 72 “financial
crime,”73 and violations of “labor rights;”74 as a vehicle for claims of
harm from air pollution,75 global warming,76 and rising sea levels;77
and as a platform to assert claims against the U.S. Navy and U.S.
government for alleged sonar-caused harm to whales and other sea
mammals.78

71

Brenner A. Allen, Comment, A Cause Of Action Against Private
Contractors And The U.S. Government For Freedom Of Speech Violations In
Iraq, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 535, 536–37, 559–73 (2005).
72
See Joel Slawotsky, The New Global Financial Landscape: Why
Egregious International Corporate Fraud Should Be Cognizable under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 131 (2006); see also
Joel Slawotsky. Are Financial Institutions Liable For Financial Crime
Under The Alien Tort Statute? (2013), ExpressO, [hereinafter Are Financial
Institutions Liable?], available at http://works.bepress.com/joel_slawotsky/1
(article currently unavailable for download).
73
See Are Financial Institutions Liable?, supra note 72.
74
See Wesley V. Carrington, Note, Corporate Liability for Violations
of Labor Rights under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1381
(2009); Grace C. Spencer, Her Body Is a Battlefield: The Applicability of the
Alien Tort Statute to Corporate Human Rights Abuses in Juarez, Mexico, 40
GONZ. L. REV. 503 (2004–2005); Sarah J. Adams Lien, Employer Beware?
Enforcing Transnational Labor Standards In The United States Under The
Alien Tort Claims Act, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 311 (2002).
75
See Ajmel Quereshi, The Search For An Environmental Filartiga:
Trans-Boundary Harm And The Future Of International Environmental
Litigation, 56 HOW. L.J. 131, 157–63 (2012).
76
See Mini Kaur, Global Warming Litigation Under The Alien Tort
Claims Act: What Sosa v. Alvarez Machain And Its Progeny Mean For
Indigenous Arctic Communities, 13 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.
155 (2006).
77
See RoseMary Reed, Rising Seas and Disappearing Islands: Can
Island Inhabitants Seek Redress Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 11 PAC.
RIM L. & POL'Y J. 399, 427 (2002); Jon M. Van Dyke et al., Whales,
Submarines, and Active Sonar, 18 OCEAN YEARBOOK 330, 359–63 (2004),
available at www.mmc.gov/sound/internationalwrkshp/pdf/vandykeetal.pdf
(suggesting the plausibility of Alien Tort Statute claims for harming marine
mammals with active sonar).
78
See Daniel Inkelas, Security, Sound, And Cetaceans: Legal
Challenges To Low Frequency Active Sonar Under U.S. and International
Environmental Law, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 207, 247 n.254 (2005);
Van Dyke et al., supra note 77.
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In the face of such cases that do not come close even to
satisfying “six degrees of Kevin Bacon,” it is no small irony that in
cases where individual aliens within U.S. territory claimed that statelevel officials committed torts against them by detaining them
without being informed of the requirement of consular notification
and access under Article 36(1)(b)(3) of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, the federal courts have rejected those claims—
which would seem at the historic core of the ATS, on the grounds the
norm at issue—one that prohibits the detention of a foreign national
with informing them of rights to consular notice and access—was
insufficiently universal to support a claim under the ATS.79
However, as discussed below, the U.S. Supreme Court in April
2013 issued its second major ATS decision, and one that will have a
very substantial impact on the assessment of future litigation risks
arising from ATS litigation. We examine that decision, and assess
the new risk landscape in Part III, infra.
B. LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE POLITICAL RISK INHERENT IN ALSTOM’S
CHOICE OF A GOLAN HEIGHTS FDI
1.

SYRIA’S CLAIMS TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

The politics of the Golan Heights creates practical legal
problems that Alstom cannot ignore. Israel wrestled the Golan
Heights territory from Syria in the course of 1967’s Six-Day War.80
After the subsequent, and brief, 1973 conflict between Syria and
Israel and a 1974 “disengagement agreement,” or cease-fire, the
Golan Heights (except 100 square kilometers ceded back in 1974)
remained in a legal limbo but a practical stasis.81 The Golan Heights
Law, enacted by Israel’s Parliament in 1981, changed that status by
applying Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to the Golan
79

See, e.g., Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008); Karboau
v. City of Portland, 498 Fed. Appx. 747, (9th Cir. 2012).
80
Preface to On The Legal Status Of The Golan Heights: Application
Of Israeli Law Or Annexation?, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 331 (1994).
81
See Muhammad Muslih, The Golan: Israel, Syria, and Strategic
Calculations, 47 MIDDLE EAST J. 611, 621, 625–27 (1993).
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Heights, which Syria complained to the U.N. Security Council
constituted annexation in violation of international law, and the U.N.
Security Council and General Assembly rebuked. 82 However, the
actions and reactions at that point were more symbolic than
substantive, and a new stasis emerged.83
Since the early 1980s, the dispute over Israel’s development of
the Golan Heights has not been as “hot” as the disputes over the
development of Jerusalem and the West Bank. Syria did not concede
its claims, and remained concerned about the commanding vista the
Heights have over Damascus; Israel did not budge on its insistence
that the return of any portion of the Golan Heights must be met by
Syrian recognition of Israel and accession to Israeli-security
demands. 84 During stirrings of a possible land-for-peace-andrecognition deal in the early 1990s, the United States attempted to
facilitate dialogue between Hafez al-Assad (Syria’s President 1971–
2000), and Yitzhak Rabin (Israel’s Prime Minister 1992–1995). 85
However, now that the “Arab Spring,” which swept from Libya to
Egypt, created civil war in Syria, 86 the stasis that has remained in
effect since 1973 is entering uncharted territory. It is difficult to
predict whether—and if so, to what degree—the post-Assad Syria
that emerges from the current civil war will be a military threat to
Israel or to its occupation of the Golan Heights.87
While the Druze populace left behind in the Golan Heights
under the authority of Israel largely continues to identify with both

82

Id. at 624; see also Asher Maoz, The Application of Israeli Law to
the Golan Heights is Annexation, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 355, 386–88 (1994);
Leon Sheleff, The Application of Israeli Law to the Golan Heights is not
Annexation, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 333 (1994).
83
See, e.g., Sheleff, supra note 82 at 337–38.
84
See Muslih, supra note 81; Maoz, supra note 82; Sheleff, supra note
82.
85
See Muslih, supra note 81; Maoz, supra note 82; Sheleff, supra note
82; see also Clyde Haberman, Rabin Hints Peace Could Cost Golan, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/22/world/rabinhints-peace-could-cost-golan.html.
86
Towards The Endgame: The World Should Start Preparing For What
Comes After Syria’s President Bashar Assad, THE ECONOMIST, July 21,
2012, at 9.
87
Isabel Kershner, Buqata Journal: Echoes of Syria’s War In The
Golan Heights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2012, at A6.
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Syria and the Assad family,88 how they will react to these changes in
the long run is unclear, because pronounced divisions have arisen
within the Druze community. 89 Viewing the situation more
holistically, it remains equally unclear whether a breakdown in the
Assad autocracy will result in problems of sabotage, terrorism, and
other destabilization along the buffer that the Golan Heights provides
between Syria and Israel.90 These worries include the possibility of
fleeing Syrian refugees trying to enter the Golan Heights, and
Assad's missile and chemical weapons arsenal falling into the wrong
hands.91
While Israel has made it plain that it does not want to ignite a
regional war by unilateral intervention, and that it prefers coordinated
international action, the Israeli government has not sought to secret
the fact that it has contingency plans for military strikes against
Syria’s chemical weapons storehouses and military convoys
suspected of transporting chemical weapons from those
storehouses. 92 Though the Golan Heights is quiet today—and the
blades of wind-turbines may turn unimpeded in the winds of the
Heights—the situation in Syria grows more volatile with each
passing day, and the risk to people and property in the Golan
Heights, as in other border areas with Syria, grows proportionately. 93
Even if the conflict is contained and the fears of terrorist or
88
Golan Druse start to turn against Syria's Assad, FOX NEWS (Jul. 28,
2012), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/07/28/golan-druse-start-to-turnagainst-syria-assad/.
89
Id.; see also Kershner, supra note 87, at A6; David Greenfield, Will
Assad’s Fall Secure Israel’s Golan Heights?, FRONTPAGE MAG, Oct. 6,
2012, http://frontpagemag.com/2012/dgreenfield/will-assads-fall-secure-isr
aels-golan-heights/.
90
Yolande Knell, Syria crisis felt in Israel and occupied Golan
Heights, BBC NEWS—MIDDLE EAST, Aug. 2, 2012, http://www.bbc.c
o.uk/news/world-middle-east-19017502.
91
See id. (describing Israeli concerns as of August 2012).
92
Id. For an excellent, regularly updated summary on the events in
Syria surrounding the end of the Assad regime and the
escalation of an internal civil war, see Times Topics: Bashar al-Assad, http://
topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people /a/bashar_al_assad/Ind
ex.html.
93
See Times Topics, supra note 92.
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insurrectionist infiltration along with the nightmares of chemical and
biological weapons falling into their hands are abated, MNEs with
the kinds of FDIs in the Golan Heights as Alstom is considering in
our hypothetical FDI problem still must worry about the status of the
investment in the wake of a new government that may, once it is on
its feet, take up the return of the Golan Heights as a central theme.94
If the Golan Heights were turned over to a future Syrian
government, the question for Alstom might well become whether
their FDIs in the Heights—such as the wind-turbine farm that is the
hypothesis of this article—will remain in the MNEs’ possession and
control, or whether the entire investment would be expropriated.
In addition, Alstom’s ties to the United States in our hypothetical
FDI might prove to be disadvantageous if the Golan Heights were to
revert to Syrian control, even in the absence of an expropriation.
Because the U.S. government designated Syria as a state sponsor of
terrorism, Syria has been subject to the U.S. Department of
Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for over
thirty years. 95 U.S. businesses find that FDIs in Syria are
impracticable, due to the EAR prohibitions on the export of almost
all U.S. products to Syria, and due to other restrictions, such as the
Grassley Amendment’s prohibitions on taking tax credits for taxes
paid in Syria and the Syria Accountability Act (SAA) of 2004’s
authorization of the President to prohibit, under authority of the
SAA, all U.S. business and investment activity in Syria at any time.96
As serious as the risks from Syrian civil war and an
unpredictable aftermath may be, 97 another shadow looms over a
wind-power FDI in Israel: the palpable potential for an armed
94

See, e.g., Fred Kaplan, The Syrian Endgame: There Are No
Guarantees. But In Almost Every Scenario, The Violence Will
Persist, SLATE, July 20, 2012, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politi
cs/war_stories/2012/07/whether_bashar_al_assad_falls_or_not_the_fighting_
in_syria_is_likely_to_persist_for_a_long_time_.html.
95
U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State,
Doing business in Syria: 2010 country commercial guide for U.S.
companies, Chapter 6, § 1, Investment Climate—Openness To Foreign
Investment, p. 26., available at http://photos.state.gov/libraries/syria/32
8666/trade_commerce/ccg-syria-2010.pdf.
96
Id.
97
See, e.g., David D. Kilpatrick, Egyptian President Warns Assad That
“Your Time Won’t Be Long”, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, at A1.
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conflict involving Israel and Iran. This set of risks is discussed in the
next section, along with the ameliorative impact of political-risk
insurance.
2.

THE IMPACT OF AN ISRAEL–IRAN ARMED CONFLICT ON FDI IN
ISRAEL—AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE

Any FDI in Israel—not just in the volatile Occupied
Territories—carries with it a particular set of risks created by an arms
race between Israel and Iran in the midst of what has been called “an
Arab Cold War.”98 While Iran was the second Middle-Eastern nation
to recognize Israel in the 1950s and maintained cooperative relations
during the reign of Reza Pahlavi99 since 1979, Iran has been in a state
of total hostility toward an Israel that Iran no longer recognizes and
Iranian leaders have repeatedly vowed to destroy. 100 Such threats
assumed a new urgency when it became clear that the production of
nuclear fuel in Iran had proceeded to the point where uranium could
be enriched to “weapons-grade” levels, 101 and, concomitantly, that

98
Curtis Ryan, The New Arab Cold War And The Struggle For Syria,
42 MIDDLE E. REP. (Spring 2012), available at http://www.merip.org
/mer/mer262.
99
See SOHRAB SOBHANI, THE PRAGMATIC ENTENTE: ISRAELI–IRANIAN
RELATIONS, 1948–1988, at 4–8
(Praeger Publishers 1989).
100
Quinton Cannon Farrar, U.S. Energy Sanctions And The Race To
Prevent Iran From Acquiring Weapons Of Mass Destruction, 79 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2347, 2350–51 & n.18–23 (2011).
101
Id.; see, e.g., David E. Sanger, Harder Push To Stop Iran from
Making Nuclear Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2010, at A6; Cody Coombs,
Blue Morning-Glories In The Sky: Correcting Sanctions To Enforce Nuclear
Nonproliferation In Iran, 19 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 419 (2009); Press
Release, IAEA Statement After Iran Meeting (June 8, 2012), available at
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2012/prn201216.html
(statement by IAEA Deputy Director General Herman Nackaerts); Mehrzad
Boroujerdi & Todd Fine, Symposium, A Nuclear Iran: The Legal
Implications of a Preemptive National Security Strategy, 57 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 619, 628 (2007) (arguing that “the course of the nuclear crisis does not
necessarily indicate that Iran is inherently untrustworthy” but rather “is
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the Iranian military had successfully tested missiles that might be
used to deliver a nuclear payload to Israel and other nations. Most
alarming to an MNE considering any new FDI in Israel—previous
suggestions102 of a “pre-emptive” military strike of some sort have
resurfaced103—includes public statements by Israel’s Prime Minister
and Defense Minster that Israel is prepared to take unilateral military
action to thwart Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons.104
The implications of armed conflict for FDIs in a conflict zone
are obviously not propitious. Perhaps that is why there appears to be
no studies published in English exploring the impact of an Israel–Iran
conflict on FDI in Israel.105 However, recent studies have focused on
the negative impact the present conflicts and regional instability are
having on foreign FDI in Middle Eastern nations.106 The impact of

attempting to achieve what it can within the rules of a game that is stacked
against it”).
102
See, e.g., Gregory Koblentz, Coercive Nonproliferation: Israel's
Use of Coercive Diplomacy to Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, AM . P OLITICAL S CI. ASS’ N (2011), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1900518.
103
See David Isenberg, Israeli Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Easier Said than Done, ASIA TIMES, Feb. 15, 2012, available at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/NB16Ak01.html.
104
See, e.g., Matthew Kroenig, Essay, Time to Attack Iran: Why a
Strike is the Least Bad Option, 91 F OREIGN AFF. 78 (2012). But see Colin
H. Kahl, Essay, Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should Be a Last Resort,
91 F OREIGN AFF. 16 (2012).
105
There have been recent studies, however, of the economic
consequences of the “cold war” between Iran, Israel, and other Middle
Eastern nations. See Mohammed Nuruzzaman, Conflicts Between Iran and
the Gulf Arab States: An Economic Evaluation, 36 S TRATEGIC AFF. 542
(2012); Ariel Cohen & Kevin DeCorla-Souza, Eurasian Energy and Israel’s
Choices, 88 BAR -I LAN U.: MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUD. 1, 32–34
(2011) (observing that “[s]urrounded by unfriendly and unreliable neighbors,
Israel is an energy island,” and suggesting strategy for maintaining viability
of energy infrastructures “to help Israel navigate . . . constantly shifting
politics and security” issues). The general media have only recently started
to run features considering the impact of an Israel–Iran armed conflict on the
economy of Israel. See, e.g., Jean-Luc Renaudie, Is Israeli Economy Under
Threat in Case of Iran War?, MIDDLE E. ONLINE (Israel), Aug. 16, 2012,
available at http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=53931.
106
Wesam Sedik & Hussien Seoudy, The Impact of Country Risk and
New Institutional Economics on Foreign Direct Investment: A Panel Data
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open warfare would be almost unimaginably devastating, especially
to energy infrastructure targets such as windmill farms, solar energy
arrays, and conventional power plants.107 Various armed conflicts in
the Middle East, Asia, and Africa over the last fifty years have
demonstrated the extent of devastation to populations, as well as
FDIs, that can occur when armed conflict destroys energy
infrastructures.108
Some investment advisors have warned investors to “probably
think twice before investing in the Israeli economy until the rhetoric
between Israel and Iran cools.”109 Israeli press coverage has included
socio-economists who warn that the cost of war would be massive
and that the damage from an Iranian counterstrike inestimable, versus
those who contend that “credit default swaps on Israeli bonds—‘a
classic measurement of the risk the market assigns to a state’—have
not risen,” that “the possibility of Israel attacking Iran does not affect
Analysis for Middle East and North Africa Region (1999–2010), 16 INT’ L
S OC ’Y FOR NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 1 (2012).
107
Alexander E. Farrell et al., Energy Infrastructure And Security, 29
ANN. REV. ENV’T & R ESOURCES 421 (2004); Karen Smith Stegen et al.,
Terrorists Versus the Sun: Desertec in North Africa as a Case Study for
Assessing Risks to Energy Infrastructure, 14 RISK M GMT. 3 (2012); Ali
Khajavi, Op-Ed., A Realistic Outlook for Iraq’s Oil Production in 2030,
M IDDLE E. ECON. S URV. (July 3, 2012), available at http://www.mees
.com/en/articles/1874-a-realistic-outlok-for-iraqs-oil-production-in-2030
(detailing damage to Iraq’s energy infrastructure in the wake of Desert Storm
II); see also Brett van Niekerk & Manoj S. Maharaj, Relevance Of
Information Warfare Models To Critical Infrastructure Protection, [39 No.
2] SCIENTIA MILITARIA: S. AFR. J. MILITARY STUD. 99 (2012); Jennifer
Giroux & Caroline Hilpert, The Relationship Between Energy Infrastructure
Attacksand Crude Oil Prices, J. ENERGY S ECURITY, Oct. 2009, available at
http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=216
:the-relationship-between-energy-infrastructure-attacks-and-crude-oilprices&catid=100:issuecontent& Itemid=352.
108
Jenny Sin-hang Ngai, Energy as a Human Right in Armed Conflict:
A Question or Universal Need, Survival, and Human Dignity, 37 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 579 (2011–2012).
109
Sean Geary, How Conflict with Iran Would Affect the Israeli
Economy, EMERGING M ONEY (Aug. 16, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://em
ergingmoney.com/technology/iran-israeli-economy-eis-teva-mlnx/.
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whether foreigners invest in the country,” and that “a brief,
successful Israeli strike could benefit the local economy.” 110
Whether Alstom would—or should—share such a sanguine view is a
difficult question to answer without a good deal more reliable
data.111
However, part of any answer that involves an Alstom FDI in
Israel needs to include the availability of insurance protection against
the risk of losses on a wind-energy FDI in the event of an Israeli–
Iranian armed conflict.112 Indeed, it has aptly been observed that “[a]
company's ability to procure PRI is often crucial to its continuing
investment in developing countries.”113 Private-market insurance for
war and other force majeure kinds of investment risks exist, but may
be prohibitively expensive.114 As one commentator observed when
surveying the availability of private sector political risk insurance in
1996, “[t]he private insurance industry has been called a boutique
provider of specialized political risk products as opposed to the more
substantial and uniform government programs” because, for
110

Moti Bassok & Hagai Amit, Lengthy Iran Conflict Likely to Cost
Israeli Economy Billions of Shekels: Former Finance Ministry Director
General Says Nuclear Iran Involves Considerable Economic Cost to Israel,
Adds that War with Iran Would Be Much More Expensive than Second
Lebanon War, HAARETZ (Aug. 14, 2012, 4:59 AM), http://www.haaretz.c
om/business/lengthy-iran-conflict-likely-to-cost-israeli-economy-billions-ofshekels-1.458060.
111
Despite persistent tensions, there have been some hopeful signs for
peace rather than war. See David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, To Calm Israel,
U.S. Offers Ways To Restrain Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2012, at A1.
However, the volatility of the region keeps predictions on day-to-day
tenterhooks. See, e,g., Anne Barnard, Michael R. Gordon & Jodi Rudoren,
Israel Targeted Iranian Missiles in Syria Attack, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2013,
at A1; David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Iran Is Seen Advancing Nuclear
Bid, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2013, at A10.
112
See Erik J. Woodhouse, The Obsolescing Bargain Redux? Foreign
Investment in the Electric Power Sector in Developing Countries, 38 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 121 (2006) (discussing the kinds of risks inherent to
energy FDIs and strategies that have been developed to address those risks).
113
Jennifer M. DeLeonardo, Note, Are Public And Private Political
Risk Insurance Two Of A Kind? Suggestions for a New Direction for
Government Coverage, 45 V A. J. INT’ L L. 737, 739 (2005).
114
See Maura B. Perry, A Model for Efficient Foreign Aid: The Case
for the Political Risk Insurance Activities of the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, 36 V A. J. INT’ L L. 511, 545–46 (1996) (discussing the
daunting challenges facing private-market FDI insurers).

2013]

SOME LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EU-BASED
MNES CONTEMPLATING HIGH-RISK FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENTS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR AFTER KIOBEL
V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM AND CHEVRON
CORPORATION V. NARANJO

189

example, they “individually apprais[e] risks on a commercial basis,
which is subject to supply and demand considerations as well as
particular risk characteristics” instead of using “standardized rating
schedules”; thus, the private sector “has never been a particularly
robust or stable source of political insurance.”115 That is not to say,
however, that there is any shortage of insurers and insurance
syndicates who offer some form of political risk coverage; but it is
not always easy to estimate what kinds of coverage limits and
premiums will attend to a political risk insurance issued in the private
sector.116 Indeed, when the “Arab Spring” came to Egypt in 2011,
premiums for political risk insurance for projects in Egypt quickly
rose 12%–15%.117
For American businesses, the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) has provided insurance of FDI in countries
specifically listed by Congress in the acts authorizing OPIC as “an
insurer ‘of last resort’” rather than a competitor of private finance
and political risk insurance. 118 While OPIC insurance has
115

Id. at 536.
See, e.g., Lijana Baublyte et al., Risk Selection in the London
Political Risk Insurance Market: The Role of Tacit Knowledge, Trust and
Heuristics, [15 No. 9] J. RISK RES. 1101, 1101 (2012) (demonstrating that
“the basis of decision-making and risk selection in the London Political Risk
Insurance (PRI) market is a combination of Art and Science with such factors
as trust and reputation playing an important role . . . . and examining
different methods and strategies of political risk underwriting employed in
the insurance market, which does not rely on statistical tools as seen in more
traditional insurance types”); Lloyd’s Risk Locator: Political Risks
http://www.lloyds.com/Redirect-pages/Risk_loc
Insurance,
LLOYD’S,
ator/Political_risks_insurance (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) (discussing
differences in location of risk, and thus ranges of premiums, for “political
risks insurance,” including “trade-related cover”; “other asset cover”;
“insurance of assets against political violence”; and “global contract”).
117
Cyril Tuohy, Egypt Causes Price Spike for Political Risk Insurance:
Expert Sees a "Pause" in the Marketplace for Political Risk Insurance as
Carriers Scramble to Reassess Middle East Exposures, RISK & INS. (Feb. 7,
2011), http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=533329908.
118
Perry, supra note 114, at 514; see Pablo M. Zylberglait, Note,
OPIC's Investment Insurance: The Platypus of Governmental Programs and
Its Jurisprudence, 25 LAW & P OL’Y INT’ L B US. 359 (1993).
116
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traditionally provided ten times the coverage limits for nearly seven
times the policy duration limits for a wider range of risks than
political risk insurance offered in the private insurance markets, 119
eligibility is limited to insureds having a substantial nexus to the
United States and essentially under American control. 120 Since
neither Alstom nor its American subsidiary meets these definitions,
121
OPIC cannot insure a Golan Heights FDI, despite the substantial
involvement of Alstom’s Texas-based nacelle production facility in
such an undertaking. However, Alstom has at least two other sources
of government-backed FDI political risk insurance programs offered
through the World Bank and its home state, France.
Indeed, it is precisely because many “national insurance
programs”—such as OPIC—“due to their respective national
objectives, often contain strict eligibility requirements that exclude
many investors and investments” 122 that the World Bank Group

119

Perry, supra note 114, at 534–36; Ashton B. Inniss, Note,
Rethinking Political Risk Insurance: Incentives for Investor Risk Mitigation,
16 S W. J. INT’ L L. 477, 488–90 (2010).
120
Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephen Kinsella, Reducing Political Risk in
Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilization Clauses,
and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance, 15 N.Y.L. S CH. J. INT’ L &
COMP. L. 1, 36 (1994).
121
See, e.g., Kathryn Gordon, Investment Guarantees and Political
Risk Insurance: Institutions, Incentives, and Development 8 (Org. Econ. Cooperation & Dev.: Investment Division, Working Paper No. 1, 2009) (noting
that only “[s]even PRI providers offer coverage for foreign corporations with
domestic presence (Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Turkey
and the United Kingdom)”), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so
l3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1718484. The Amarillo, Texas Alstom facility is
owned by an entity loosely referred to as “Alstom Wind, North America”
(AWNA)
(http://www.ryancompanies.com/projects/Alstom-Wind-NorthAmerica/), but which appears to in fact be a limited-liability corporation
called Alstom Wind Texas LLC, which is a Delaware corporation
headquartered in Connecticut. Alstom’s Amarillo facility is one of thirtyseven it maintains in the U.S., divided among Grid, Transport, Power, and
Corporate Headquarters segments of Alstom’s businesses, which employ
“10,000 employees in locations that span 47 states and the District of
Columbia.” U.S. Locations, ALSTOM , http://www.alstom.com/us/locations/
(last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
122
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE MINERAL LAW AND POLICY:
TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 325 (Elizabeth Bastida et al. eds., 2005).
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created the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),123 an
international financial institution offering political risk insurance
guarantees for FDIs in developing countries,124 to “overcom[e] some
of these shortcomings and hel[p] to fill the gaps.”125 MIGA political
risk insurance is structured and operated similarly to OPIC political
risk insurance; however, MIGA operates with a number of broad
policy objectives beyond those that animate OPIC’s activities. 126
MIGA is, however, somewhat of an enigma. Since its inception, 175
nations have acceded to the MIGA Treaty, and MIGA has insured
some 600 projects in an aggregate amount exceeding “$21 billion of
guarantees.” 127 “To date, MIGA has only paid out three claims,”
while negotiating a resolution in “fifty disputes over its guaranteed
investments to prevent claims filings.”128
France also has its own national insurer of French firms seeking
protection of their FDI, in an agency called Compagnie Française
d'Assurance Pour Le Commerce Extérieur (COFACE).129 Founded
123

See Malcolm D. Rowat, Multilateral Approaches to Improving the
Investment Climate of Developing Countries: The Cases Of ICSID and
MIGA, 33 HARV. INT’ L L.J. 103, 105 & n.9, 126–34 (1992) (describing how
MIGA was actually the product of the World Bank-sponsored Convention
Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, which opened
for states’ signatures in October 1985 and entered into force April 1988).
124
Miriam Mafessanti, Corporate Misbehavior & International Law:
Are There Alternatives to “Complicity”?, 6 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 167, 222–
24 & nn.382–87, 229, n.427 (2010) (footnotes omitted) (providing that
MIGA “has developed Environmental and Social Review Procedures and
Safeguard Policies, modeled on the Performance Standards of the
[International Finance Corporation], which bind its private sector clients”).
125
Comeaux & Kinsella, supra note 120 at 40–45.
126
Inniss, supra note 119, at 490–92; see also Lisa J. Laplante &
Suzanne A. Spears, Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Community
Consent Processes in the Extractive Sector, 11 YALE HUM . RTS . & DEV.
L.J. 69, 78–79 & nn.50–55 (2008).
127
Sam Foster Halabi, Efficient Contracting Between Foreign Investors
and Host States: Evidence from Stabilization Clauses, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 261, 275 (2011).
128
Id. at 274–75.
129
Who We Are, COFACE, http://www.coface.com/CofacePortal/CO
M_en_EN/pages/home/Who_we_are (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
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in 1946 as a French governmental agency and privatized in 1990,
COFACE is an example of an export credit agency (ECA), which
many countries have created 130 in the last sixty years to insure
foreign sales transactions and longer-term FDI projects undertaken
by home-state businesses.131 COFACE offers political risk insurance
along the general outlines of OPIC’s program, but for which Alstom
qualifies.132 Political risk can be insured for periods of five to fifteen
years, at premiums ranging from 0.7% to 1% of the total value of the
investment. 133 How COFACE might go about assessing the risks
posed by Alstom’s hypothesized Golan Heights FDI is unknown;
COFACE “has a proprietary risk evaluation system.”134
Similarly to COFACE, but in contrast to OPIC, Lloyd’s of
London, the world’s most famous private insurance market, provides
little transparency into premiums of the political risk insurance it
offers, the methodology for calculating premiums, the limits of
financial exposure Lloyd’s syndicates are willing to assume, or how
those limits are determined.135 In 2012, one of the Lloyd’s brokers,

130
See Janet Koven Levit, The Dynamics of International Trade
Finance Regulation: The Arrangement on Officially Supported Export
Credits, 45 HARV. INT’ L L.J. 65, 142–50 & nn.345–78 (2004) (describing
the listings and details for numerous ECAs).
131
See id.; see also About Political Risk Insurance, M ULTILATERAL
INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY, http://www.miga.org/resources/index.cf
m?stid=1870#nav (last visited May 21, 2013) (“Most public providers are
national export credit agencies (ECAs), which may cover both export
credit/trade transactions, as well as longer-term investments. ECAs usually
support investors and lenders from their home country going into developing
countries, and may also have mandates to support development and be selfsustaining.”).
132
Sidney Posel, Factoring Accounts Receivable in France: Some
Legal Aspects and American Comparisons, 57 TUL. L. REV. 292, 326 n.124
(1982) (noting that COFACE offers credit insurance against “political risks”
for foreign investors).
133
Perry, supra note 114, at app. M.
134
Gordon, supra note 121, at app. tbl.8.
135
LLOYD’S, supra note 116. Sagicor, one of the Lloyd’s syndicates,
states that its “program line” limit for political risk insurance is $7.5 million.
Political Risk, Credit, Surety and Terrorism, SAGICOR, http://www.sagi
coratlloyds.com/sagicor-lloyds/pecuniary-lines (last visited Mar. 31, 2013);
see also Nathan Jensen, Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign
Direct Investment, 70 J. P OL. 1040, 1043 & n.36 (2008) (noting that “much
of the political risk insurance coverage is essentially the same product used
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RFIB Group, noted that the private market for political risk insurance
is centered in London, where ten corporate entities—of which
Chartis, Sovereign, and Zurich are dubbed “the ‘big three’”—and
twenty-five syndicates on Lloyd’s market are involved in negotiating
and issuing political risk insurance.136 Fifteen London-based brokers
interact with these insurers to create the bulk of the private pool of
insurance contracts to cover credit and political risks.137 The privatemarket political risk policies are limited in duration as well as in
coverage limits: most fall within the range of two to three years, and
as the tenor is lengthened, the number of insurers with the capacity to
insure decreases.138 The outermost private-market limits are fifteen
years, which are available from only a few of the private-market
insurers.139
From this general information about political risk insurance and
insurance markets, several observations can be made in the case of
Alstom and a hypothesized Golan Heights investment. First, it is
likely that Alstom can find political risk insurance coverage for its
Golan Heights FDI from a number of different sources, both public
and private. Second, Alstom must scrupulously avoid bribery of any
government official, or even the arguable appearance of bribery; not
only because of anti-bribery laws such as the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act140 and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,141 but also
50 years ago and . . . doesn’t appropriately cover a number of important risks
faced by multinationals”).
136
TOBY HEPPEL, RFIB GRP. LTD., THE PRIVATE INSURANCE MARKET
FOR CREDIT AND POLITICAL RISKS 4 (Apr. 2012), available at
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Docume
nts/Toby%20Heppel%20Presentation.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
137
Id. at 5. Chubb Insurance Group withdrew from the credit and
political risks market in May 2010. Id. at 8.
138
Id. at 9; Jensen, supra note 135, at 1042–43 & nn.32–36.
139
Jensen, supra note 135, at 1042–43 & nn.32–36.
140
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (2006). Recent U.S. enforcement efforts have
focused on foreign MNEs. See Leslie Wayne, Foreign Firms Most Affected
by a U.S. Law Barring Bribes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2012, at B1; Claudio
Gatti, Alstom at Center of Web of Bribery Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/business/global/30alstom.html.
However, Alstom, S.A., may no longer be directly subject to the Act
because, inter alia, its shares are no longer traded on U.S. stock exchanges,
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because an allegation of bribery in connection with the FDI typically
is itself grounds for retroactive cancellation of the political risk
insurance policy and denial of any coverage for an occurrence. 142
Third, Alstom must take heed of the moral-hazard clauses in FDI
insurance that “exclude coverage of events that the insured entity
might reasonably have been expected to avoid” 143 —such as
undertaking an investment in areas during a time when armed
conflict may, from a post hoc perspective, have seemed imminent.
Fourth, finding political risk insurance meeting the extent of
coverage needed should war break out between Israel and one of its
neighbors may be difficult, given the relatively modest coverage
limits available in private markets. Even the higher limits available
through an export credit agency such as COFACE (or OPIC, if an
Alstom subsidiary were to qualify) may be taxed to compensate

one of the bases for jurisdiction, and are now exclusively traded on the Paris
Stock Exchange. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a); see also News Releases, NYSE
EURONEXT (Aug. 13, 2004), http://www.nyse.com/press/1092392
705795.html (announcing suspension of Alston shares from trading on the
NYSE).
141
See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.
(2011) (hereinafter OECD Convention), available at http://www.oec
d.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/38028044.pdf. Both France
and the United States have ratified the Convention and enacted implementing
legislation. Id. Prior to implementing the OECD Convention, France
seemed to treat bribery of foreign officials as cost of doing business. See,
e.g., Scott D. Syfert, Capitalism or Corruption? Corporate Structure,
Western Investment and Commercial Crime in the Russian Federation, 18
N.Y.L. S CH. J. INT’ L & COMP. L. 357, 403 (1999) (observing that at the
time, “payments in most of the world [we]re considered a routine cost of
business,” and citing the example of COFACE, which at the time “over[ed]
foreign bribery as export risk”); Christopher F. Dugan & Vladimir
Lechtman, The FCPA in Russia and Other Former Communist Countries, 91
AM . J. INT ’ L L. 378, 379 (1997).
142
See Gordon, supra note 121, at 9 (noting presence of such clauses in
COFACE insurance contracts). The World Bank recently debarred two
Alstom subsidiaries because their employees allegedly offered bribes to
Zambian government officials in the early 2000s to win a contract for power
plant construction. See Dionne Searcey & David Crawford, World Bank
PunishesUnits of Alstom SA for Bribery, WALL S T. J., Feb. 23, 2012, http://o
nline.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203918304577238943984834040.
html.
143
Gordon, supra note 121, at 3.
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Alstom in the event war or terrorism destroys the hypothesized Golan
Heights wind farm. Alstom’s comparable wind-farm projects in
other areas of the world are valued at least ten times greater than
even the most generous coverage limit ($20 million) provided by
OPIC. 144
Like many FDI projects, this one risks being

144

Multimatrix aspires to build 160 wind turbines on the eighteen-acre
area,
and
generate
450
MW
of
power.
Ari
Rabinovitch, Israel Uses Golan to Build Wind Energy Industry, REUTERS, A
pr. 29, 2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/04/29/us-israel-energy-windidUKTRE63S37320100429. Comparable, recent Alstom projects provide a
good gauge by which to measure the magnitude of the FDI value for
comparison to political risk coverage limits. See, e.g., Press Release,
(Sept.
2010),
Whitelee
Onshore
Wind
Farm,
ALSTOM
http://www.alstom.com/uk/projects/power/whitelee/
(describing
$250
million (€200 million) project for “Scottish Power Renewables . . . to build a
217 MW extension to the Whitelee wind farm in Scotland” of some seventyfive wind turbines under a contract including “supply, transportation,
installation, commissioning, and operation [and] maintenance”); Press
Release, Alstom Will Supply Equipment to Four Wind Farms in Brazil,
ALSTOM (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.alstom.com/press-centre/2012/4/85822/
(describing the contract valued at $165 million (€130 million) in which, “[i]n
addition to the [supply and installation of 40] wind turbines, Alstom will be
responsible for the supply and installation of electrical systems and
substations throughout the complex” located in the Brazilian State of Rio
Grande do Sul). Even very modest wind-farm projects, such as Alstom’s in
Ethiopa, would appear to exceed even OPIC coverage limits. See Press
Release, Alstom Grid Wins Subcontract with CYMI For Around €17 Million
Project to Supply Equipment for Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation,
(June
12,
2012),
http://www.alstom.com/pressALSTOM
centre/2012/6/alstom-grid-wins-subcontract-with-cymi-for-around-17million-project-to-supply-equipment-for-ethiopian-electric-powercorporation/ (“Alstom has signed a subcontract with Spanish company
CYMI (ACS Group), to supply and manufacture equipment for the Ethiopian
Utility (EEPCO) as part of the Electricity Transmission System
Improvement Project (ETSIP) in Ethiopia.”); see also Following a Planning
Hitch,
Ethiopia’s
First Wind Farm Is Back on Track, RENEW
ABLES I NT’ L: T HE M AG . (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.renewablesinternational
.net/following-a-planning-hitch-ethiopias-first-wind-farm-is-back-ontrack/150/505/30897/ (noting Alstom’s supply of fifty-four turbines as part
of a €283 million project).
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underinsured.145 This presents a challenge for Alstom in protecting
its FDI.146 Of course, Alstom might seek to deal with these limits by
taking out multiple policies 147 of political risk insurance, 148 and by
seeking a definition of insurable “occurrence” or “loss” that would
cover to policy limits the sub-units of the project, such as each wind
turbine, rather than merely the project in its entirety.149
Thus, Alstom will have to make, as it and other MNEs that work
in politically volatile regions must do before each FDI, a careful costbenefit analysis.150 What makes Alstom’s hypothesized FDI in Israel
more complex and challenging is that it is not the host country’s
actions toward Alstom that pose the significant risks. Rather, the

145

Alex Khachaturian, “Are We in Good Hands?” The Adequacy of
American and Multilateral Political Risk Insurance Programs in Fostering
International Development, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1044, 1054–55, 1057–
58, 1059–62 (2006) (noting gaps in political risk insurance coverage
policies).
146
Scott G. Johnson, Ten Years After 9/11: Property Insurance Lessons
Learned, 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. P RAC . L.J. 685, 687 (2011) (“[W]here the
per occurrence limit of insurance does not fully compensate the insured for
its loss, whether a loss constitutes one occurrence or multiple occurrences
can be a significant issue.”).
147
Given Alstom’s resources and ability to obtain the attention of
government officials, it might be in a position to persuade public political
risk insurers (such as OPIC and MIGA) to partner with private political risk
insurers as co-insurers to increase coverage amounts, encourage more
insurers to have confidence in insuring a particular risk, and to put their “real
informational advantage” to work in “act[ing] as a superior sorter of risk.”
DeLeonardo, supra note 113, at 781–89.
148
Insurance against terrorism risks will be required as well, and the
insurability of those risks in the wake of highly organized terror-attacks
against public infrastructure targets has tightened the market. See Andrew
Gerrish, Note, Terror CATs: TRIA’s Failure to Encourage a Private Market
for Terrorism Insurance and How Federal Securitization of Terrorism Risk
May Be a Viable Alternative, 68 WASH. & LEE L. R EV. 1825 (2011).
149
An analogous issue was presented concerning property insurance on
the World Trade Center towers, which were destroyed on September 11,
2001. See Michael Murray, Note, The Law of Describing Accidents: A New
Proposal for Determining the Number of Occurrences in Insurance, 118
YALE L.J. 1484 (2009).
150
Randel R. Young & Richard Devine, Managing Risk in Emerging
Market Hydrocarbon Development Projects, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
30-1, § 30.07[5] (2009).
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risks emanate from actions that Israel and the neighboring states of
Syria and Iran may take against each other.
At the time this article went to print, those risks have been
significantly heightened by the continuing escalation of the Syrian
conflict, and the very real potential for that conflict to become a
proxy conflict between Israel and Iran. As the New York Times
recently reported, “[e]lite infantry and reconnaissance units have
been moved into the long-quiet Golan Heights this spring” as “the
concern in Israel runs deeper along what was for decades one border
it did not have to worry much about” and “Israel’s military
leadership now views southern Syria as an ‘ungoverned area’ that
poses imminent danger.”151 The situation has escalated even further,
demonstrating the ways in which Syria may become the focal point
of a proxy conflict between Iran and Israel. The front-page news on
May 6, 2013, proclaimed that “[t]he Syrian government publicly
condemned Israel for a powerful air assault on military targets near
Damascus early Sunday, saying it ‘opened the door to all
possibilities,’ as fear spread throughout the region that the country’s
civil war could expand beyond its borders,” and prompted “[s]ome
analysts” to observe that “Israel may have been sending a message to
its main rival, Iran, that despite recent gains by Mr. Assad’s forces,
the alliance between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah has waning power to
check Israeli action.”152
These events are going to have an immediate—and quite
palpable—impact on the availability and cost of PRI153 for projects,
like that hypothesized for Alstom, in the region. Two months before
151
Jodi Rudoren, Israel Tightens Border Defense As Syria Erupts, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 2013, at A1.
152
Anne Barnard, Syria Condemns Israeli Assault Near Damascus,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2013, at A1; see Jodi Rudoren & Isabel Kershner,
Airstrikes Into Syria A Message To Iranians, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2013, at
A8 (“The twin airstrikes in Damascus on Friday and Sunday attributed to
Israel appear to be more about Jerusalem’s broad, mostly covert battle with
Iran and Hezbollah than about the bloody civil war raging in Syria.”).
153
World Bank Group, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency,
Survey of Political Risk Insurance Providers, PERSPECTIVES (Jan. 2008),
available at www.pri-center.com/documents/south_south/survey_provider.
pdf.
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these events transpired, analysts in the PRI market were already
seeing an increase in demand for PRI and related coverages for
Middle-Eastern FDI projects,154 which will only drive up insurance
154
See, e.g., WILLIS, POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE: MIND THE GAP (April
2011), at 2, available at http://www.willis.com/Documents/P ublications
/Services/Political_Risk/Willis_Political_Risk_Report_April_2011.pdf. As
the authors observe, “[i]nsurers too will be looking at their own exposures
and aggregations and as a result will be seeking to impose tighter wordings
and rate increases and even, in some cases, withdrawing from certain areas
and lines of business.” Id. The authors also explain that “[t]here are three
main types of coverage that companies concerned with political unrest could
consider: Strikes, Riots and Civil Commotions (SRCC) insurance, Terrorism
cover (known as the Lloyd’s Sabotage & Terrorism Only Form) and full
Political Violence cover.” Id. at 3; see also Taking a Multi-Country
Approach to Political Risk and Trade Credit Insurance, MARSH (Mar. 1,
2013),
http://usa.marsh.com/NewsInsights/ThoughtLeadership/Artic
les/ID/29546/Taking-a-Multi-Country-Approach-to-Political-Risk-andTrade-Credit-Insurance.aspx. As Marsh notes,
[m]any multinationals have since discovered
that this country-by-country approach may
leave them vulnerable to unexpected events. In
recent years, many businesses have recognized
the unpredictability of global risk and have
increasingly turned to a broader approach to
political and trade credit risk management
through the purchase of multi-country
insurance policies.
A multi-country policy enables businesses
to take a more holistic approach to managing
risk.
Instead of attempting to cover
unpredictable risks through a patchwork of
policies for individual nations, a multi-country
policy typically covers 15 to 20 countries, but
potentially more.
These policies can be
customized to cover a single region—for
example, the Middle East and North Africa—
or include countries worldwide.
Underwriters often prefer this multicountry approach as it allows them to spread
their political and trade credit risks across
several countries. Because of this, the terms
available in such policies can often be more
favorable than single-country policies. For
example, policies may have higher limits
available; provide coverage for countries that
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premiums,155 increase the overhead that MNEs will face with their
Middle-Eastern FDIs,156 and constrict the scope of the imminent risks
that many insurers will be willing to underwrite.157
are typically difficult to insure, such as Egypt;
and/or offer more attractive pricing.
Companies purchasing political risk
insurance on foreign investments and assets are
also seeking to insure a broader range of risks,
rather than focusing on what they perceive to
be the most likely events to occur. Some of
these risks include expropriation, forced
divestiture, political violence (including forced
abandonment), business interruption and
contingent business interruption, contract
frustration, and trade disruption.
Id.

155
See, e.g., KIT BROWNLEES, GALLAGHER LONDON, TURNING TIDES—
THE GLOBALISATION OF POLITICAL RISK (2012), available at
http://www.ajginternational.com/assets/Uploads/Publications/TurningTides
WhitePaperJuly2012.pdf.
156
See, e.g., Stuart Collins, Political Risk Industry Grows As Threat
Climbs Firms’ Agenda, COMMERCIAL RISK EUROPE (Apr. 8, 2013), available
at http://www.commercialriskafrica.com/cre/2153/134/Political-risk-indust
ry-grows-as-threat-climbs-firms-agenda/.
157
See, e.g., Sarah Vesey, Middle East Unrest Puts Political Risk
Insurance In Spotlight: Marsh, BUSINESS INSURANCE (Feb. 13, 2013, 9:31
AM),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20130213/NEWS04/130
219930 (citing and quoting from MARSH, NAVIGATING CREEPING POLITICAL
RISKS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS (Dec. 2012), available at
http://uk.marsh.com/Portals/18/Documents/12-1171-MRMR%20Briefin
g%20-%20Infrastructure_v5.pdf; see also Kristen David, A Political Risk
Insurance Lesson from the Arab Spring: The Importance of Early Notice,
POLICYHOLDER INFORMER (May 3, 2013), http://www.policyholderi
nformer.com/2013/05/03/a-political-risk-insurance-lesson-from-the-arabspring-the-importance-of-early-notice/; Political Risks Rise In Middle East
And North Africa, BUSINESS INSURANCE (Apr. 11, 2013, 6:00 AM),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20130411/NEWS09/130419963
(noting that “[s]everal of Lloyd’s syndicates and new entrants are expected
to begin underwriting political risk in 2013”); Political-Risk Insurance: Of
Coups And Coverage—Political Turmoil Is Costly. Unless You Are Fully
Insured., THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 2007, available at http://www
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II. TOWARD THE RESTORATION OF THE 1789 LEGISLATIVE
BOUNDARIES OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT’S 2013 DECISION IN KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH
PETROLEUM CO. AND WHAT KIOBEL AUGURS FOR THE
FUTURE OF ATS SUITS AS FDI RISKS
The litany of other kinds of ATS cases—or proposals for cases
to be asserted under the ATS—discussed in Part I.A, above are
serious matters for any corporation planning an FDI that might find
itself within a U.S. federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.
The absurd consequences of embroiling the judicial branch of the
U.S. government into many of the cases, examples of which are
listed below, is apparent; some might yet find a hold in the U.S.
courts under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),158 but if so,
that is a choice that Congress made in enacting the TVPA. Surely,
however, neither the Congress of 1789, nor any other Congress since,
would seek to extend its legislative jurisdiction (let alone commonlaw expansion of a 235-year-old statute) to produce the kind of result
that Seventh Circuit U.S. Appeals Court Chief Judge Hamilton
foresaw in soberly considering the effects of purported ATS
litigation filed against the Hungarian State Railways:
[W]e cannot overlook the comity and reciprocity
between sovereign nations that dominate
international law. The plaintiffs suing the railway
seek a judgment from a U.S. court ordering the
national railway to pay plaintiffs as much as $1.25
billion. The plaintiffs suing the bank seek as much
as $75 billion. The sum of damages sought by
plaintiffs would amount to nearly 40 percent of
Hungary's annual gross domestic product in 2011.
.economist.com/node/8967224. For regular updates in the PRI area, see,
e.g., MIGA: Political Risks And Emerging Markets—Insuring Investments,
Ensuring Opportunities, BLOGS.WORLDBANK.ORG, http://blogs.worldban
k.org/miga/ (last visited May 17, 2013).
158
Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). For a
discussion of the relationship between the TVPA and the ATS, out of which
the TVPA grew, see, e.g., Philip Mariani, Note, Assessing the Proper
Relationship between the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim
Protection Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (2008); Kathryn L. Pryor, Does the
Torture Victim Protection Act Signal the Imminent Demise of the Alien Tort
Claims Act?, 29 VA. J. INT’L L. 969 (1988–1989).
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Divided among Hungary's current population of 10
million people, that is more than $7500 per person.
We should consider how the United States would
react if a foreign court ordered the U.S. Treasury
or the Federal Reserve Bank to pay a group of
plaintiffs 40 percent of U.S. annual gross domestic
product, which would be roughly $6 trillion, or
$20,000 for every resident in the United States.
And consider further the reaction if such an order
were based on events that happened generations
ago in the United States itself, without any effort to
secure just compensation through U.S. courts. If
U.S. courts are ready to exercise jurisdiction to
right wrongs all over the world, including those of
past generations, we should not complain if other
countries' courts decide to do the same.159
It is for such cases—the vast bulk of contemporary ATS
filings—that the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co. 160 has brought to an end the strange internationalist career
devised for the ATS since 1980. After granting certiorari in Kiobel
to consider whether an ATS claim lay against a corporation 161—a
point on which, as almost every other aspect of the ATS, the federal
circuits differ—concern quickly shifted in the February 28, 2012 oral
argument162 to whether the ATS should ever apply to conduct outside
of the United States. 163
Subsequently, the Court ordered
159

Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 682 (7th Cir. 2012)
(emphasis added) (dismissing on grounds that plaintiffs must first exhaust
available remedies in Hungary’s courts, before seeking remedies in
American courts).
160
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), aff’g
on other grounds 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
161
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
162
See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (Feb. 28, 2012) (No. 10-1491).
163
The conduct at issue in Kiobel—as well as in its celebrated
predecessor, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000)—
is amply narrated in Larisa Wick, Human Rights Violations In Nigeria:
Corporate Malpractice And State Acquiescence In The Oil Producing Deltas

202

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 9.2

supplemental briefing followed by a new oral argument on October
1, 2012, 164 in which the Court’s desire to limit the ATS’s
extraterritorial reach was palpable.165
When Chief Justice Roberts began announcing the Court’s
opinion in Kiobel on April 17, 2013, few expected that the Court
would find unanimity on anything.166 Yet it did. The Court defied
predictions, and defied the expectation of a splintering along the lines
as seen in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. 167 Rather, the differences in
Of Nigeria, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 63 (2003). See generally James
Donnelly-Saalfield, Irreparable Harms: How the Devastating Effects of Oil
Extraction in Nigeria Have Not Been Remedied by Nigerian Courts, the
African Commission, or U.S. Courts, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVT’L L. &
POL’Y 371 (2009); James Goodwin & Armin Rosencranz, Holding Oil
Companies Liable For Human Rights Violations In A Post-Sosa World, 42
NEW ENG. L. REV. 701 (2008).
164
See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (Oct. 1, 2012) (No. 10-1491).
165
See, e.g., John W. Bellinger, Oral Argument in Kiobel: Justices
Seem Inclined to Shut ATS Door Further, But Will It Remain Ajar?,
LAWFARE BLOG (Oct. 2, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.lawfareblo
g.com/2012/10/oral-argument-in-kiobel-justices-seem-inclined-to-shut-atsdoor-further-but-will-it-remain-ajar/.
166
Typical of the expectations expressed by commentators is that of
Julian Ku, (More) Spiking the Football on Kiobel, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 23,
2013, 9:06 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/23/more-spiking-thefootball-on-kiobel/ (“‘Nearly everyone anticipating the Kiobel decision
(including myself) predicted a Supreme Court vote starkly divided on
ideological lines.’”) (quoting Eugene Kontorovich, Opinion, A Supreme
Rebuke To Global Forum-Shopping: The Justices Say No To Those Who
Want To Make U.S. Courts The Venue For All The World's Torts, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 22, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873244937
04578430592807923134.html. Previously, commentators had perceived an
interesting—and at face value, unexpected—differentiation of how
administrations of the two dominant American political parties have viewed
the ATS. See Jide Nzelibe, Contesting Adjudication: The Partisan Divide
over Alien Tort Statute Litigation (Northwestern Public Law Research Paper
No. 12-31, Nov. 30, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2183943
(Article to be published in forthcoming issue of the NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.).
167
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Eugene
Kontorovich, Kiobel And Academic Fallability, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Apr. 17, 2013, 12:54 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/04/17/kiobel-andacademic-fallability/. See generally Keith A. Petty, Who Watches the
Watchmen: Vigilant Doorkeeping, the Alien Tort Statute, and Possible
Reform, 31 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 183 (2009); Pamela J.
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viewpoint among the Court’s opinions boil down as to the reasons
why an ATS lawsuit will not lie for Nigerian plaintiffs to sue an
Anglo-Dutch corporation over alleged torts in violation of the law of
nations that transpired in Nigeria.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, which
grounded its ruling “on a canon of statutory interpretation known as
the presumption against extraterritorial application,” which,
“provides that ‘[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none.’” 168 After discussing the
international relations rationale for the presumption, Chief Justice
Roberts observed:
Indeed, the danger of unwarranted judicial
interference in the conduct of foreign policy is
magnified in the context of the ATS, because the
question is not what Congress has done but instead
what courts may do. This Court in Sosa repeatedly
stressed the need for judicial caution in considering
which claims could be brought under the ATS, in
light of foreign policy concerns. As the Court
explained, “the potential [foreign policy]
implications . . . of recognizing. . . . causes [under
the ATS] should make courts particularly wary of
impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and
Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.”
These concerns, which are implicated in any case
arising under the ATS, are all the more pressing
when the question is whether a cause of action

Stephens, Spinning Sosa: Federal Common Law, the Alien Tort Statute and
Judicial Restraint, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1 (2007); Tim Kline, Door Ajar Or A
Floodgate: Corporate Liability After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 94 KY. L.J.
691 (2005–2006); Gerald Weber, The Long Road Ahead: Sosa v. AlvarezMachain and Clearly Established International Tort Law, 9 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 129 (2005).
168
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661 (2013)
(quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878
(2010)).
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under the ATS reaches conduct within the territory
of another sovereign.169
Examining the historical setting of the ATS within the context of
the early Republic (from the Marbois incident through the 1795
Attorney General Opinion discussing the British demand for redress
against American citizens who had aided a French raid upon
Freetown in the Sierra Leone Colony),170 the Chief Justice saw no
reasonable basis on which the presumption against extraterritoriality
might be rebutted in the case of the ATS—indeed, quite the contrary:
Nothing about this historical context suggests that
Congress also intended federal common law under
the ATS to provide a cause of action for conduct
occurring in the territory of another sovereign.
Indeed, far from avoiding diplomatic strife,
providing such a cause of action could have
generated it. Recent experience bears this out. See
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 77–78
(C.A.D.C. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part)
(listing recent objections to extraterritorial
applications of the ATS by Canada, Germany,
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, South Africa,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). Moreover,
accepting petitioners’ view would imply that other
nations, also applying the law of nations, could
hale our citizens into their courts for alleged
violations of the law of nations occurring in the
United States, or anywhere else in the world. The
presumption against extraterritoriality guards
against our courts triggering such serious foreign
policy consequences, and instead defers such
decisions, quite appropriately, to the political
branches.

169

Id. at 1664 (citing and quoting Sosa, 542 U.S., at 727–28, 124 S.
Ct., at 2739) (“Since many attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for
the violation of new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse
foreign policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if at all, with great
caution”; and “[t]]he possible collateral consequences of making
international rules privately actionable argue for judicial caution.”).
170
Id. at 1666–68.
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We therefore conclude that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS,
and that nothing in the statute rebuts that
presumption. “[T]here is no clear indication of
extraterritoriality here,” and petitioners’ case
seeking relief for violations of the law of nations
occurring outside the United States is barred.171
The Chief Justice might also have made another point here, one that
the author believes is obvious when one steps back from the thicket
of ratiocinations about the ATS and instead looks intelligently at the
historical setting of the 1789 Judiciary Act within the context of the
early Republic. That point is that a comprehensive subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts over matters involving aliens is
neatly provided between Section 11 172 of the 1789 Judiciary Act
(what we’ve come to know as “diversity of citizenship” subject
matter jurisdiction) and Section 9 (what we’ve come to know as the
171

Id. at 1668–69 (citing Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883). Chief Justice
Roberts also invoked the hoary aura of Justice Joseph Story:
Finally, there is no indication that the ATS was
passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable
forum for the enforcement of international norms. As
Justice Story put it, ‘No nation has ever yet pretended to
be the custos morum of the whole world. . . .’ It is
implausible to suppose that the First Congress wanted
their fledgling Republic—struggling to receive
international recognition—to be the first. Indeed, the
parties offer no evidence that any nation, meek or
mighty, presumed to do such a thing.
Id. at 1668 (quoting U.S. v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (No.
15,551) (C.C.Mass.1822) (Story, J.)).
172
The importance of federal court alienage subject matter jurisdiction as
seen both to the Founders and to modern scholars is apparent when one
considers that even those seeking to curtail substantially or abolish outright
diversity jurisdiction recognize the vital national interests in preserving
undisturbed the alienage provisions thereof and even suggest expanding their
reach by requiring only “minimal” diversity of citizenship. See, e.g.,
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side
Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963, 966-968 &
n. 11 (1979).
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ATS) – and Section 9 was necessary precisely to fill the hole that
Section 11 would leave in cases like the Marbois incident, wherein
the litigants were both aliens, the injury occurred in the United
States, and thus the injured alien would have no access to the federal
courts through diversity of citizenship. 173 That Congress further
173

See Michael G. Collins, The Diversity Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 42
VA. J. INT'L L. 649 (2002). Professor Bradley has challenged this point of
view, asserting that “[i] t has long been established that suits between aliens
do not fall within Article III alienage diversity jurisdiction” — and although
“Article III contains specific clauses for certain cases likely to involve law of
nations issues, such as cases involving ambassadors and admiralty cases”—
“outside of those contexts, it is not clear what the Article III basis for
jurisdiction would be in an ATS case between aliens.” Curtis A. Bradley,
The Alien Tort Statute and Attorney General Bradford’s Opinion, 106 AM. J.
INT'L L. 509, 522 (2011)(footnotes omitted). It appears to be Professor
Bradley’s suggestion that taking the view espoused here by the author would
result in an ATS that exceeded the judicial power in Article III to be
implemented by the Congress, particularly if “the law of nations” as it was
understood during the Founding Era was a creature of state, rather than
federal, law. Id. at 522-523 & n. 23 (“Article III concerns therefore provide
an additional reason for construing the ATS not to apply to conduct by
foreign citizens,” since “numerous scholars have concluded …[that]… the
law of nations was treated as general common law in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, not federal law.”). However, given that the
Judiciary Act of 1789 was the first attempt to reify the broad strokes of
Article III, it would not be surprising that Oliver Ellsworth and his
colleagues may have had no reason to limn the boundaries of the judicial
power with either the fly-speaking of modern scholars or with complete
success in keeping the statute within the ambit of Article III as those
boundaries would be declared later by the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed,
other provisions of the 1789 Judiciary Act either were found unconstitutional
, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)( §13’s purported grant
of power to the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus), or to be
unconstitutional as commonly applied by the federal courts, see Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-79 (1938)(overruling Justice Story’s
construction of §34, “The Rules of Decision Act,” in Swift v. Tyson , 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842), to avoid declaring §34 unconstitutional). The 1789
Judiciary Act was hardly written on a Mosaic tablet, and the sui generis
nature of what Congress was trying to do in writing on this tabula rasa of a
federal system commands our attention rather than our veneration. See, e.g.,
William J. Wiecek, The Reconstruction Of Federal Judicial Power, 13 J.
AM. LEG. HIST. 333, 337 & n.11 (1969)(noting that “the Judiciary Act of
1789 was a compromise measure, trimmed down considerably from the
original draft by Oliver Ellsworth to placate opponents
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narrowed the ATS jurisdiction provision to [a] torts that are [b]
committed in violation of the law of nations, simply serves to
reaffirm how strongly the 1789 Senate Judiciary Committee had
Marbois and similar incidents in mind when providing a federal
forum for cases such as the one that grew out of Marbois,—
Respublica v. de Longchamps174 —cases that would otherwise hang
of the lower federal courts”); Harold M. Bowman, The Unconstitutionality
Of The Rule In Swift v. Tyson, 18 B.U. L. REV. 659, 674- 680 (1938).
Similarly, other provisions of the 1789 Judiciary Act, particularly Section 25,
have raised storms of controversy strongly flavored by innuendo of
unconstitutionality. See, e.g., Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial
Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States — A History of the
Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REV. 1 (1913); see also
Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and
the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1518 (1989)(“
When the origins of our federal court system are viewed in their context of
social and economic history, many questions … find answers. In particular, it
becomes clear that the system was constructed neither in the abstract nor
within a conviction that law was separated from politics, but rather the
contrary. The framers of the system worked within a living and unquestioned
understanding that law was politics, that they were solving immediate and
great political problems the best way they could.”) ; see, generally WILFRED
J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING
MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE (Wythe Holt &
L.H. LaRue, Eds. 1990)
174
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (Pa. Ct. Oyez and Terminer 1784). The best exegesis
of the Marbois incident and the legal and political concerns it raised comes
from a non-legal source, G.S. Rowe & Alexander Knott, Power, Justice, and
Foreign Relations in the Confederation Period: The Marbois-Longchamps
Affair, 1784-1786, 104 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIO. 275 (June 1980). See also
John C. Massaro, The Forgotten Jurisdiction, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 83, 90-91
(2012). While technically a criminal prosecution, Respublica v. de
Longchamps has been a staple of American torts casebooks and hornbooks
for generations, cited to illustrate the extended personality doctrine in the law
of tortious battery. See, e.g., DAN D. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN, & ELLEN
BUBLICK, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 37 (7th ed. 2013). The rationale for
finding battery although de Longchamps struck only Marbois’ cane with his
own is significant, for it shows how much more seriously the Founders
would have taken the need to deal with such affronts not only by criminal
prosecution but also by civil suit: “`As to the assault, this is, perhaps, one …
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in a legal limbo while leaving justice up to the vagaries of state
benches in the parochial years of the early Republic.175
in which the insult is more to be considered than the actual damage; for,
though no great bodily pain is suffered by a blow on the palm of the hand, or
the skirt of the coat, yet these are clearly within the definition of assault and
battery, and among gentlemen too often induce dueling and terminate in
murder.’” Respublica v. de Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 114 (Opinion of
M’Kean, C.J.). And Chief Justice M’Kean’s expression of concern in those
years about affronts to dignity inducing dueling and terminating in murder
became all-too-well exemplified some twenty years later, when Founder and
an architect of the federal judicial power through the celebrated Federalist
No. 78, Alexander Hamilton, was felled by the duelist’s pistol. See Joanne
B. Freeman, Dueling as Politics: Reinterpreting the Burr-Hamilton Duel, 53
WM. & MARY QTRLY 289, 294-297 (Apr. 1996). That Chief Justice M’Kean
in de Longchamps hoped it would not become so is evidencedt by the
breadth with which he defined battery — i.e., “[a]s, therefore, anything
attached to the person, partakes of its inviolability; De Longchamps' striking
Monsieur Marbois' cane, is a sufficient justification of that gentleman's
subsequent conduct” in defending himself,” 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 114, —
which quickly inured to encouraging the civil remedy for the offended, rather
than the resort to organized violence. See, e.g., Hyatt v. Wood, 3 Johns. 239
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808); James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect:
Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279, 1372-1375 (2000); see also United
States v. Little, 26 F.Cas. 936, 2 Wash.C.C. 205, No. 15,598 (C.C.D. Pa.
1808); see generally PETER GAY, THE CULTIVATION OF HATRED: THE
BOURGEOIS EXPERIENCE, VICTORIA TO FREUD 9-33 (1994)(discussing die
Mensur, the culture of dueling among 19th and early 20h century German
students).
175
William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 692 (2001-2002);
William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A
Response to the "Originalists", 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221,
225-237 (1996). We do well here to remember what Professor Bador called
the compromise embodied in the 1789 Judiciary Act, “the essence of” which
“was an agreement that the question whether access to the lower federal
courts was necessary to assure the effectiveness of federal law should not be
answered as a matter of constitutional principle, but rather, should be left a
matter of political and legislative judgment, to be made from time to time in
the light of particular circumstances,” Paul M. Bador, Congressional Power
Over Jurisdiction Of The Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1031
(1981-1982), as well as Professor Holt’s admonition that understanding of
the 1789 Judiciary Act “can be reached only when one accepts the fact that
the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 were products of political
vision and political struggle, relatively temporary political solutions for
immediate, pressing political problems.” Wythe Holt, The Origins of
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In a particularly enigmatic concluding section of only three
sentences, yet bearing its own Roman numeral “IV,” Chief Justice
Roberts left Kiobel’s version of an analogous statement in Sosa that
has continued to haunt the federal courts with uncertainty—however
in this case, the statement did not concern the “recognition” of causes
of action under the ATS, but rather, the applicability of the
presumption against extraterritoriality in cases that were not as
remote as the “f-cubed” paradigm presented by Kiobel:
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took
place outside the United States. And even where
the claims touch and concern the territory of the
United States, they must do so with sufficient force
to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application. Corporations are often present in
many countries, and it would reach too far to say
that mere corporate presence suffices. If Congress
were to determine otherwise, a statute more
specific than the ATS would be required.176
For his part, Justice Kennedy, whose questioning and
expressions of concern about extraterritorial application of the ATS
at the first oral argument of the case in February 2012 set the wheels
of the present decision in motion, concurred that the presumption
against extraterritoriality applied on the facts of this case, but did not
appear to desire a broader ruling:
The opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a
number of significant questions regarding the reach
and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute. In my
Alienage Jurisdiction, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 547, 548 (1989).
Furthermore, we should bear in mind Professor Holt’s observation “that a
national court system was thought necessary on all sides because state courts,
or at least many state courts, were not doing their jobs.” Holt, supra, at 549;
see also id. at 553-562 (explaining examples of state-court judicial
xenophobia).
176
Id. at 1669 (citing Morrison, 130 S. Ct., at 2883–88).
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view that is a proper disposition. Many serious
concerns with respect to human rights abuses
committed abroad have been addressed by
Congress in statutes such as the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) . . . and that class
of cases will be determined in the future according
to the detailed statutory scheme Congress has
enacted. Other cases may arise with allegations of
serious violations of international law principles
protecting persons, cases covered neither by the
TVPA nor by the reasoning and holding of today's
case; and in those disputes the proper
implementation of the presumption against
extraterritorial application may require some
further elaboration and explanation.177
Justice Alito also concurred with the Chief Justice’s majority
opinion, but he and Justice Thomas, unlike Justice Kennedy, would
prefer an even more restrictive holding:
I concur in the judgment and join the opinion
of the Court as far as it goes. Specifically, I agree
that when Alien Tort Statute (ATS) “claims touch
and concern the territory of the United States, they
must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application.”
This formulation obviously leaves much
unanswered, and perhaps there is wisdom in the
Court's preference for this narrow approach. I
write separately to set out the broader178 standard
that leads me to the conclusion that this case falls
within the scope of the presumption.
In Morrison we explained that “the
presumption against extraterritorial application
would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated
to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is
involved in the case.” We also reiterated that a
177

Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). Here, Justice Alito likely means
“broader” in the sense of “more encompassing,” for the standard he
articulates narrows, rather than broadens in any way, the scope of the Chief
Justice’s proposed “touch and concern” criterion.
178
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cause of action falls outside the scope of the
presumption—and thus is not barred by the
presumption—only if the event or relationship that
was “the ‘focus’ of congressional concern” under
the relevant statute takes place within the United
States. . . .
The Court's decision in Sosa makes clear that
when the ATS was enacted, “congressional
concern” was “‘focus[ed],’” on the “three principal
offenses against the law of nations” that had been
identified by Blackstone: violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy. The Court therefore held
that “federal courts should not recognize private
claims under federal common law for violations of
any international law norm with less definite
content and acceptance among civilized nations
than the historical paradigms familiar when [the
ATS] was enacted.” In other words, only conduct
that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness
and acceptance among civilized nations can be said
to have been “the ‘focus’ of congressional
concern,” when Congress enacted the ATS. As a
result, a putative ATS cause of action will fall
within the scope of the presumption against
extraterritoriality—and will therefore be barred—
unless the domestic conduct is sufficient to violate
an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s
requirements of definiteness and acceptance among
civilized nations.179
Unlike the extraterritoriality-presumption based rationales of the
Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Alito, Justice Breyer, writing
for himself and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, would not
rely on the extraterritoriality presumption at all. 180 Rather, Justice
179

Id. (Alito, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis

added).

180

Id. at 1671–74 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Breyer would focus on the context of the connections between a
putative ATS claim and U.S. interests—a foreign relations law
perspective:
Unlike the Court, I would not invoke the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Rather,
guided in part by principles and practices of
foreign relations law, I would find jurisdiction
under this statute where (1) the alleged tort occurs
on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American
national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct
substantially and adversely affects an important
American national interest, and that includes a
distinct interest in preventing the United States
from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well
as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common
enemy of mankind.181
Justice Breyer elaborated his rationale grounded in the foreign
relations law perspective in the following terms:
In applying the ATS to acts “occurring within
the territory of a[nother] sovereign,” I would
assume that Congress intended the statute’s
jurisdictional reach to match the statute’s
underlying substantive grasp. That grasp, defined
by the statute’s purposes set forth in Sosa, includes
compensation for those injured by piracy and its
modern-day equivalents, at least where allowing
such compensation avoids “serious” negative
international “consequences” for the United States.
And just as we have looked to established
international substantive norms to help determine
the statute’s substantive reach, so we should look
to international jurisdictional norms to help
determine the statute’s jurisdictional scope.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law is helpful. Section 402 recognizes that,
subject to § 403’s “reasonableness” requirement, a
nation may apply its law (for example, federal
common law) not only (1) to “conduct” that “takes
181

Id. at 1671

2013]

SOME LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EU-BASED
MNES CONTEMPLATING HIGH-RISK FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENTS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR AFTER KIOBEL
V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM AND CHEVRON
CORPORATION V. NARANJO
place [or to persons or things] within its territory”
but also (2) to the “activities, interests, status, or
relations of its nationals outside as well as within
its territory,” (3) to “conduct outside its territory
that has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory,” and (4) to certain foreign
“conduct outside its territory . . . that is directed
against the security of the state or against a limited
class of other state interests.” In addition, § 404 of
the Restatement explains that a “state has
jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for
certain offenses recognized by the community of
nations as of universal concern, such as piracy,
slave trade,” and analogous behavior.
Considering these jurisdictional norms in light
of both the ATS’s basic purpose (to provide
compensation for those injured by today’s pirates)
and Sosa’s basic caution (to avoid international
friction), I believe that the statute provides
jurisdiction where (1) the alleged tort occurs on
American soil, (2) the defendant is an American
national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct
substantially and adversely affects an important
American national interest, and that includes a
distinct interest in preventing the United States
from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well
as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common
enemy of mankind.
I would interpret the statute as providing
jurisdiction only where distinct American interests
are at issue. Doing so reflects the fact that
Congress adopted the present statute at a time
when, as Justice Story put it, “No nation ha[d] ever
yet pretended to be the custos morum of the whole
world.” That restriction also should help to
minimize international friction. Further limiting
principles such as exhaustion, forum non
conveniens, and comity would do the same. So

213
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would a practice of courts giving weight to the
views of the Executive Branch.182
Justice Breyer then turned to the application of his foreign
relations law-based test to the case the Kiobel plaintiffs presented to
the Court:
Applying these jurisdictional principles to this
case, however, I agree with the Court that
jurisdiction does not lie. The defendants are two
foreign corporations. Their shares, like those of
many foreign corporations, are traded on the New
York Stock Exchange. Their only presence in the
United States consists of an office in New York
City (actually owned by a separate but affiliated
company) that helps to explain their business to
potential investors. The plaintiffs are not United
States nationals but nationals of other nations. The
conduct at issue took place abroad. And the
plaintiffs allege, not that the defendants directly
engaged in acts of torture, genocide, or the
equivalent, but that they helped others (who are not
American nationals) to do so.
Under these circumstances, even if the New
York office were a sufficient basis for asserting
general jurisdiction, it would be farfetched to
believe, based solely upon the defendants’ minimal
and indirect American presence, that this legal
action helps to vindicate a distinct American
interest, such as in not providing a safe harbor for
an “enemy of all mankind.” Thus I agree with the
Court that here it would “reach too far to say” that
such “mere corporate presence suffices.”183
Five days later, the Court granted Rio Tinto PLC’s petition for a
writ of certiorari in the Sarei case, vacated the Ninth Circuit’s en

182
183

Id. at 1674 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1677–78 (internal citations omitted).
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banc opinion, and remanded the case “for further consideration in
light of Kiobel.”184
Having surveyed the four opinions and two principal rationales
of the Justices unanimous in their judgment, we next turn to consider
matters of great import to MNEs both foreign, such as Alstom, and
domestic, such as Chevron, in considering the risks posed by their
FDIs: What terrain lies ahead—both perceived and imperceptible—
in the post-Kiobel ATS landscape?
A. FUTURE ATS LITIGATION
Taken together, the U.S. Supreme Court’s major
pronouncements in Sosa and Kiobel on the scope of the ATS answer
some questions clearly:
(1) While the ATS has been held to be a subject
matter jurisdictional statute, 185 the ATS was
not “stillborn” because it also “interact[s]”
with “the ambient law of [its] era” such that
“federal courts could entertain claims once the
jurisdictional grant was on the books, because
torts in violation of the law of nations would
have been recognized within the common law
of the time.”186
(2) Causes of action that violate modern
international law can be “recognized” (as
opposed to created) by federal district courts,
but only when they “rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century
184

Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, No. 11–649, 2013 WL 1704704 (Apr. 22,

2013).

185

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004) (“The statute
was intended as jurisdictional in the sense of addressing the power of the
courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain subject.”).
186
Id. at 714.
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paradigms we have recognized,” i.e.,
“Blackstone's three primary offenses: violation
of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy.”187
(3) Because
the
“presumption
against
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the
ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that
presumption,” cases “seeking relief for
violations of the law of nations occurring
outside the United States” are “barred” when
“all of the relevant conduct took place outside
the United States.”188
(4) However, “where the claims touch and
concern the territory of the United States,” the
ATS may apply provided that the claims “do
so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption
against
extraterritorial
application.”189
(5) “[M]ere corporate presence” by itself does not
“suffic[e]” to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality, given that “[c]orporations
are often present in many countries.”190
The combination of what these holdings said, what they didn’t
say, and the many other issues on which the Supreme Court hasn’t
spoken definitely—and, of course, on which Congress has enacted no
legislation—leave a very vague litigation frontier that will have to be
limned, case-by-case, through the common-law decision-making
processes of the ninty-four federal district courts and the thirteen
U.S. appellate courts. One commentator has suggested that there are
at least three categories of ATS cases whose survival after Kiobel
remains open to debate, particularly as one of “those that” some of
the Justices see as remaining “‘unresolved’ by Kiobel:

187

Id. at 724–25.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10-491, slip op. at 13–14
(U.S. Apr. 17, 2013).
189
Id. at 14.
190
Id.
188
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(1) Cases alleging Sosa-sufficient torts committed
overseas by U.S. defendants;
(2) Cases such as Filartiga, where a foreign
defendant uses the U.S. as an effective “safe
harbor,” thereby preventing other states from
bringing him to justice; and
(3) Cases in which the defendant is alleged to
have engaged in conduct in the United States
that contributed materially to the violation of a
Sosa-sufficient law of nations norm (such as
providing active assistance to torture), but
where that conduct in the U.S. was not itself
sufficient to establish the violation. ([But
excluding from] this category cases alleging
aiding and abetting predicated solely on
knowledge by a U.S. corporation of a foreign
subsidiary’s bad acts. Although even that case
is not technically resolved by Kiobel, . . . it’s
safe to predict the Court would not recognize
such a claim, most likely on the theory that
such general knowledge, and failure to stop the
tort, does not satisfy the scienter requirement
for a Sosa-qualified claim.)191
Yet, that is not all that remains unresolved, as the
following subsections explain in detail.
1.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY REDEFINED—APPLYING THE CHIEF
JUSTICE’S “TOUCH AND CONCERN” PHRASEOLOGY

While the Court in Kiobel clarified that the ATS does not apply
to conduct by a foreign corporation that transpires entirely in that
foreign country, the majority’s opinion once again, as it did in Sosa,
tantalizingly leaves “the door . . . still ajar subject to vigilant
191
Marty Lederman, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: What Remains of the
ATS?, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 18, 2013, 6:40 PM), http://opiniojuris.or
g/2013/04/18/kiobel-insta-symposium-what-remains-of-the-ats/.
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doorkeeping.”192 That metaphorical door is represented by the Chief
Justice’s very specific use of the “touch and concern” language to
delineate a gray area where the ATS will not have extraterritorial
application. However, that is merely a presumption, and it is subject
to rebuttal by the plaintiffs’ showing that their claims do not merely
“touch and concern the territory of the United States,” but rather, that
they touch and concern the territory of the United States “with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application.” This leaves three major sets of unresolved issues,
which likely will present numerous sub-issues. First, what does it
mean to say that a claim a plaintiff seeks to assert pursuant to the
ATS “touches and concerns the territory of the United States”?
Second, how is it that a plaintiff can demonstrate that a claim touches
and concerns the territory of the United States “with sufficient force”
to rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application. Third,
what kind of force is being referenced, and how shall we know when
that force is “sufficient to rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality”?193
Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc.194 is a case that presents
the kind of fact pattern that will immediately test the boundaries set
by Kiobel. In that case, which “concerns the well-publicized Abu
Ghraib prison abuse scandal[,] . . . four previously detained Iraqi
citizens [brought] claims arising under common law and the . . .
[ATS] against military defense contractor CACI [Premier
Technology, Inc.] for alleged abuse and torture during their detention
in Abu Ghraib, Iraq.”195 The corporate defendant is headquartered in
Virginia.196 The extraterritoriality issue left open by Kiobel would
have to be faced head-on here: Does the conduct by an American
192

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Interpreting “Touch and
Concern”, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 19, 2013, 9:59 AM), http://opiniojuris.or
g/2013/04/19/kiobel-insta-symposium-interpreting-touch-and-concern.
194
Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-00827-GBL, 2013 WL
1234177 (E.D. Va. Mar. 19, 2013); see Jonathan Kaufman, Lower Courts Set
to Address Questions Kiobel Left Unanswered, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L (May 9,
2013), http://www.earthrights.org/blog/lower-courts-set-address-questionskiobel-left-unanswered (noting that the “touch and concern” language will be
at issue in upcoming motions in three pending cases: Samantar, the South
African Apartheid Litigation, and the Chiquita Litigation).
195
Al Shimari, 2013 WL 12334177, at *1.
196
Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l Inc., 679 F.3d 205, 209 (4th Cir. 2012).
193
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military contractor in running a prison in a foreign country, but under
contract with U.S. armed forces, touch and concern the territory of
the United States with sufficient force so as to “rebut the
extraterritoriality presumption”? The answer is far from clear. Nor
is the answer likely to come from this litigation, because the district
court has now, after remand, dismissed Al Shimari on statute of
limitations grounds.197
The phrase “touch and concern” has not previously appeared in
reported ATS cases in the federal courts until recently.198 Thus, the
phrase is an entirely new judicially applied gloss on the thirty-three
words that make up the ATS. What could touch and concern mean?
The phrase itself comes from the law of real property, where it is a
197

Al Shimari, 2013 WL 1234177, vacated Shimari v. CACI Int’l Inc.,
2008 WL 7348184 (E.D. Va., Nov. 25, 2008). In its original decision,
subsequently reversed, the District Court dismissed the “[p]laintiffs’ claims
to the extent that they rely upon ATS jurisdiction because tort claims against
government contractor interrogators are too modern and too novel to satisfy
the Sosa requirements for ATS jurisdiction.” 657 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D.
Va. 2009). In a related case, the District Court in Maryland appeared to
come to exactly the opposite conclusion, permitting the ATS claims against
the contractors to go forward. Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702,
745–60 (D. Md. 2010).
198
In recent years, the phrase has been used in opinions authored by
Justice Ginsburg in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2565 n.7 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) (noting that wrongful conduct may sufficiently touch and concern a
whole class of persons where there are “‘common questions of law or fact’
between the claims of the lead plaintiff and the applicant class”); Kucana v.
Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 248 (2010) (noting that a denial of a motion to reopen
. . . touches and concerns only the question whether the alien’s claims have
been accorded a reasonable hearing”); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi
Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 123 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that cases
in which tax assessments burden off-reservation land “do not touch and
concern . . . taxes formally imposed on nonmembers that nonetheless burden
on-reservation tribal activity”); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 517–18
(2002) (noting that the proof requirements of a pending case “do not touch or
concern . . . whether resort to a prison grievance process must precede resort
to a court”); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (noting that institutional constraints prohibit federalism from
touching or concerning state law interpreted by state courts).
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term of art derived from the common-law used to describe promises
that limit the use of a particular parcel of land.199 “At common law,
real covenants and equitable servitudes do not run with the land
unless they touch and concern the land.”200 Perhaps the majority’s
focus on territory—the real property aspect of legislative
jurisdiction—provides a logical, if not compelling, connection to this
concept of real property law.201 To fully understand how ill-chosen
and infelicitous a phrase the Chief Justice’s opinion in Kiobel chose,
however, we need not go any further than examining a recent
explanation of how the phrase has caused innumerable problems in
the area of law that gave it its birth:
The touch and concern requirement has had a
tumultuous history. The requirement has endured
decades of scholars’ failed attempts at articulating
a definitive definition, test, or rationale for the
requirement, and it has weathered severe criticism.
The touch and concern requirement was first
conceived in the English courts in Spencer’s Case
and later explained in Congleton v. Pattison as a
requirement that the covenant must “directly affect
the nature, quality, or value of the thing demised,
[or] the mode of occupying it.” In 1914, Professor
Harry Bigelow, in his article The Content of
Covenants in Leases, rejected the Congleton test,
declaring it “vague” and “question-begging,” and
articulated the following test: a covenant touches
and concerns the land if it “operate[s] either to
make more valuable some of the rights, privileges,
or powers possessed by the covenantee or to
199
See generally Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of
Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1982).
200
Note, Touch and Concern, The Restatement (Third) of Property:
Servitudes, and a Proposal, 122 HARV. L. REV. 938, 938 (2009) (footnote
omitted); see Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an Economic Understanding of Touch
and Concern, 1988 DUKE L.J. 925, 925–32 (1988).
201
See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Touching And Concerning
Copyright: Real Property Reasoning In MDY Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard
Entertainment, Inc., 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1063, 1065 (2011) (discussing
an analogous example of how “the spirit—if not the exact terminology—
generation of servitude-like restrictions imposed by intellectual property
owners”).

2013]

SOME LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EU-BASED
MNES CONTEMPLATING HIGH-RISK FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENTS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR AFTER KIOBEL
V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM AND CHEVRON
CORPORATION V. NARANJO

221

relieve him in whole or in part of some of his
duties.”
Professor Bigelow’s test was later
tweaked by Dean (later Judge) Charles Clark:
If the promisor’s legal relations
in respect to the land in question
are lessened—his legal interest as
owner rendered less valuable by
the promise—the burden of the
covenant touches or concerns
that land; if the promisee’s legal
relations in respect to that land
are increased—his legal interest
as owner rendered more valuable
by the promise—the benefit of
the covenant touches and
concerns that land.
Though the Bigelow–Clark test has been widely
criticized as being circular, it remains an oft-quoted
test because, despite many attempts, there has been
no consensus on an alternative.202
The touch and concern phrase is so vapid, in fact, that Reporters
eliminated it from the Restatement (Third) of Property. 203 It is a
shame that touch and concern has been revived in a completely
different setting, perhaps ringing dimly in the minds of judges or
their law clerks from long ago property classes, than the
202
Touch and Concern, The Restatement (Third) of Property:
Servitudes, and a Proposal, supra, note 200, at 939 (footnotes omitted)
(quoting CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS
WHICH “RUN WITH LAND” 97 (2d ed. 1947)).
203
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000); see
Touch and Concern, The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, and a
Proposal, supra note 200, at 940–45. But see Van Houweling, supra note
201, at 1064–65 (arguing that applying the touch and concern concept in
connection with the doctrine of exhaustion in transferring intellectual
property rights “suggests that the reasoning underlying the touch and concern
doctrine may be more useful in this new context than in the land context
where it first arose”).
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extraterritorial reach of the ATS—whether a dispute touches or
concerns the territory of the United States—to sew anew analogous,
and equally inefficient, seeds of confusion, opacity, and
argumentation, thereby unwittingly creating a new set of transaction
costs for ATS litigants.204 Indeed, the new touch and concern test
may well suffer from the same problems that the Reporter of the
Restatement (Third) of Real Property identified when he set out “to
reweave the ancient strands of servitude law into a new, and
presumably smoother, fabric,” and homed in on touch and concern as
“[o]ne of the knotty strands destined for elimination or replacement .
. . . [because] ‘it identifies neither the problems addressed nor the
value choices that must be made in determining whether to apply
it.’”205

204

One commentator has observed that “[t]he only thing that is truly
clear is that today, the Supreme Court has provided fodder for another
decade or more of litigation and created more business for litigators” because
“[c]ompanies and victims’ advocates will battle over when claims touch and
concern the U.S. with sufficient force.” Katie Redford, Commentary: Door
Still Open for Human Rights Claims After Kiobel, SCOTUS BLOG (Apr. 17,
2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/commentary-door-still-open-forhuman-rights-claims-after-kiobel/.
205
Stake, supra note 200, at 926 (quoting Susan F. French, Servitudes
Reform and the New Restatement of Property: Creation Doctrines and
Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 928, 931 (1988) (footnote
omitted)). At least one commentator has suggested that Kiobel may be a
Pyrrhic victory for corporations because of the changes it is likely to bring to
discovery in corporate ATS suits:
Kiobel would be a Pyrrhic victory if, to dismiss ATS
claims, corporate defendants must have their officers and
directors sit for depositions to determine to what extent
they contributed to human rights violations abroad.
Some of these individuals might be located in the United
States but also have formal or informal roles in the
entities that are most connected to the alleged violations
committed abroad. It is not uncommon for there to be a
great deal of overlap among the boards and management
teams of a multinational corporation’s subsidiaries.
Milan Markovic, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Settlement, Discovery and
JURIS
(Apr.
24,
2013,
4:45
PM),
Kiobel,
OPINIO
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/24/kiobel-insta-symposium-settlementdiscovery-and-kiobel. Another commentator has asked, “if mere corporate
presence is not enough, what kind and how much territorial activity within
the United States is enough?”, and has provided a “non-exhaustive list” of
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Thus, there are a number of paradigms that were not directly
addressed by the Court in deciding Kiobel on its particular litigation
facts, which are left for future ATS litigation:
(1) Can a foreign plaintiff sue a U.S. defendant for
acts or omissions occurring wholly outside of
the United State[s] that allegedly violate the
law of nations? [Does it make a difference
whether the defendant is a: (a) citizen; (b)
resident; (c) corporation headquartered in
America; (d) corporation incorporated in
America; or (e) a subsidiary of a foreign
corporation in America?]
....
(2) Can a foreign plaintiff sue a foreign defendant
for acts or omissions occurring in part in the
United States that lead to an injury in a foreign
country that allegedly violates the law of
nations? . . .
....
(3) Can a foreign plaintiff sue a U.S. defendant for
acts or omissions occurring in part in the
United States that lead to injury in a foreign
country?206

“the types of activities that might be the subject of future litigation.” Roger
Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Degrees of Territoriality, OPINIO JURIS,
(Apr. 22, 2013, 9:56 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/22/kiobel-instasymposium-degrees-of-territoriality.
206
Donald Childress, Kiobel Commentary: An ATS Answer with Many
Questions (And the Possibility of a Brave New World of Transnational
(Apr.
18,
2013,
5:03
PM),
Litigation),
SCOTUS
BLOG
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-an-ats-answerwith-many-questions-and-the-possibility-of-a-brave-new-world-oftransnational-litigation.
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Because of the opacity of the touch and concern test, Professor
Burt Neuborne of NYU foresees as much post-Kiobel litigation as
there was pre-Kiobel:
[T]he Kiobel majority says little or nothing
about how to decide ATS cases where a significant
link to the territorial United States exists, either
because the injured plaintiff is a United States
national, the defendant is a United States resident,
and/or a significant proportion of the operative
facts took place within the United States. The
Breyer concurrence indicates that the ATS will
apply in many such cases. The Roberts majority is
silent on whether one or more of such links will
rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.
The swing-vote Kennedy concurrence is
purposefully vague on the issue. So, much ATS
litigation will continue, albeit in a narrower set of
cases involving allegations of significant links to
the territorial United States. We can look forward
to years of uncertainty, split decisions, and an
eventual return trip to a reconstituted Court.207
Another commentator, however, sees opportunity in the way
Chief Justice Roberts phrased the touch and concern test, reading
into it the classic effects test 208 for determining the scope of
extraterritorial application of a federal statute, articulated 209 by

207
Burt Neuborne, Some Quick Thoughts on Transnational Human
Rights Litigation in American Courts After Kiobel, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
ONLINE FORUM (Apr. 19, 2013), http://nyujilp.org/some-quick-thoughts-ontransnational-human-rights-litigation-in-american-courts-after-kiobel.
Professor Childress offers some specific predictions on hypotheticals similar
to those posed by Professor Neuborne. See Childress, supra note 206.
208
See Joseph Rome, R.I.P. A.T.S.? How Much of the Alien Tort Statute
Survives the Supreme Court’s Kiobel Decision?, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
ONLINE FORUM (Apr. 17, 2013), http://nyujilp.org/r-i-p-a-t-s-how-much-ofthe-alien-tort-statute-survives-the-supreme-courts-kiobel-decision
(noting
that the Court’s decision that claims should “‘touch and concern the territory
of the United States’” sounds familiar to “the old ‘effects’ test”).
209
See U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see
also Jordan A. Dresnick et al., The United States as Global Cop: Defining
the ‘Substantial Effects’ Test in U.S. Antitrust Enforcement in the Americas
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Learned Hand when he and a Second Circuit panel were “Justices for
a Day” because they sat in the stead of a Supreme Court which,
because of recusals, could not muster a quorum.210 The effects test
subjects companies carrying on business outside of the United States
to federal law, such as antitrust law, if their business activity is
intended to affect U.S. commerce, and if that activity is not de
minimis. 211 If so, “this could be an opportunity to reconcile the
majority opinion with Breyer’s concurrence; perhaps if a ‘distinct
American interest’ were at stake in a particular case, the Court would
be satisfied that the presumption has been rebutted in that particular
case,” particularly since “only [Justices] Alito and Thomas supported
the notion that the offending conduct must occur on U.S. soil.”212
It would seem unlikely that the touch and concern language
chosen by Chief Justice Roberts would evoke the effects test. The
Supreme Court extensively criticized and rejected it in Morrison,213
although this securities law case provided the very analytic
foundation on which Chief Justice Roberts built his analysis for the
Kiobel majority. Furthermore, the effects test itself is just as murky,
heavily criticized, 214 and poorly predictive of results 215 as the

and Abroad, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 453, 467–68 (2009) (footnotes
omitted).
210
REASON AND IMAGINATION: THE SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE OF
LEARNED HAND 247–48 (Constance Jordan ed., 2013).
211
Nat’l Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 666 F.2d 6, 8–9 (2d
Cir. 1981).
212
Rome, supra note 208.
213
Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878–81
(2010).
214
See id.; Donald J. Curotto, Extraterritorial Application of the
Antitrust Laws and Retaliatory Legislation by Foreign Countries, 11
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 577 (1981). In an often-cited opinion, the Ninth
Circuit criticized the effects test as inadequate and proposed a soft, multifactored balancing test that, while extensively applied in the lower courts,
still functions on an intensely factual, case-by-case basis. Id. at 582–83
(discussing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976)); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796
(1993) (following the Timberlane rejection of the effects test). But see
Dresnick, supra note 209, at 467–68 & n.95 (characterizing Timberlane as a
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property-law conception of touch and concern. Indeed, that test is
notorious for its morphing into an array of tests as courts applied
it,216 so the invitation for courts to resort to it to interpret the touch
and concern gloss on the ATS should be flatly declined.
To understand the touch and concern language, the best hope is
to return to the first causes of the statute itself,217 as Chief Justice
Roberts did, in Kiobel. Recalling the historical backdrop of the ATS
will be critical in doing so.218 Although courts will be invited to find
that the incorporation or headquartering of an MNE in America
satisfies this standard, judges will need to be even more astute and
vigilant than Sosa instructed them to be. In particular, they will need
to focus on three main things. First, a court should ensure that it is
not the defendant, but rather, the defendant’s improper conduct that
modification of the effects test by “adding the element of international
comity to the ‘effects test,’ thus creating a tripartite analysis”).
215
See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878–81; Austen Parrish, The Effects
Test: Extraterritoriality's Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455 (2008);
Austen L. Parrish, Morrison, the Effects Test, and the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality: A Reply to Professor Dodge, 105 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 399 (2011). But see William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40
SW. L. REV. 687 (2011); William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality After Morrison, 105 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 396
(2011).
216
For a classic description of the problem, see Judge Becker’s opinion
in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161,
1187 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (describing the many variations of the effects test
across jurisdictions).
217
For an example of this scholarly method in action, see Eugene
Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals
about the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 155–
56 (2004).
218
For the range of values, we may view collective the following: Sosa,
542 U.S. at 716–17 (discussing the 1784 Marbois affair, which encouraged
the creation of the Judiciary Act, giving the Court original jurisdiction over
diplomats); Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal
Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183 (2004)
(discussing how piracy provides the foundation for the ATS); Thomas H.
Lee, The Safe–Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
830 (2006) (discussing how safe conduct inspired the ATS); see also Joseph
Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 445 (1995) (asserting the capture of the
enemy vessels as the only scenario in which the ATS applies). Doe v.
Nestle, S.A. 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1068 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
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touches and concerns the United States. Second, a court must ensure
that it is specifically the territory of the United States that is being
touched and concerned, rather than the United States generically, or
the United States’ interests abstractly. Lastly, a court must ensure
that the territory of the United States being touched and concerned is
done so in a way that, unless a federal court forum is provided to the
alien(s) seeking to sue, strongly puts at risk one of the core values—
neutrality, protection of diplomats, protection of aliens under safe
conducts—in the ATS’s history.219
This, however, will not always be an easy task in the hands of
the lower federal courts. In a decision rendered two months before
Kiobel, the Ninth Circuit reversed a federal district court’s ruling that
had short-circuited an attempt by Japan’s whaling lobby
(euphemistically named a “Research Institute”) to use the ATS as a
sword to thwart an Oregon-based conservation society’s aggressive
efforts to interfere with whaling. 220 Writing for the Ninth Circuit
panel, Chief Judge Kozinski had no hesitation to paint with a broad
brush in analogizing the conservationists’ efforts to disrupt ocean
whaling to piracy:
You don't need a peg leg or an eye patch.
When you ram ships; hurl glass containers of acid;
drag metal-reinforced ropes in the water to damage
propellers and rudders; launch smoke bombs and
flares with hooks; and point high-powered lasers at
other ships, you are, without a doubt, a pirate, no

219

See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669

(2013).

220

Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y,
860 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (W.D. Wash. 2012), rev’d, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir.
2013). Invoking § 1350 in this way presents innovative avenues for MNEs,
complementary to the legislative lobbying discussed infra Part III.B, to
protecting investments, both domestic and foreign, from private activism as
well as from judicial disruption. See Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc.,
864 F. Supp. 2d 839 (D. Alaska 2012). While Alstom would not likely be
able to employ similar litigation tactics to dissuade activism against its FDI
sites in Israel, such litigation might be useful were there to be activism.
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matter how high-minded you believe your purpose
to be.221
While the analogy asserted here is not entirely persuasive,222 the
slope of analogy that Judge Kozinski has started down, however,
may prove even less persuasive and more slippery. 223 Assigning
eighteenth century roles to actors in twenty-first century events has
superficial appeal that conceals the substantial potential for the
drawing of inapposite analogies and the application of faulty
inductive reasoning that lack intellectual and historical grounding.224
For example, there are those who have sought—and no doubt will
renew their efforts—to use analogy to cast certain kinds of corporate
FDI conduct as “piracy”225 as well as “ambassadorial.”226 Great care
221

Inst. of Cetacean Research, 708 F. 3d, at 1101. While Judge Milan
D. Smith dissented from the panel’s decision to order reassignment of the
case to a new district judge upon remand, he concurred in the reinstatement
of the whaler’s ATS claim and the panel’s prior decision in Inst. of Cetacean
Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 702 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2012)
to preliminarily enjoin the conversation group’s activities, because “[e]ven if
one believes it is barbaric to harvest whales for any purpose at the beginning
of the 21st century, as practiced by Cetacean, it is clearly permitted under
international law.” Id. at 1106 (Smith, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part).
222
See generally the extensive discussion of the doctrinal
underpinnings of international piracy law in Samuel Shnider, Universal
Jurisdiction Over “Operation of a Pirate Ship”: The Legality of the Evolving
Piracy Definition in Regional Prosecutions, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
473 (2013).
223
For an example of this at work, see Martha Lovejoy, Note, From
Aiding Pirates To Aiding Human Rights Abusers: Translating The
Eighteenth-Century Paradigm Of The Law Of Nations For The Alien Tort
Statute, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 241 (2009).
224
See, e.g., Kontorovich, The Piracy Analagy, supra note 218, at 183;
see also Dan Hunter, No Wilderness of Single Instances: Inductive Inference
in Law, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365 (1998). See generally Dan Hunter, Reason Is
Too Large: Analogy And Precedent In Law, 50 EMORY L.J. 1197, 1206
(2001) (comparing and contrasting analogy and inductive reasoning because
“legal commentators have caused enormous problems by failing to explain
how analogy differs from the related inference processes of induction and
metaphor”).
225
See Kontorovich, The Piracy Analagy, supra note 218, at 236–37;
see, e.g., Jennifer J. Rho, Comment, Blackbeards Of The Twenty-First
Century: Holding Cybercriminals Liable Under The Alien Tort Statute, 7
CHI. J. INT’L L. 695, 703–18 (2007) (arguing that “piracy provides a
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will need to be exercised lest such analogies once again threaten to
distort the ATS in the very ways the Kiobel Court has tried to nip in
the bud.
2.

WHAT IS A TORT FOR ATS PURPOSES?

Courts have largely failed to grapple with another challenging
word—tort—that has been in every iteration of the statute since the
Judiciary Act of 1789. 227 The decided cases often involve a
misinterpretation of the significance of the phrase “for tort only.”228

remarkably good analogy to cybercrime”; ergo, cybercrime should be
actionable as piracy under the ATS). Such FDIs may not always be in
infrastructure or commercial enterprises—it could very well be the supply of
corporate personnel to whom U.S. foreign military operations are
subcontracted. See, e.g., Mark Mazetti, Pakistan’s Public Enemy: How a
Single Spy Helped Turn Pakistan Against the United States, N.Y. TIMES
SUNDAY MAG., Apr. 14, 2013, at MM30, available at http://www.ny
times.com/2013/04/14/magazine/raymond-davis-pakistan.html; see also
Jenny S. Lam, Accountability for Private Military Contractors Under The
Alien Tort Statute, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1459 (2009); cf. Ansel J. Halliburton,
Pirates Versus Mercenaries: Purely Private Transnational Violence at the
Margins of International Law, EXPRESSO, 2010, available at
http://works.bepress.com/ansel_halliburton/1.
226
Cf. Logan Michael Breed, Regulating Our 21st-Century
Ambassadors: A New Approach To Corporate Liability For Human Rights
Violations Abroad , 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1006–07, 1013–15 (2001–
2002).
227
The reader is referred to the 1878, 1911, and 1948 versions of the
ATS, the product of re-codification rather than amendment, which are set
forth in JENNIFER K. ELSEA, THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEWS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS (Oct. 2, 2003), at 6–8, available at
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/1864.
228
See generally J.M. Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of
Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 445 (1994) (arguing that the
phrase “tort only” was meant to cover prize claims involving damage or
injury to property); William S. Dodge, Which Torts In Violation Of The Law
Of Nations?, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 351 (2000–2001). Writing
in 2001 before the Supreme Court’s Sosa decision, Professor Dodge
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Most have tended to virtually read the word tort out of the statute and
to ignore the critical punctuation mark—that although not included in
the handwritten Judiciary Act of 1789,229 was quickly interpolated by
the federal judges in the 1790s discussing the ATS230—that separates
observed that “[t]here are at least four possible standards courts might utilize
to determine which torts in violation of the law of nations are actionable:
The most expansive would be to read the Alien Tort
Statute as authorizing the federal courts not just to apply
customary international law established by existing state
practice but to create new law, analogizing to Lincoln
Mills v. Textile Workers. The Filartiga court noted this
possibility but did not need to adopt it, and no court has
done so subsequently. A second possibility would be to
read the Alien Tort Statute, in accordance with its plain
language, to extend to all torts in violation of the law of
nations determined in the usual way—by state practice
followed out of a sense of legal obligation. This seems
to be what Filartiga intended, although only one court
has expressly adopted this reading. A third and arguably
narrower reading would limit suits under the Alien Tort
Statute to those that are “universal, definable, and
obligatory,” and a fourth reading would limit actionable
torts to a still narrower category of those that violate jus
cogens norms.
Id. at 352-53 (footnotes omitted).
229
See Transcript of Federal Judiciary Act (1789), available at http://w
ww.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=12&page=transcript. Origi
nal images of the handwritten documents may be viewed at http://www.ourd
ocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=12#.
230
See Judge Richard Peters in Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942,
947–48 (D. Pa 1793), and Judge Thomas Bee in Bolchos v. Darrel, Bee 74, 3
F. Cas. 810, No. 1607 (D.S.C. 1795). In Bochos, Judge Bee observed:
I was at first doubtful whether this court had jurisdiction,
Darrel's seizure, under the mortgage, having been made
on land. But as the original cause arose at sea, every
thing dependent on it is triable in the admiralty. Cro.
Eliz. 685, Yel. 135, Le Caux and Eden, and other cases
are full to this effect. If, indeed, I should refuse to take
cognizance of the cause, there would be a failure of
justice, for the court of common law of the state has
already dismissed the cause as belonging to my
jurisdiction in the admiralty. Besides, as the 9th section
of the judiciary act of congress [Act Sept. 24, 1789, 1
Stat. 77] gives this court concurrent jurisdiction with the
state courts and circuit court of the United States where
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the words “tort only” from the modifier “in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.” In contrast, in their
discussion of the ATS, both Federal District Judge Richard Peters in
1793 and Federal District Judge Thomas Bee in 1795 included a key
mark of punctuation—the profound comma—between the concept of
tort and the separate concept of a “violation of the law of nations.”231
While these judicial opinions did not center on that point, that two of
President Washington’s original federal trial judges naturally read the
comma into the statutory language certainly shows an understanding,
and a recognition of the importance, of punctuation that has in
modern ATS cases been entirely ignored.232 Effectively reading the

an alien sues for a tort, in violation of the law of
nations, or a treaty of the United States, I dismiss all
doubt upon this point.
3 F. Cas. at 810 (emphases added).
Similarly, Judge Peters had
independently observed in Moxon:
Damages may be superadded, but a proceeding for a
marine trespass in different, as it is entirely a suit for
damages, and not for the thing itself. Neither does this
suit for a specific return of the property, appear to be
included in the words of the judiciary act of the United
States, giving cognizance to this court of ‘all causes
where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the
laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States.’
Judiciary Act, § 9 [1 Stat. 76]. It cannot be called a suit
for a tort only, when the property, as well as damages
for the supposed trespass, are sought for.
17 F. Cas. at 947–48 (emphases added). For the identification of Richard
Peters as the judge in Moxon, see WILLIAM R. CASTRO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL 87–90 (U. So. Carolina
Pr. 2006), and for the importance of Judge Peters to the development of
American law during the early Republic, see, e.g., Joseph Whitla Stinson,
Opinions of Richard Peters, 1781–1817, 70 U. PA. L. REV. 197 (1921–1922);
Peter B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and
the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 26
(1978–1979).
231
See Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. 810.
232
Professors Bellia and Clark in a recent article have recognized the
issue:
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separate concept of tort out of the ATS, modern courts paraphrase the
statute as referring to an “action for any violation of international
law”233 or “for violation of standard international law norms that are
‘universal, definable, and obligatory.’”234 This misinterpretation is a
Another possible reading, however, is that “only”
modified “in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States” to emphasize that only those torts in
violation of the law of nations fell within the jurisdiction
that the ATS conferred. A significant class of tort claims
by aliens would not have involved law of nations
violations, including claims by enemy aliens, claims for
interference with real property rights, claims for private
wrongs without force or violence (such as slander), or
claims between aliens for injuries arising outside the US.
By placing “only” before “violations of the law of
nations,” Congress may have wished to emphasize that
federal courts could not hear this broader range of tort
claims under § 9. Moreover, in other instances the
drafters of the first Judiciary Act used the word “only” to
modify a subsequent prepositional phrase. A final
possibility is that “only” modifies the language that
appears both before and after it. In any event, the
meaning of the statute does not turn on whether “only”
was meant to emphasize only torts (and not breaches of
contract or debts) or only those torts in violation of the
law of nations (and not other torts). Under either
reading, the statute conferred jurisdiction only over torts
that also constituted law of nations violations.
Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the
Law Of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 518–19 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
In downplaying its significance, however, they miss the precision with which
Congress meant to communicate the intended scope of the ATS, thus
resulting in the circular analyses plaguing ATS decisions today, and missing
the critical parameters that the First Congress sought to place around this
important class of federal-court subject matter jurisdiction, as the author
explains at the conclusion of this subsection.
233
See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996)
(“[o]n its face, section 1350 requires the district courts to hear claims ‘by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations.’ . . . We
read the statute as requiring no more than an allegation of a violation of the
law of nations in order to invoke section 1350.”).
234
See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal.
1987); see also Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction
over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 88 (1981).
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judicial gloss that was made by Justice Souter in Sosa, but had its
origins earlier in Filartiga. In one of the first scholarly articles some
thirty-five years ago that parsed § 1350, Professor Kenneth Randall
correctly described how a reasonable person with legal training, but
without an instrumentalist agenda, would process the language of the
statute:
In order to establish jurisdiction under the
Alien Tort Statute, a plaintiff must first establish
that his or her action is for a tort only. Contrary to
the assertions in many opinions and commentaries,
this basic element of the statute does not refer to an
“international tort.” While international law may
provide remedies for certain types of “civil
wrongs,” the specific notion of a “tort,” at least in
name, does not exist in the international legal
system. The “tort” element of the statute refers
instead to a municipal tort under American law.
An Anglo-American legal concept, torts were
recognized as early as the eighteenth century.
Torts derived from the action of trespass, the
remedy for all “direct and immediate injuries . . .,”
whether caused by intentional or negligent conduct.
Since the term “torts” does not literally exist in
international law, but did exist in eighteenth
century America, it is logical to conclude that the
statute requires plaintiff to establish a common law
tort. An examination of the possible origin of the
statute supports the conclusion that the statute
refers to a municipal tort.235
235
Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law
Claims: Inquiries Into The Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1,
33–34 (1985–1986) (footnotes omitted). As Dean Randall acknowledges,
his view—with which the author is entire sympathy—was (and remains) a
minority view; but although a minority view, it is also the correct view. Id.
at 32–33. As Dean Randall noted, this approach is the one suggested by
Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren, expressing the “‘minority view’ that the statute
requires a municipal tort under American law plus a violation of the law of
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Unfortunately, as earlier observed, the courts which have
rendered the leading decisions in the area have chosen to operate on a
view of the statute that simply bears no reality to its words. As Dean
Randall observed over twenty-five years ago, “[m]any opinions
simply do not discuss whether a tort has occurred under municipal
law.”236 Disputes over whether the tort itself must be some kind of
international law cause of action or arise from international law, or
over whether § 1350 simply recognizes causes of action for
violations of international law, have taken the scholarship and the
judicial analyses so far from the text of the statute as to make the
whole enterprise seem a study in surrealism—one in which
ambiguity is “refined” out of what in fact is textual clarity.
Yet indeed, tort does have an independent and specific meaning,
and one that is fully consonant with the understanding of leading
lawyers of the early Republic. As an initial matter, despite some
speculation to the contrary,237 tort was a legal term of art that was in
use during the time of the Judiciary Act’s drafting and in the legal
discourse of the early Republic. While Blackstone, the leading legal
primer for colonial lawyers, did not make the assignation of tort
(apparently preferring instead the solidly Anglicized “private wrong”
rather than the Law-French tort),238 the term was hardly novel among
nations or a treaty,” as opposed to “‘majority view’” that drew, as in
Filartiga, only upon international law to determine liability. Id. at 37–38
(quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)).
236
Id. at 36 n.152.
237
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 261–64, 409–
27 (1973) (“All in all, tort law was not a highly developed field in 1776, or
for a good many years thereafter.”); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780–1860, at 85–99, 201 (1977)
(“Indeed, until the ideological triumph of the will theory of contracts after
1825, jurists did not yet perceive any fundamental conflict between
contractual and customary duties.”).
238
See Michael L. Rustad, Review: A REVISIONIST HISTORY OF TORT
LAW: FROM HOLMESIAN REALISM TO NEOCLASSICAL RATIONALISM, by Alan
Calnan, 15 L. & POL. BOOK REV. 350, 352–53 (2005), available at
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/calnan505.htm;
see
also Robert W. Drane & David J. Neal, On Moral Justifications for the
Tort/Crime Distinction, 68 CAL. L. REV. 398, 402 n.11 (1980) (citing 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2) (“Blackstone attempted to couch his
definition as more than an appeal to authority by arguing that crime involves
harm to public interests while tort involves only the interests of
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American lawyers. For example, a search of the Westlaw database
that collects all reportable cases from earlier eras (called AllcasesOld) for simply the term tort and a date restriction to cases decided
before 1840 239 produces some 1,975 federal and state cases
employing the word tort—an exceptional number of cases
considering this was an era when case reporting was barely in its
infancy and at best, done sporadically and ad hoc for most courts.240
The oldest of the reported cases to use the word tort (and to
distinguish it from contract) is a decision from a colonial Maryland
court that preceded the Judiciary Act by some fifty-five years.241 It
again appears in this colonial court in 1756, this time used
extensively both by the court, as well by counsel in the summary of
their argument, which is focused on the common-law form of action

individuals.”). Perhaps even more illuminating of the fog Blackstone’s
nascent concept of tort law, John F. Witt has observed:
In his Commentaries [Blackstone] worked excruciatingly
hard (and not always successfully) to trim the unruly
brambles of the common law into the kind of carefully
ordered rationality that characterized the civil law and
natural law traditions. As John Goldberg has recently
observed, Blackstone sought to do just this for the
smattering of common law actions that he grouped under
the rubric of “torts or wrongs.”
....
To the modern ear, Blackstone’s approach is at once
foreign and familiar. The motley assemblage of ancient
writs can leave the reader feeling a little like Jeremy
Bentham, who dismissed as ridiculous the entire
Blackstonian enterprise of finding reason hidden deep
within the common law’s historical nooks and crannies.
John Fabian Witt, Contingency, Immanence, and Inevitability in the Law of
Accidents, 1 J. TORT L., 1, 4–5 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
239
The search terms are: tort & da(bef 1840).
240
Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Decline and Fall of the American Judicial
Opinion, Part I: Back to the Future from the Roberts Court to Learned
Hand—Context and Congruence, 12 BARRY L. REV. 53 (2009).
241
Black v. Digges’ Ex’rs, 1 H. & McH. 153, (Provincial Court,
Proprietary Province of Maryland, 1744).
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known as trover 242 and the tort of conversion that underlies it. 243
Indeed, the court’s opinion cites to what appears to be some kind of
treatise, entitled Law of Torts, for the proposition that “[i]n trover the
conversion is the gist of the action.”244 Torts make an appearance in
a 1779 case from colonial Virginia in which the term was, as it would
be again in the Judiciary Act of 1789, used to describe the subject
matter jurisdiction of a court:
[t]he commissions of the crown gave the courts
which were established a most ample jurisdiction
over all maritime contracts, and over torts and
injuries, as well in ports as upon the high seas; and
acts of parliament enlarged, or rather recognized,
this jurisdiction, by giving or confirming
cognizance of all seizures for contraventions of the
revenue laws.245
The earliest federal courts, organized under
Confederation, also seemed no strangers to the
sense familiar to us, and used the word with a
familiarity that suggests it was well known and
242

the Articles of
word torts in the
comfort and easy
understood in the

F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: ALSO, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT
COMMON LAW: TWO COURSES OF LECTURES (A.H. Chaytor & W.J.
Whittaker eds., 1909) (“Select Writs—The Case Trover”), available at
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/maitland-formsofaction.asp (part of
the Internet Medieval Sourcebook).
243
Leach v. Slater, 1 H. & McH. 513, (Provincial Court, Proprietary
Province of Maryland 1773).
244
Id. As the defendant’s attorney, one S. Chase, is reported having
argued to the court:
There has been a demand and refusal, within three years,
therefore the act does not attach. Trover is an action
founded on a tort. The defendant must have been guilty
of some illegal act, to charge him with a conversion.
The whole tort consists in the wrongful conversion. 1
Burr. 31. The right to purchase is lawful, consequently
the user under that purchase is lawful. Suppose one
steals my horse and sells it, the purchaser is not guilty of
a wrong, nor subject to an action, before a demand and
refusal; if it were otherwise, a man might be made
answerable for a tort against his own intent.
Id.
245
In re First Case of the Judges, 4 Call 1, (Va. 1779) (emphasis
added).
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lawyers’ lexicon almost twenty years before the Judiciary Act of
1789. 246 The Superior Court of Connecticut used tort in 1786 to
contradistinction to pleas sounding in contract, as did courts in
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina. 247 Tort
was common enough parlance that in a 1790 case, the Superior Court
in Philadelphia could speak of common practices of juries
deliberating in torts cases—a discussion that will resonate with an
utmost contemporary ring with any active trial lawyer of the twentyfirst century:
The first objection, as to the manner of the jury
collecting the sense of its members, with regard to
the quantum of damages, does not appear to us to
be well founded, or at all similar to the case of
casting lots for their verdict. In torts and other
cases, where there is no ascertained demand, it can
seldom happen that jurymen will, at once, agree
upon a precise sum to be given, in damages; there
will necessarily arise a variety of opinions, and
mutual concessions must be expected; a middle
sum may, in many cases, be a good rule; and
though, it is possible, this mode may sometimes be
abused by a designing juryman, fixing upon an
extravagantly high, or low sum, yet unless such
abuse appears, the fraudulent design will not be
presumed.248
246

See, e.g., Keane v. The Gloucester, Bee 399, 2 U.S. 36, 39, 2 Dall.
36, 39, 14 F.Cas. 163 (Fed. Ct. App. 1782) (“[t]he libellants do not seek a
compensation for a wrong; they are not in pursuit of damages for a tort.”).
247
Bradley v. Camp, 1 Kirby 77, 1 Am. Dec. 13 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1787); accord Eastwick v. Hugg, 1 U.S. 222, 1 Dall. 222, (Pa. Com. Pl.
1787); Middleton’s Ex’rs v. Robinson, 1 Bay 58, 1 S.C.L. 58 (Courts of
Common Pleas and General Sessions of the Peace of South Carolina 1787);
Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. 357, 1 Dall. 357 (Pa. 1787); Brown v.
Belches, 1 Va. 9, 1 Wash. 9 (Va. 1791).
248
Cowperthwaite v. Jones, 2 U.S. 55, 56, 2 Dall. 55, 56 (Pa. Com. Pl.
Aug. 1790) (emphasis added). We find the word tort in common usage in
Virginia, too, as revealed by a 1790 case involving the tort of slander to title.
Ross v. Pines, 3 Call 568, 7 Va. 568 (Va. 1790) (“With respect to the
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By 1800, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had gone so far as
to recognize that gross negligence by a maritime pilot, although
licensed by the state, was actionable as the tort of negligence—and
that court was perfectly comfortable with using the word negligence
as though it were part of the common legal parlance, just a decade
after the Judiciary Act of 1789. 249 Indeed, we find in a South
Carolina case (and a state statute discussed in that case) a list of
causes of action denominated as torts to include “trespass, trover,
detinue, slander, or assault and battery or other action, arising merely
from tort . . . .”250
Within this milieu, a federal district court in 1796 had
occasion to cite to the ATS in support of its exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction over a case brought by a sea captain claiming
ownership of a group of enslaved individuals. 251 Federal District
Judge Thomas Bee (who, in this nascent era of court reporting as
averred to above reported his own case decisions), like the many
courts of this era surveyed above, used the term tort within the ATS
just as naturally and comfortably as the numerous cases used the
word in a wide variety of other legal contexts—and, obviously taking
the familiarity of his audience into account, had no need to pause
damages, the evidence does not show the amount; but, this being a tort, the
jury was not bound by exact calculation.” (emphasis added)); accord
Hoomes v. Kuhn, 4 Call 274, 8 Va. 274 (Va. 1791) (in a civil suit for assault
and battery, the court observed that it “never interferes with the verdict in an
action of tort, unless the sum found is excessive”). Far from being
exceptional, references to torts in a manner that suggested an assumption that
the decision’s audiences are both comfortable and familiar occur in other
contexts as well. See, e.g., Shelton v. Shelton, 1 Va. 53, 1 Wash. 53 (Va.
1791) (“2 Vern. 747, was a hard case in itself, and I believe would not at this
day be so determined, under its particular circumstances. But the rule there
laid down seems a good general one, ‘that where goods in a house are
devised, a voluntary removal of them in the testator’s life time, without tort
or fraud, is a revocation.’” (emphasis added)).
249
See Bussy v. Donaldson, 4 U.S. 206, 4 Dall. 206, 1 L.Ed. 802 (Pa.
1800).
250
State v. Huntington, 1 Tread. 325, 3 Brev. 111, 5 S.C.L. 111, 6
S.C.L. 325, (S.C. Const. Ct. App. 1813).
251
Bolchos v. Darrel, Bee 74, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795). Judge Bee
described the nature of the action as follows: “Captain Bolchos captured and
brought into this port a Spanish prize; on board of which were these slaves,
formerly mortgaged to Savage, whose agent, [Edward] Darrel, by virtue of
Savage’s mortgage, seized and sold them.” Id.
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over the term as if it would be exceptional, unique, or different than
it was typically used as a feature of America’s municipal law. 252
There is nothing “alien” about Congress’s use of the word tort in the
Judiciary Act; it means nothing more, nor nothing less, than the term
meant in the currency of legal language of the colonial and the early
252

Id. Judge Bee ultimately determined that a U.S.–France treaty
precluded the return of the enslaved persons to the party claiming ownership
by mortgage:
It is certain that the law of nations would adjudge neutral
property, thus circumstanced, to be restored to its neutral
owner; but the 14th article of the treaty with France
alters that law, by stipulating that the property of friends
found on board the vessels of an enemy shall be
forfeited. Let these negroes, or the money arising from
the sale, be delivered to the libellant.
Id. at 811. It is a bitter irony that the first time the ATS appears in reported
decisions was in a case in which it was being invoked by slaveholders in aid
of an alleged property right—a generation after Lord Mansfield’s decision in
R v. Knowles, ex parte Somersett (1772) 20 State Tr 1, declaring slavery to
be against the law of England and declaring that no one claimed to be a slave
could be forcibly removed from England. Id. (“no master ever was allowed
here to take a slave by force to be sold abroad because he had deserted from
his service, or for any other reason whatever; we cannot say the cause set
forth by this return is allowed or approved of by the laws of this kingdom,
therefore the man must be discharged.”). See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Requiem
For A Heavyweight, 67 ALB. L. REV. 965, 992 (citing R. KENT NEWMYER,
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC
368 (1985)) (noting that in the similar case of L’Amistad, Justice Story
hewed closely to the legal linguistics of property law in freeing slaves
escaped from Spanish claimants, viewing the issue before him “‘not [as]
whether slavery in general was good, bad, moral, or legal but whether certain
Spaniards owned certain Africans.’”). Though clearly a man limited by his
times, Judge Bee was nonetheless a remarkable jurist of the early Republic
period, serving as the Federal District Judge in South Carolina for twentytwo years. See Thomas M. Stubbs, South Carolina’s Federal Justices and
Judges, 8 S.C.L.Q. 403, 407 (1955–1956); see also Honorable Thomas Bee,
SINGLETONFAMILY.ORG http://www.singletonfamily.org/getperson.php?pers
onID=I275635&tree=1 (last visited May 21, 2013) (noting that Judge Bee
hosted President Washington at Bee’s Church Street home during a 1791
visit to Charleston, and that President Washington had appointed Bee to the
federal judgeship the year before).
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Republic era. 253 As Professors Bellia and Clark observe in their
recent article elucidating the ATS within the context of “the law of
nations” as it was understood in the eighteenth century:
§ 14 of the Judiciary Act [of 1789] authorized
federal courts to issue common law writs that “may
be necessary for the exercise of their respective
jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and
usages of law.” The First Congress soon thereafter
provided in the Process Act of 1789 that “the forms
of writs and executions . . . in the circuit and
district courts, in suits at common law, shall be the
same in each state respectively as are now used or
allowed in the supreme courts of the same.”
Although the Sosa Court correctly concluded that
federal courts would employ the common law
forms of action in ATS cases, the Court was
apparently unaware that Congress had expressly
directed federal courts to do so in these statutes.
Thus, when Congress conferred jurisdiction upon
federal courts to hear alien claims “for a tort only
in violation of the law of nations or treaty of the
United States,” it fully expected them to recognize
and employ the common law causes of action then
in use.254
What makes a tort one that also violates the law of nations is the
character of the actors—such as a diplomat as the victim of a tort or
the circumstances of its commission—such as the failure to protect
an alien or her property while in American territory, i.e., the safe-

253

For a differing viewpoint that states that it reaches an expansive
interpretation that is nonetheless more faithful to the intent of Congress in
adopting the Judiciary Act, see William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of
the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the “Originalists”, 19 HASTINGS INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996). Without elaborating this footnote into a
separate law review article of its own, the author simply notes here that, as
reflected throughout this article, he disagrees with a number of Professor
Dodge’s inferences, which he sees as inferences that, while drawn from
eighteenth century materials, are drawn with a twentieth century perspective
that creates cognitive dissonance.
254
Bellia & Clark, supra note 232, at 545.
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conduct theory of the ATS.255 Read in this way, the statute entirely
avoids the problems expressed in a July 1789 letter from Edmund
Pendleton256 to James Madison (that scholars only recently seem to
255

Thomas D. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 830 (2006); Bellia & Clark, supra note 232, at 540–45.
As Professors Bellia and Clark observe, the statute
was designed to redress ordinary torts committed by
private US citizens against aliens. The reason was
simple: any intentional common law tort committed with
force by a US citizen against the person or property of an
alien constituted a violation of the law of nations and
imposed an obligation on the United States to redress the
injury or become responsible to the alien’s nation. Thus,
it was the basic party alignment—rather than some
specific characteristic of the underlying intentional tort—
that triggered jurisdiction under the ATS.
Id. at 542–43. See also M. Anderson Berry, Whether Foreigner or Alien: A
New Look at the Original Language of the Alien Tort Statute, 27 BERKELEY
J. INT’L LAW. 316, 320–22 (2009) (arguing that the House emendation of
“foreigner” from the Senate Bill to “alien” in the Judiciary Act as passed
evidences an even further narrowing of the scope of the ATS to apply:
“Considering Article III of the Constitution and the related provisions in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, along with the late eighteenth century legal,
international, and general uses and definitions of “alien” and “foreigner”—in
conjunction with relevant changes that occurred from the Senate’s
handwritten draft of the judicial bill through subsequent codifications of
relevant sections of the Judiciary Act of 1789—it is fair to say that an
understanding of what Congress intended by the deceptively simple change
from “foreigner” to “alien” was a narrowing of the ATS; making it available
to “aliens” but not to “foreigners,” . . . in other words, making it available
only to residents of the United States.”).
256
While perhaps not as well known as the other Founders, Pendleton
served through the cursus honorum of public service in the Revolutionary
period and the early Republic, holding the offices, among others, of Member
of the Virginia Committee of Revisors (with Thomas Jefferson), President of
the Constitutional Ratifying Convention in Virginia, President of Virginia’s
Committee of Public Safety (equivalent of Governor), and President (Chief
Justice) of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. See Wesley J. Campbell,
Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104, 1131
(2012); David A. Erhart, “I Am In Control Here”: Constitutional And
Practical Questions Regarding Presidential Succession, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L.
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have brought to the table, so to speak, in the discussion of the ATS’s
original meaning):
[W]hat is meant by a Tort? Is it
intended to include suits for the Recovery
of debts, or on breach of Contracts, as a
reference to the laws of Nations & Federal
treaties seems to indicate; or does it only
embrace Personal wrongs, according to
[its] usual legal meaning, or violations of
Personal or Official privilege of
foreigners? [I]n the last case it will
probably be unexceptionable, in the
former, very inconvenient.257
Looking at the ATS from a non-anachronistic viewpoint (i.e.,
from the viewpoint of contemporaries such as Judges Richard Peters
and Thomas Bee and Congressman Edmund Pendleton) would
greatly facilitate—and simplify—its application. First, it would
remove forms of liability based on negligence or absolute fault that
would have been exotic, hybrid, and untenable to eighteenth century
legal minds, which some courts have nonetheless imposed. 258
Second, it would end the elusive hunt set off by Sosa’s assumption
that courts have a limited common law power to recognize new
REV. 323, 336 n.115 (2013); William G. Merkel, A Founding Father on
Trial: Jefferson’s Rights Talk and the Problem of Slavery During the
Revolutionary Period, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 603 n.20 (2012); Benjamin
H. Barton, An Article I Theory of the Inherent Powers of the Federal Courts,
61 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 23 (2011); Michael J. Klarman, The Founding
Revisited, 125 HARV. L. REV. 544, 570 n.153 (2011) (book review).
257
Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (July 3, 1789), in
4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789–1800, 444, 446 (Maeva Marcus & James R. Perry eds., 1992),
quoted in Bellia & Clark, supra note 232, at 518 n.352; also in Curtis A.
Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 621
(2002).
258
See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), and note
especially the very strong dissent, 562 F.3d at 191, 194–95 (Wesley, J.,
dissenting) (“Instead of following and applying our framework, the majority
substitutes in its place a compelling narrative,” employing “several sources
that it believes demonstrate a customary norm against medical
experimentation by non-state entities and weaves them together to reach its
conclusion.”).
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claims “based on the present-day law of nations” so long as they
“rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms.” 259 Third, it would eliminate the “state
actor” requirement that Sosa read into the ATS, 260 which is
confusing, ahistorical, and has led to a tortured jurisprudence as ATS
plaintiffs have tried to plead around it using “aiding and abetting”
allegations.261
3.

CAN A CORPORATION BE A PROPER ATS DEFENDANT?

Although the Second Circuit’s rationale in Kiobel—that
corporations cannot be proper defendants in ATS corporations
because “customary international law has steadfastly rejected the
notion of corporate liability for international crimes, and no
international tribunal has ever held a corporation liable for a violation
of the law of nations”262—was both unprecedented263 and created the
circuit split on which the Supreme Court relied on granting certiorari
in the first place, the court did not decide that issue.264 The extensive
259

See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004).
See, e.g., Michael Giuseppe Congiu, From Rights to Remedies: The
Alien Tort Claims Act, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the State Action
Requirement, 2 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 427 (2005–2006).
261
See, e.g., Michael Garvey, Comment, Corporate Aiding and
Abetting Liability under the Alien Tort Statute: A Legislative Prerogative, 29
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 381 (2009); see also James Morrisey, Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.: Aiding and Abetting Liability
under the Alien Tort Statute, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 144 (2011).
262
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010),
aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
263
Geoffrey Pariza, Genocide, Inc.: Corporate Immunity to Violations
of International Law after Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 8 LOY. U. CHI.
INT’L L. REV. 229, 247 (2010–2011) (observing that “Kiobel marks a
dramatic departure from the consensus among U.S. courts”).
264
The Second Circuit stands alone in its view of per se exemption of
corporations from the ATS. Compare Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co.,
LLC, 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,
671 F.3d 736, 748–49 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, NO. 11-649, 2013 WL 1704704
260
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briefing by the parties, by amici, by the Solicitor General on behalf
of the United States, and the oral argument held in February 2012 all
went for naught. It might very well seem nothing short of amazing—
indeed, appalling—that the Court appeared to have ducked the very
issue on which the case was decided by the Second Circuit.
Corporations have filed numerous motions to dismiss on the basis of
the Second Circuit panel’s holding in Kiobel,265 and the outcome of
those motions—indeed, the precedential effect of the Kiobel panel
decision in the Second Circuit itself, where a large portion of ATS
cases have been filed—remains unsettled, going on two and a half
years after the Kiobel panel filed its maverick decision in October
2010.
The corporate liability issue, 266 however, is a faux issue—one
that, frankly, some Second Circuit judges, seemingly in frustration

(U.S. Apr. 22, 2013); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11(D.C. Cir.
2011); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008);
Beanal v. Freeport–McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir.1999);
Krishanthi v. Rajaratnam, No. 09–CV–05395, 2011 WL 2607108 (D.N.J.
June 11, 2011). See Kristin L. Leveille, Debate Two Hundred Years in the
Making: Corporate Liability and the Presumption against Extraterritoriality
under the Alien Tort Statute, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 653 (2012).
265
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Karnes, Comment, Pirates Incorporated?:
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and the Uncertain State of Corporate
Liability for Human Rights Violations Under the Alien Tort Statute, 60
BUFFALO L. REV. 823 (2012); Pariza, supra note 263, at 253 n.231 (citing
Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., No. 10 Civ 5646(JSR), 2010 WL 4967827 at *3
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint alleging Chevron had
aided Sadam Hussein commit human rights abuses because corporations
cannot be liable for violations of international law)); see also Aziz v. Alcolac
Inc., 2009 cv 00869, appeal docketed, No. 10-1908 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2010)
(requesting dismissal on the grounds that corporations cannot be liable for
violations of international law under the ATS); Flomo v. Firestone Natural
Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 2d 810, 818 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (dismissing Liberian
children’s claims of child labor, holding that corporate liability is not a rule
of customary international law); Viera v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1:09-cv-0495RLY-DML, 2010 WL 3893791 at *5 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010) (dismissing
Brazilian residents’ claims of environmental contamination because ATS
action may not be maintained against corporate defendant), aff’d on other
grounds, 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011).
266
Jonathan Drimmer, Resurrection Ecology and The Evolution Of The
Corporate Alien Tort Movement, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 989 (2012); Lorelle
Londis, Corporation Face of the Alien Tort Claims Act: How an Old Statute
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with the inability of the Circuit to tame the corporate campaigns
being waged using the ATS as the tool and the Southern District of
New York as the workshop, 267 produced as if out of thin air. 268
While the Second Circuit opinion in Kiobel expended great energy
on the contemporary debate269 over corporate liability for tort, neither
Kiobel, nor Sosa for that matter, bother to look at a far more
significant question, one most pertinent to the question of
interpreting § 1350: Did American law recognize that a corporation
had the juridical personality to be a proper defendant for a tort claim
in a civil court of general jurisdiction?
The status of a variety of civil practice concepts and rules during
the early Republic is challenging to discern. Simultaneously, the
country was passing from colonial status through revolution and war
to an emergent independent nation. At the same time, a distinct
American legal system and experimental philosophy of law were
arising and reifying.
The English Common Law was,
simultaneously, employed as the foundation for the new legal order
while at the same time being constrained, and in some quarters, even
reviled, as a badge of colonial servitude. These political and legal
Mandates a New Understanding of Global Interdependence, 57 ME. L. REV.
141 (2005).
267
See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116–17 (Cabranes, J.). Judge Cabranes
barely suppressed his apparent view that the ATS is little more than a
demand for extortion followed by a press conference. See id. Corporate
counsels have expressed even less generous views. See, e.g., Andrew J.
Pincus & Kevin Ranlett, Class Action Trends—U.S. Supreme Court—
Supreme Court Holds That Alien Tort Statute Doesn’t Apply
Extraterritorially, MAYER-BROWN CLASS DEFENSE: CUTTING-EDGE ISSUES
IN
CLASS-ACTION
LAW
&
POLICY,
Apr.
17,
2013,
http://www.classdefenseblog.com/2013/04/17/supreme-court-holds-thatalien-tort-statute-doesnt-apply-extraterritorially/.
268
Judge Cabranes took some umbrage at a similar suggestion made by
Judge Pierre Leval, who concurred in the judgment but strongly dissented
from the entirety of Judge Cabranes’s corporate liability analysis. Kiobel,
621 F.3d at 122 n.24. Other commentators have observed that “Judge
Leval’s lengthy concurrence is more of a scathing dissent insofar as it
completely rejects the majority’s rationale.” Pariza, supra note 259, at 241.
269
See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A
Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
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changes were also accompanied by economic transformation.270 In
no area was this more dynamic than in the origins of corporate form
and corporate doctrine in American law. As Morton Horowitz has
observed, “[a]s late as 1780, colonial legislatures had conferred
charters on only seven business corporations, and a decade later the
number had increased to but forty. However, in the last ten years of
the eighteenth century, 295 additional corporate charters were
granted.” 271 Against this expanding milieu, the activities of these
early corporations began to create conflict with other citizens who
claimed injury as a result. Among these injuries were various torts.
Case law in this era is sparse, for the practices regarding the
publication of court decisions had not taken hold, and the willingness
to make financial commitments to such an enterprise had not yet
taken the powerful hold they would in the second half of the
nineteenth century.272 Yet, the court decisions accessible from the
early Republic show clear support for corporate entity liability for
tort.
Riddle v. Proprietors of Merrimack River Locks and Canals273
provides an early example. The corporate entity responsible for the
construction and operation of a canal contended that a corporation
was not a proper defendant in a boat owner’s claim for damages due
to negligence (at the time called “trespass on the case”) in the
construction and operation of the canal. Citing English precedent
from no less an authority than Lord Mansfield in Mayor of Lynn v.
270

The foregoing passage sprang full-formed from the author’s head,
somewhat like the goddess Athena is said to have sprung from the head of
Zeus, as the product of much reading and reflection since he first wrote on
legal matters of the Colonial Era (Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Comment,
Compelling Governmental Interest Jurisprudence of the Burger Court: A
New Perspective on Roe v. Wade, 50 ALB. L. REV. 675 (1986)) and is
perhaps symptomatic of a tendency in the author, brought to his attention by
the late Dean John E. Ryan (1938–2008), to be “Van Detta on everything.”
However, support for these ideas may generally be found in Douglas Arner,
Development of the American Law of Corporations to 1832, 55 SMU L. REV.
23, 43-50 (2002).
271
MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1780–1860, at 112 (1977) (citing J.S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER
HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 24 (1917)).
272
Van Detta, The Decline and Fall of the American Judicial Opinion,
Part I, supra note 240, at 68–69 & n.80 (discussing the early history of case
reporting practices).
273
7 Mass. 169, 1810 WL 1012 (Mass. 1810).
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Turner, the court rejected the entity’s arguments: “By this decision it
is settled that case will lie against a corporation for neglect of a
corporate duty, by which the plaintiff suffers.” 274 Similar early
decisions came from courts in New Hampshire and New York. 275
274

Id. at 12 (citing Cowp. 86).
Looking retrospectively, the Connecticut Supreme Court collected
the following early authorities in an 1867 decision on the question of
corporate liability for negligence:
But when a corporation is charged with the performance
of some public duty, as a condition, express or implied,
upon which it holds its corporate powers; when a grant is
made to a corporation of some special power or privilege
at its request, out of which public duties grow; and when
some special duty is imposed upon a corporation not
belonging to it under the general law with its consent; in
these and like cases, if the corporation is guilty of
negligence in the discharge of such duty, thereby causing
injury to another, it is liable to an action in favor of the
party injured. The Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, Cowper,
86; Henly v. The Mayor of Lyme, 5 Bingham, 91;
Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. Hamp., 284; Riddle v.
Proprietors of Locks and Canals, 7 Mass., 187; Bigelow
v. Randolph, 14 Gray, 543; Conrad v. Village of Ithaca,
16 N. York, 158; Weet v. Trustees of the Village of
Brockport, 16 N. York, 161.
Jones v. City of New Haven, 34 Conn. 1, 8 (1867). Obviously, the extent of
corporate liability was to grow further, and to evolve past some of the
formalistic distinctions that these earlier courts made about the
circumstances under which a corporation could be held liable for negligence.
This evolution started in the early Republic, with cases like Riddle, where
courts began the process of moving away from the “model . . . [based on] the
eighteenth century conception of a municipal corporation . . . .” Horowitz,
supra note 271, at 113. Those seeking to exploit the benefits of the corporate
form while shedding burdens were as assiduous in that era in that pursuit as
their twenty-first century heirs; this is well-illustrated by Professor Horowitz:
For a time, the corporation continued to occupy a
twilight zone in the eyes of the law, sometimes
conceived of as a public instrumentality, at other times
regarded as a private entity. While they sought to
emphasize their recently acknowledged private nature
when claiming constitutional protection of corporate
275
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property, corporation continued to underline their public
service functions in order to claim both the power of
eminent domain and freedom from competition.
Attempting to take advantage of the eighteenth century
notion that public instrumentalities were protected from
competition, corporations continued to argue both that
their charters were grants of exclusive property interests
and that economic rivalry was, in effect, a private law
nuisance to property.
Id. at 114. Other early cases holding corporate entities liable to tort
claimants include Weld v. Proprietors of Side Booms in Androscoggin River,
6 Greenl. 93, 93, 6 Me. 93, 99, 1829 WL 291, *5 (Me. May Term 1829);
Chesnut Hill & Springhouse Turnpike Co. v. Rutter, 4 Serg. & Rawle 6, 8
Am. Dec. 675, McCready v. Philadelphia Guardians of the Poor, 9 Serg. &
Rawle 94, 11 Am. Dec. 667, 1822 WL 1992 (Pa. 1822) (holding that the
actions of trover and trespass for mesne profits lie against guardians of the
poor who had been incorporated by act of the state assembly); Goshen &
Sharon Turnpike Co. v. Sears 7 Conn. 86 (1829) (“[O]wners of public roads
were always bound to repair them, and liable for damages occasioned by
their neglect, as already shewn. Corporations are artificial persons, and, for
certain purposes, are considered as natural ones; e.g. they have been
denominated occupiers of land, deemed inhabitants of cities, &c. and bound
to repair bridges ratione tenuroe suoe terrarum. They have sued, and have
been sued, as citizens.”); see also Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Greenl. 361,
1 Me. 361, 1821 WL 290 (Me.), 10 Am. Dec. 88 (1821) (finding
corporations answerable to suit, citing authorities where the suit against the
corporate defendant sounded in tort, but without specifically stating whether
the suit sub judice sounded in tort); Lyman v. White River Bridge Co., 2 Aik.
255, 16 Am. Dec. 205, 1827 WL 1380 (Vt. 1827). In White, the Vermont
Supreme Court provided some very clear-minded reasoning, reflective of
what obviously was a strong current in American law flowing from the
Republic’s birth:
This case, and the others referred to, are entirely
decisive, that a corporation, as such, may be sued in an
action on the case for a tort.
But it is said, that, admitting that a corporation is
liable in an action on the case for a tort, yet it cannot
commit a trespass, or be answerable in that form of
action. But if an action on the case will lie against a
corporation for a tort, there seems to be no good reason
why trespass will not also lie. The distinction between
the two actions is not, whether the act complained of was
accompanied with force, or whether there was an intent
to do the injury; but whether the injury was the direct
and immediate effect of the act complained of, or was
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The federal courts of the early Republic, in cases such as the 1827
federal circuit decision in Fowle v. Corporation of Alexandria, also
appear to have taken cognizance of Riddle and its general principle
of corporate liability for negligence, although continuing to treat
“public” corporations more leniently than private ones.276

the collateral consequence of some act previously done.
If a corporation is liable in case for consequential
damages, proceeding from an act authorized by them,
they may, and ought to be liable in trespass, for an
immediate or direct injury, arising from an act authorized
by them, or done by their command. Indeed, there seems
to be no difference, either on principle, or on technical
grounds, as to the liability of a corporation, in actions of
the case ex delicto, and actions of trespass.
Lyman v. White River Bridge Co., 2 Aik. 255, 16 Am. Dec. 205, 1827 WL
1380 (Vt. 1827). Some courts, while recognizing corporate tort liability,
excepted certain tort claims based on personal assault, battery, and trespass.
See, e.g., Orr v. Bank of U.S., 1822 WL 4, *5, 1 Ohio 36, 43, 13 Am. Dec.
588, 588, 1 Hammond 36, 36 (Ohio Apr. Term 1822). The reasoning for
decisions such as Orr was explained seventeen years later by the same court:
The whole reasoning proceeds upon the inconsistency of
suing a corporation in a form of action which
presupposes the injury to have been committed with
force and arms, and is, therefore, equally applicable to
trespass upon the person and upon reality. It is true the
objection may be denominated a technical one; but even
a technical rule, after it has become a general one, should
for that reason alone be preserved, unless manifest
inconvenience would be the consequence. But here none
such can result. The individual members of the
corporation would be liable in their personal capacity, if
the circumstances of the case would warrant it.
Foote v. City of Cincinatti, 9 Ohio 31, 33–34 (1839).
276
Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 398,
409–10 (U.S. 1830), aff’g, 3 Cranch C.C. 70, 9 F. Cas. 606, 3 D.C. 70, No.
4993 (C.C.D. Dist. Col. Apr. Term 1827). The case involved allegations that
the municipal corporation had not required the statutory bond for a particular
auctioneer, who failed to remit to the plaintiff the monies earned from
auctioning goods for plaintiff, and who turned out to be entirely insolvent.
The bond requirement was intended to provide a measure of compensatory
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Any doubts about the state of the law must be resolved in favor
of a general understanding that private corporations were held liable
for torts, and the support comes from no less an authority than Chief
Justice Marshall, writing in an appeal from the federal circuit
decision in Fowle:
The common council has granted a license to carry
on the trade of an auctioneer, which the law did not
empower that body to grant.
Is the town
responsible for the losses sustained by individuals
from the fraudulent conduct of the auctioneer? He
is not the officer or agent of the corporation, but is
understood to act for himself as entirely as a tavern
keeper, or any other person who may carry on any
business under a license from the corporate body.
Is a municipal corporation, established for the
general purposes of government, with limited
legislative powers, liable for losses consequent on
its having misconstrued the extent of its powers, in
granting a license which it had no authority to
grant, without taking that security for the conduct
of the person obtaining the license, which its own
ordinances had been supposed to require, and
which might protect those who transacted business
with the persons acting under the license? We find
no case in which this principle has been affirmed.
That corporations are bound by their contracts
is admitted; that money corporations, or those
carrying on business for themselves, are liable for
torts is well settled: but that a legislative
corporation, established as a part of the
government of the country, is liable for losses
sustained by a non-feasance, by an omission of the
corporate body to observe a law of its own, in
which no penalty is provided, is a principle for
which we can find no precedent.277
insurance to consignors, such as plaintiff, who were injured by an
auctioneer’s misfeasance or nonfeasance.
277
Fowle, 28 U.S. at 409–10 (emphasis added). The distinction being
drawn is between public corporations, “such as towns and societies,” versus
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Thus, in the mind of one of the contemporaries politically and
professionally connected to the drafters of the Judiciary Act of
1789,278 which included the ATS, it was well settled “[t]hat money
corporations, or those carrying on business for themselves, are liable
for torts.”279

money corporations, which were the privately organized corporations for
profit with which we are familiar today, as is evident from the explanation
offered by Justice Ingersoll of the Supreme Court of Errors in Connecticut,
in a case in which a money corporation’s power was challenged to enact “a
by-law, duly made and passed by said company, on the 20th day of
September, 1810 . . . providing, that at all future meetings of said company,
‘the vote should be determined by the majority of the shares, which each
vote should represent, either as his own property, or as attorney for other
persons.” State ex rel. Kilbourn v. Tudor, 5 Day 329, 1812 WL 131 (Conn.),
5 Am. Dec. 162, at *3, *4–*5 (Conn. 1812) (noting that private, “money”
corporations have the powers of judicial persons).
278
John Marshall was serving in the Virginia House of Burgesses at the
time, although he had been a delegate to Virginia’s ratification convention.
The Committee in Philadelphia impressed to draft the Judiciary Act included
Marshall’s fellow Virginia politician, Richard Henry Lee, as well as
Ellsworth, Paterson, McClay, Strong, Basset, Few, and Wingate. They were
to “‘comprise a Committee, to bring in a bill for organizing the Judiciary of
the United States.’” Henry J. Bourguignon, The Federal Key To The
Judiciary Act Of 1789, 46 S.C. L. REV. 647, 667 (1995).
279
In an 1839 decision, Justice Bates of the Supreme Court of
Delaware made the most well-written, thoughtful, and scholarly survey of
the law of corporate liability for tort, as it was at the dawn of the Republic, as
it had developed since that time, and as it was developing into the
foreseeable future: “it is much more reasonable to say that where a
corporation is authorized by law to make a road, if any injury is done in the
course of making that road by the persons employed under its authority, it
shall be responsible in the same manner that an individual is responsible for
the acts of his servants touching his business,” and that “there is no solid
ground for a distinction between contracts and torts.” Whiteman v.
Wilmington & S.R. Co, 2 Harr. 514, 2 Del. 514, 1839 WL 172, at *5–*6
(Del. Super. Ct. 1839). Justice Bates rejected the corporation’s advocacy of
a liability exemption, presciently observing that “[t]here is certainly nothing
in reason or justice to entitle them to the exemption claimed. Numerous as
they have become, and constantly multiplying in the midst of us as they are,
it would be unjust to society, as well as unreasonable in itself, to suffer them
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This history—coupled with a proper interpretation of the ATS
that treats “tort” and “violation of the law of nations” as separate
elements—dispenses with the entirely fallacious reasoning provided
in Judge Cabranes’ majority opinion for the Second Circuit panel in
Kiobel. Judge Leval’s elaborate critique of Judge Cabranes’ majority
opinion is a most worthy one280—but, as he is wont to do, Judge
Richard Posner boiled the many pages of Leval’s arguments down to
a very straightforward set of propositions in an opinion for his circuit
soundly and emphatically rejecting Judge Cabranes’ reasoning:
The outlier is the split decision in Kiobel .
. ., which indeed held that because
corporations have never been prosecuted,
whether criminally or civilly, for violating
customary international law, there can’t
be said to be a principle of customary
international law that binds a corporation.
The factual premise of the majority
opinion in the Kiobel case is incorrect. At
the end of the Second World War the
allied
powers
dissolved
German
corporations that had assisted the Nazi
war effort, along with Nazi government
and party organizations—and did so on
the authority of customary international
law. . . . The second of these [dissolution
orders] found that I.G. Farben (the
German chemical cartel) had “knowingly
and prominently engaged in building up
and maintaining the German war
potential,” and it ordered the seizure of all
its assets and that some of them be made
“available for reparations.”
And suppose no corporation had ever been
punished for violating customary international law.

to escape the consequences of direct injuries inflicted upon citizens by their
agents in the prosecution of their business.” Id.
280
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 154–88 (Leval, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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There is always a first time for litigation to enforce
a norm; there has to be.281
Judge Posner then proceeded to pose a thought-provoking question to
which the Kiobel majority had seemed oblivious:
We have to consider why corporations have
rarely been prosecuted criminally or civilly for
violating customary international law; maybe
there’s a compelling reason. But it seems not; it
seems rather that the paucity of cases reflects a
desire to keep liability, whether personal or
institutional, for such violations within tight
bounds by confining it to abhorrent conduct—the
kind of conduct that invites criminal sanctions. It
would have seemed tepid to charge the Nazi war
criminals with battery, wrongful death, false
imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, fraud, conversion, trespass, medical
malpractice, or other torts. And it was natural in
light of the perceived effect of the Nuremberg trials
on German and international opinion concerning
the type of practices in which Hitler’s government
had engaged that a tradition would develop of
punishing violations of customary international law
by means of national or international criminal
proceedings; it was a way of underscoring the
gravity of violating customary international law.282
Judge Posner then illuminated several other points to bring his
concise analysis full-circle, noting that “[t]he Alien Tort Statute,
moreover, is civil, and corporate tort liability is common around the
world,” and thus,
[i]f a corporation complicit in Nazi war crimes
could be punished criminally for violating
customary international law, as we believe it could
281
Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th
Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
282
Id. at 1018.
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be, then a fortiori if the board of directors of a
corporation directs the corporation’s managers to
commit war crimes, engage in piracy, abuse
ambassadors, or use slave labor, the corporation
can be civilly liable.283
The Supreme Court in Kiobel missed an opportunity to resolve
the issue that brought the case to the Court in the first place, by
simply citing, even in a footnote, Judge Posner’s reasoning with
approval. Of course, Judge Posner’s reasoning is persuasive of its
own accord and does not need the sanction of a Supreme Court
majority to establish its correctness. Considering how closely the
Second Circuit was divided on the plaintiffs-appellants’ en banc
rehearing petition and that the Second Circuit prior to Kiobel had
shown no difficulty with corporate liability under the ATS, 284 one
can only hope that going forward, the circuit will abandon the illstarred reasoning of the Kiobel panel and will choose no longer to
follow it as circuit law, both in light of its outlier status and the
evident disdain with which all nine Justices treated it by assuming
corporate liability sub silentio in all four opinions they filed in Kiobel
and by feeling no need to state the obvious—that Judge Cabranes
was, as Judge Posner so politely put it, “incorrect.”
4. LINGERING ISSUES FOR FORUM NON CONVENIENS, POLITICAL
QUESTION DOCTRINE, ACT-OF-STATE DOCTRINE, EXHAUSTION OF
LOCAL REMEDIES IN ATS SUITS—AND THE COUP DE GRÂCE OF
FEDERAL PLEADING IN THE TWOMBLY-IQBAL AGE
Alstom and other MNEs are unlikely to face a Kiobel-like ATS
suit over FDI after the Supreme Court has put to rest the notion of
such “foreign-cubed” lawsuits. However, E.U.-based MNEs might
very well see ATS suits in scenarios in which the ATS claims might
be said to “touch and concern the territory of the United States.”
Such ATS suits would then shift the focus once again to the
intractable and perennial procedural issues that are of unique
uncertainty and complexity in ATS cases.
While some
commentators have criticized the use of procedural dismissals in

283

Id. at 1019–21 (citations omitted).
E.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 91–92 (2d
Cir. 2000); see Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir.2009).
284
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ATS cases,285 the procedural issues are not phantoms, but rather, are
quite substantial in the context of any transnational litigation,
especially those involving FDIs generally and even more
specifically, FDIs that require substantial corporate cooperation and
coordination with the host country’s government. Among these
unresolved issues are whether ATS claims require prudential
exhaustion, 286 are particularly vulnerable to forum non conveniens
dismissals,287 raise non-judiciable political questions,288 are barred by
the act-of-state doctrine, 289 require state-action to be proven; 290
whether the ATS statute of limitations should be “borrowed” from
the ten-year period adopted under the TVPA; 291 and whether the
executive branch should be invited to submit statements of interest in
285

Rosaleen T. O’Gara, The Use Of Procedural Dismissals Under The
Alien Tort Statute, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 797 (2010).
286
Ron A. Ghatan, The Alien Tort Statute and Prudential Exhaustion,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1273 (2011).
287
Nicholas A. Fromherz, A Call for Stricter Appellate Review of
Decisions on Forum Non Conveniens, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV.
527 (2012); P.J. Kee, Expanding the Duties of the Vigilant Doorkeeper: ATS
Litigation and the Inapplicability of the Act of State Doctrine and Forum
Non Conveniens, 83 TUL. L. REV. 495 (2009); Matthw R. Skolnik, Forum
Non Conveniens Doctrine In Alien Tort Claims Act Cases: A Shell Of Its
Former Self After Wiwa, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 187 (2002); Aric K. Short,
Is the Alien Tort Statute Sacrosanct—Retaining Forum Non Conveniens in
Human Rights Litigation , 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1001 (2000–2001).
288
See, e.g., Amy Endicott, The Judicial Answer: Treatment of the
Political Question Doctrine in Alien Tort Claims, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
537 (2010); Deborah Azar, Simplifying the Prophecy of Justiciability in
Cases Concerning Foreign Affairs: A Political Act of State Question, 9 RICH.
J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 471 (2010).
289
Samuel W. Bettwy, Subject Matter Jurisdiction And Foreign
Governments: Act Of State, Sovereign Immunity, And The Alien Tort Statute,
80 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 221 (1986).
290
Michael Barsa & David Dana, Three Obstacles to the Promotion of
Corporate Social Responsibility by Means of the Alien Tort Claims Act: The
Sosa Court's Incoherent Conception of the Law of Nations, the Purposive
Action Requirement for Aiding and Abetting, and the State Action
Requirement for Primary Liability, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 79 (2010).
291
Alka Pradhan, The Statute of Limitations for Alien Torts: A
Reexamination After Kiobel, 21 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 229 (2011).
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every case and, if so, whether the federal courts should defer to
them.292
The pleading regime inaugurated by the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 293 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal 294 imposes a “plausibility-pleading standard”—“[i]n reality,”
Professor Arthur Miller observes, “a form of fact pleading by another
name” 295 —requiring trial judges “to evaluate the strength of the
factual ‘showing’ of each claim for relief and thus determine whether
it should proceed.”296 This regime, now often known in colloquial
brevity as Twiqbal,297 has spelled particular trouble for ATS cases,298
which are long on allegations but short on critical facts.299 Although
292
Margarita S. Clarens, Deference, Human Rights and the Federal
Courts: The Role of the Executive in Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 7 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 415 (2007). Compare Derek Baxter, Protecting The
Power Of The Judiciary: Why The Use Of State Department “Statements Of
Interest” In Alien Tort Statute Litigation Runs Afoul Of Separation Of
Powers Concerns, 37 RUTGERS U. L.J. 807 (2006), with Brian C. Free,
Awaiting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.: Advocating The Cautious Use Of
Executive Opinions In Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, 12 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 467 (2003).
293
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
294
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
295
Arthur R. Miller, From Conley To Twombly To Iqbal: A Double
Play On The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 20 (2010).
296
Id. at 23.
297
RHJ Med. Ctr., Inc. v. City of Dubois, 754 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730
(W.D. Pa. 2010) (noting that Twombly and Iqbal are commonly referred to
collectively as Twiqbal).
298
James E. von der Heydt, Ripple Effects: The Unintended Change To
Jurisdictional Pleading Standards After Iqbal, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 799,
834–35 (2012) (citing Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260–
61 (11th Cir. 2009)) (“The conspiracy allegations in Sinaltrainal invite
comparisons with Iqbal itself, and its holding can be defended as another
instance of identifying plaintiff’s failure to plead plausible facts adequate to
activate a federal statute.”); Jordan D. Shepherd, Note, When Sosa Meets
Iqbal: Plausibility Pleading in Human Rights Litigation, 95 MINN. L. REV.
2318 (2011); Civil Procedure–Pleading Requirements–Eleventh Circuit
Dismisses Alien Tort Statute Claims Against Coca-Cola Under Iqbal’s
Plausibility Pleading Standard, 123 HARV. L. REV. 580 (2009) (discussing
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009)).
299
Jean-Marie Simon, The Alien Torts Claims Act: Justice Or Show
Trials?, 11 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 4, 31-32 (1993). The difficulty is well
illustrated in a recent federal district court decision applying Iqbal to ATS
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some courts and commentators have urged that Twiqbal shouldn’t be
rigorously applied to what they would characterize as jurisdictional
pleading, the far more prevalent view subjects ATS claims to the
rigors of Twiqbal, and many complaints are found wanting. For
example, even in Kiobel, the corporate liability and extraterritoriality
issues were ultimately unnecessary to the decision of the case, for
even Judge Leval, who of all the judges reviewing Kiobel was the
most amicably disposed to the plaintiffs’ case, performed a
claims in a case where Iraqi nationals filed a five-count complaint against
eleven business entities, and one individual who allegedly owned and
operated one of entities, alleging that Iraqi nationals were killed or seriously
injured by defendants while defendants provided security services for United
States government:
[P]laintiffs must allege facts in their complaints that give
rise to a plausible entitlement to relief for claims alleging
war crimes pursuant to the ATS. In other words, the facts
alleged in the complaint, assumed to be true, must create
a plausible inference that each of the elements required
to state a claim for war crimes under the ATS is met.
Thus, in order to prevail on defendants’ motions, the
complaints must state facts that would allow a trier of
fact plausibly to infer that defendant Prince (i)
intentionally (ii) killed or inflicted serious bodily harm
(iii) on innocent civilians (iv) during an armed conflict
and (v) in the context of and in association with that
armed conflict. Plaintiffs have failed to meet this burden
as to the ATS war crimes claims in each of the five
cases.
In re XE Services Alien Tort Litigation, 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 589–90 (E.D.
Va. 2009) (citation omitted) (emphases added); accord Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc.,
658 F.3d 388, 401–02 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding lack of factual particularity in
complaint attempting to plead that chemical manufacturer violated ATS by
selling thiodiglycol (TDG) to Iraqi government, which then used TDG to
manufacture mustard gas to attack members of ethnic minority group);
Weisskopf v. United Jewish Appeal-Fed’n of Jewish Philanthropies of N.Y.,
Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 912 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (finding that “there are no
nonconclusory allegations that Defendants knew that Israelis were allegedly
violating Plaintiff’s human rights and that Defendants intended to further
those violations” and “[a]bsent well-pled allegations that Defendants
intended to further a primary violation of the law of nations, Plaintiff’s ATS
claims must be dismissed.”).

258

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 9.2

devastating Twiqbal analysis of the complaint and would, like every
other judge who has looked at this course, dismiss it. “When read
together,” Judge Leval wrote,
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., and Iqbal establish a requirement that, for a
complaint to properly allege a defendant's
complicity in human rights abuses perpetrated by
officials of a foreign government, it must plead
specific facts supporting a reasonable inference
that the defendant acted with a purpose of bringing
about the abuses.300
The challenge posed for putative ATS plaintiffs is daunting,301 and
likely to continue to be the coup de grâce even to ATS cases that
survive the other perils in the procedural gauntlet.302

300
Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, 188–89 (Leval, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir.2009)).
301
See, e.g, Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1156 (In a case
brought under the ATS by Relatives of victims killed during time of severe
civil unrest in Bolivia against that country’s former president and former
minister of defense, holding that “[t]he Complaint in this case has all of the
flaws against which Iqbal warned.”). Congress has witnessed some stirrings
around legislatively abrogating Iqbal, see Benjamin J. Williams, Case
Comment, Civil Procedure—Pleading: The United States Supreme Court
Revisits The Pleading Standard Under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
Making Surviving A Motion To Dismiss More Difficult—Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), 86 N.D. L. REV. 383, 402–03 (2009) (discussing
Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009),
introduced by Senator Specter). Its lead sponsor, however, Senator Arlein
Specter, lost a 2010 Senate re-election bid in the primaries, and passed away
in 2011. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Arlen Specter, Pennsylvania Senator, Is Dead
at 82, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2012, at A22. The bill was not enacted in the
2009 or 2010 Congressional sessions, and appears to have returned to
Committee, not to again emerge. See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of
2010, S. 4054 (111th), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1
11/s4054; see also Michael R. Huston, Note, Pleading with Congress to
Resist the Urge to Overrule Twombly and Iqbal, 109 MICH. L. REV. 415
(2010). Other efforts were to be directed at the Rules Advisory Committee.
See Williams, supra note 301, at 403–05. Because of the transactional costs
involved and the priority of other issues, it is very unlikely that there will be
legislation or a new federal rule to abrogate Twiqbal. See Paul Stancil,

2013]

SOME LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EU-BASED
MNES CONTEMPLATING HIGH-RISK FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENTS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR AFTER KIOBEL
V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM AND CHEVRON
CORPORATION V. NARANJO

259

5. NEW LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN ATS CASES OVER FOREIGN MNES
THROUGH THEIR U.S. SUBSIDIARIES: THE SUPREME COURT GRANTS
DIAMLERCHRYSLER’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM THE
NINTH CIRCUIT’S BAUMAN DECISION
The Supreme Court is poised to recognize another significant
procedural limitation on ATS suits. Having granted certiorari in
DaimlerChrysler, A.G. v. Bauman,303 the Court is likely to take the
next step on the path it hewed in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
Congressional Silence and the Statutory Interpretation Game, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1251, 1318–24 (2013).
302
As Professor Miller describes the impact of Twiqbal:
Moreover, why were Twombly and Iqbal necessary? The
1986 summary judgment trilogy had made that motion a
powerful pretrial terminator, especially when coupled
with judicial control over the pretrial process. For a
quarter century, successive amendments to the Federal
Rules had impressed limits on the extent of discovery,
established mandatory disclosure, and narrowed the
scope of what matters could be inquired into under the
discovery rules. For years *53 before Twombly and
Iqbal, the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal rate had been rising.
Judicial gatekeeping seemed to be working. The
Supreme Court’s coup de grace simply was not needed.
Arthur R. Miller, supra note 295, at 52–53 (footnotes omitted); see Amanda
Sue Nichols, Note, Alien Tort Statute Accomplice Liability Cases: Should
Courts Apply the Plausibility Pleading Standard of Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2221–25 (2008) (arguing that “ATS
accomplice liability cases deal with similar types of claims and defendants as
the Supreme Court envisioned when it established the plausibility standard,
and thus it is legally consistent to apply the plausibility standard to ATS
accomplice liability claims.”); see also Jeffrey M. Sweeney, Corporate
Aiding And Abetting Under The Alien Tort Statute: A Proposal For
Evaluating The Facial Plausibility Of A Claim, 56 LOY. L. REV. 1037, 1040–
41, 1058–69 (2010) (proposing standards by which courts can apply Twiqbal
to ATS claims).
303
Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011),
cert. granted, 2013 WL 1704716 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2013).
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S.A. v. Brown 304 of limiting exorbitant exercises of personal
jurisdiction over foreign-based MNEs through their American
subsidiaries. While the court used Brown to answer the question,
whether “foreign subsidiaries of a United States parent corporation
amenable to suit in state court on claims unrelated to any activity of
the subsidiaries in the forum State,”305 the Court will use Bauman to
answer negatively the question whether a foreign parent corporation
will have the subsidiary’s U.S.-contacts attributed to it as the basis
for exercising general personal jurisdiction. The Court decided some
twenty-five years ago that service on the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign
parent can be sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement for personal
jurisdiction;306 that does not imply that the U.S. subsidiary’s contacts
with the U.S. are sufficient to establish a basis for personal
jurisdiction.
Although Daimler AG is a German public stock company that
does not manufacture or sell products, own property, or employ
workers in the United States, and maintains a separate corporate
identity from its subsidiaries,
the Ninth Circuit nevertheless held that
DaimlerChrysler, A.G., is subject to general
personal jurisdiction in California—and can
therefore be sued in the State for alleged humanrights violations committed in Argentina by an
Argentine subsidiary against Argentine residents—
because it has a different, indirect subsidiary that
distributes Daimler AG-manufactured vehicles in
California.307
As, among other things, an ATS case, Bauman represents a
particularly important and especially expansive personal jurisdiction
exercised through an implied agency theory.308 It is the paradigm for
304
305
306

131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
Id. at 2850.
See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694

(1988).

307

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, No.
11-965 (Feb. 6, 2012).
308
644 F.3d at 920. The other relevant legal test in these scenarios—
the “alter-ego” test—clearly did not apply given the scrupulousness with
which the parent and subsidiary observed their separate corporate identities.
See id.
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triangulating (some might say, “bootstrapping”) extraterritorial
personal jurisdiction in ATS cases. That triangulation seeks to use
the relationships of a foreign (e.g., E.U.) -based parent corporation to
subsidiaries in a host country and to American subsidiaries to create
a basis for hailing the parent into a U.S. court. In this case, the
triangulation seeks to use the American subsidiary to hail the
German parent before the U.S. federal courts to defend claims that a
second subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, “collaborated with
state security forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill the Argentine
workers and labor activists Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’”—a war which
“began in 1976 when the military overthrew the government of
President Isabel Peron and set up a military dictatorship.” 309 A
unanimous Ninth Circuit panel held that
In light of [the parent corporation’s] pervasive
contacts with the forum state through [its
Michigan-based, North American subsidiary],
including the extensive business operations of that
subsidiary, the interest of California in adjudicating
important questions of human rights, our
substantial doubt as to the adequacy of Argentina
as an alternative forum, and the various issues
discussed above with respect to Germany, we hold
that [the parent] “has not met its burden of
presenting a compelling case that the exercise of
jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and
substantial justice.”310
Federal courts in six of the circuits have rejected this
jurisdictional logic. 311 The Ninth Circuit itself narrowly declined
309

644 F.3d at 911–12 & n.3.
Id. at 930.
311
See Singh v. Daimler, AG, 902 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (E.D. Mich.
2012) (discussing the disagreement and rejecting the Bauman agency
approach); see, e.g., Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 648–
49 (8th Cir. 2003); Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th
Cir. 1990); Estate of Thomson v. Toyota Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545 F.3d
357, 362–63 (6th Cir. 2008); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co.,
136 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo,
310
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rehearing, prompting seven circuit judges to dissent. 312 Brown
augurs the resolution of the issue in Bauman,313 which is likely to
compliment Kiobel as another milestone in scaling back the long arm
of American law’s span.
B. IS THERE ANY HUMAN DIGNITY IN PURSUING HUMAN RIGHTS
CLAIMS THROUGH ATS LITIGATION THAT IS MARKED OVERWHELMINGLY
BY THE ABSENCE OF ENFORCEABLE JUDGMENTS HOLDING ANY
MALEFACTOR TO ACCOUNT? THE WARRANT OF CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION
Judge Roger Robb’s observation in Tel-Oren serves more
broadly as an appropriate epitaph to the insoluble problems of ATS
litigation as it has been conceptualized since 1980—resulting in
much litigation but little by way of finding of liability and virtually
nothing by way of enforcement of the few liabilities found: “To grant
the initial access in the face of an overwhelming probability of
frustration of the trial process as we know it is an unwise step.”314
Can there be any dignity for victims of outrages that violate the
law of nations through a statute primarily employed “more to draw
attention to a political cause than to seek redress in U.S. courts”?315
Can there be any justice when precious few individuals or
corporations accused of a spectrum of abhorrent conduct are ever
actually adjudicated liable after a full trial,316 let alone compelled to

N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 62–63 (4th Cir.1993); Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc.,
216 F.3d 1286, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2000).
312
Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir.
2011) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of petition for en banc reh’g).
313
Id. at 775–76, n.1.
314
Tel-Oren v. PLO, 726 F.2d 774, 824 (Robb, J., concurring); see,
e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and
Corporate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 971 (2004).
315
Simon, supra note 299.
316
As Simon very emphatically pointed out, “since plaintiffs bringing
lawsuits under section 1350 assume that a defendant will not appear in court
and that a default judgment will be entered, the option of bringing
unsubstantiated claims is even more appealing,” because “[p]laintiffs’
attorneys, knowing with some assurance that they will never be called upon
to defend or support such allegations, have nothing to lose by including them
in the complaint.” Id. at 71. Simon also observed a striking selectivity in
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pay the penalties and to make restitution to their victims? As an
astute student commentator observed twenty years ago:
[D]espite an understandable desire to redress
terrible and often massive human rights violations,
neither evidentiary standards, forum issues, nor
questions of fairness have ever been raised as to the
propriety of forcing foreign defendants to litigate
uniquely testimonial and witness-based issues in
U.S. courts.
Somehow the tragic nature of
plaintiffs' claims implies that such questions are
irrelevant. The presumption seems to be that such
lawsuits should go forward on political and moral
grounds alone. For plaintiffs’ attorneys who
pursue it, the Alien Tort Statute has also become an
unabashed beacon of political correctness.317
Yet, as the student commentator noted, we should “ask whether
such cases should be filed at all, given the dearth of evidence they
present,” 318 and the fact that “both the ability to obtain personal
jurisdiction over a defendant and the potential media value are
determinative of who will be served with a section 1350 lawsuit.”319
It bears worth pausing here to emphasize that the purpose of this
aspect of an FDI analysis is not to defend corporate misconduct.
Complicity of MNEs in the murder, torture, enslavement, wrongful
detention, and other criminal abuses of human beings, e.g., “ethnic
cleansing, genocide, torture” and other human rights violations, is
serious, and intolerable. 320 Corporate social responsibility is a
those ATS suits chosen to be filed in U.S. courts, seemingly one to exempt
“politically leftist governments.” Id. at 78 (footnotes omitted).
317
Id. at 4.
318
Id. at 31 (elaborating that “plaintiffs’ lawyers routinely file lawsuits
devoid of any rudimentary adherence to evidentiary standards,” and rely on
evidence that “contain[s] hearsay and double hearsay problems.”).
319
Id. at 32.
320
See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 40, at 1146; see also Ronen
Shamir, Between Self-Regulation And The Alien Tort Claims Act: On The
Contested Concept Of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 635 (2004) (arguing that from the “perspective of a C[orporate]
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modern, and overdue, movement 321 that gives MNEs the
opportunities, as well as the incentives, to self-police and to
participate in the formulation of a legal regime to effectively regulate
MNE conduct,322 and to the extent MNEs fail to do so, gives homeand host-state governments the standards by which to legislate
compliance.323 But such regulation should be more predictable and
S[ocial] R[esponsibility] field that exists above and beyond any concrete
judicial outcome, the career of the [Alien Tort Statute] cases, by forcing the
issue of corporations and human rights into the open, already shapes
corporate behavior because it forces corporations to reflect upon, if not to
institutionalize, human rights-related issues”).
321
See, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, Legal Mechanization of Corporate
Social Responsibility Through Alien Tort Statute Litigation: A Response to
Professor Branson with Some Supplemental Thoughts, 9 SANTA CLARA J.
INT’L L. 251, 254 (2011) (“The corporate social responsibility discussion
raises three principal issues about how a moral corporation lives its life: how
a corporation chooses its self-interest versus the interests of others, when and
how it should help others if control decisions may harm the shareholder
owners, and how far the corporation must affirmatively go to help right the
perceived wrongs in the world in which it operates.”).
322
See, e.g., Norbert Horn, International Rules for Multinational
Enterprises: The ICC, OECD, and ILO Initiatives 30 AM. U. L. REV. 923
(1980–1981); A.A. Fatouros, On the Implementation of International Codes
of Conduct: An Analysis of Future Experience, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 941
(1980–1981); Richard D. Kauzlarich, The Review of the 1976 OECD
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 30
AM. U. L. REV. 1009 (1980–1981). But see Timothy W. Stanley,
International Codes of Conduct for MNC's: A Skeptical View of the Process,
30 AM. U. L. REV. 973 (1980–1981).
323
A leading model is the Guidelines for MNEs that the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development issued originally in 1976.
Daniel Plaine, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 11 INT’L L.
339, 339–41 (1977); Jernej Letnar ýerniþ, Corporate Responsibility for
Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, 3 HANSE L. REV. 77 (2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317263; see also Ashley L. Santner, A Soft Law
Mechanism For Corporate Responsibility: How The Updated OECD
Guidelines For Multinational Enterprises Promote Business For The Future,
43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 375, 376–77 & nn.4–5 (2008). For a detailed
discussion of how forty-two OECD nations, including the United States and
France, have implemented the Guidelines by establishing National Contact
Points, see Leyla Davarnejad, In The Shadow Of Soft Law: The Handling Of
Corporate Social Responsibility Disputes Under The OECD Guidelines For
Multinational Enterprises, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 351 (2011); Christopher N.
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clearly stated than the common law-style case adjudication that
courts have attempted under the ATS, particularly where that
adjudication occurs in the courts of a country other than that where
the MNE’s conduct, or the effects of the MNE’s conduct,
transpired. 324 A legislative process, like the one that led to
Congress’s enactment of the TVPA, 325 allows for a considerably
more nuanced and holistic assessment of the wide range of relevant
economic and foreign relations factors implicated in such lawmaking than courts can even approach in case-by-case
adjudication. 326 The subjects to which courts have been asked to
Francoise, A Critical Assessment of the United States’ Implementation of the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 223 (2007); see also Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, U.S.
Dep’t
of
State,
OECD:
U.S.
National
Contact
Point,
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/oecd/usncp/us/index.htm.
In addition, the
governments of developed nations can encourage developing-country
governments to regulate more responsibly within their own borders by using
the existing network of international trade-statuses and international trade
treaties as a system of pressures and rewards for reform. See, e.g., Ian
Urbina, Unions Press To End Special Trade Status For Bangladesh, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2013, at B1 (“After several deadly factory disasters in
Bangladesh — including the collapse of an eight-story garment factory last
month that left at least 1,127 people dead — labor advocates are stepping up
pressure on the Obama administration, calling for it to convey its disapproval
of working conditions in the country by revoking its special trade status.”)
324
Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 40, at 1147 (noting importance of
goal to “eliminate[e] . . . distorting economic effect by ensuring that all firms
are subject to the same standard of liability for torts committed in a particular
place”); see also Jack L. Goldsmith III, Note, Interest Analysis Applied To
Corporations: The Unprincipled Use Of A Choice Of Law Method, 98 YALE
L.J. 597 (1989).
325
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106
Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)).
326
See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
472–73 (6th ed. 2003) (explaining the general rule of mandatory exhaustion:
“A claim will not be admissible on the international plane unless the
individual alien or corporation concerned has exhausted the legal remedies
available to him in the state which is alleged to be the author of the injury.
This is a rule which is justified by practical and political considerations. . .
.”). Compare Ghatan, supra note 282, at 1274–75, 1292–93, 1297–1300
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extend the ATS are far better committed to “a modern Congress that
ma[kes] clear its desire that the federal courts police the behavior of
foreign individuals and governments” in a statute that “embod[ies] a
legislative judgment that is” both “current” and “clear.” 327
Moreover, the American people, through their elected
representatives, should be given the opportunity to be heard on
whether, and to what extent, they want U.S. courts opened to ATS
litigation, rather than leaving the matter entirely to the preferences of
federal judges and other “litigation elites.”328 While recent attempts
at such legislation have gone nowhere,329 the Supreme Court’s 2013
decision in Kiobel should rekindle an effort for which scholars called
for a generation ago, 330 and continue to call for today. 331 Thus,

(recommending the that the reach of the ATS be limited by requiring
prudential exhaustion of local remedies “in which there is a weak nexus to
the United States” and “alleged violation of norms that are not Peremptory,”
which “could greatly reduce the number of claims available to plaintiffs
under the ATS”), with Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1225–26,
1235–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (Bybee, J., dissenting) (arguing that international
law requires exhaustion of local remedies as a condition to bringing an
international cause of action in an American tribunal, and domestic law
should require it), vacated en banc on other grounds, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir.
2008).
327
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813 (Bork, J., concurring); see John B.
Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights In U.S. Courts And Abroad: The
Alien Tort Statute And Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5–6
(2009).
328
Judith Kimerling, Oil, Contact, And Conservation In The Amazon:
Indigenous Huaorani, Chevron, And Yasuni, 24 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 43, 97–98 (2013).
329
See, e.g., Mariani, supra note 158, at 1384 & n.1 (2008) (citing S.
1874, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 1870, 109th Cong. Rec. S11433-S11436 (Oct.
17, 2005)); Petty, supra note 167, at 185, 217–19 (2009); Lucien J. Dhooge,
A Modest Proposal to Amend the Alien Tort Statute to Provide Guidance to
Transnational Corporations, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 119 (2007);
see also Roger Alford, What is Feinstein Thinking in Amending the ATS?,
OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 22, 2005, 10:45 AM), http://lawofnations.blogsp
ot.com/2005/10/what-is-feinstein-thinking-in-amending.html; Roger Alford,
Feinstein Withdraws ATS Amendment, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 26, 2005, 8:05
AM), http://lawofnations.blogspot.com/20 05/10/feinstein-withdraws-atsamendment.html.
330
See, e.g., Kenneth C. Randall, Further Inquiries Into The Alien Tort
Statute And A Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 473, 511–32
(1986).
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MNEs, such as Alstom, should embrace the opportunity to this
debate and contribute meaningfully to it,332 for a domestication of the
ATS in Kiobel will not pretermit the need for the kinds of claims
found in ATS cases to be addressed. Any evaluation of Alstom’s
risk posed by its FDIs in Israel—whether the Jerusalem Light Rail
Project in the West Bank Occupied Territories or a hypothesized
wind-energy project in the disputed Golan Heights—should include a
discussion of the larger question whether Alstom will seek to
influence the policy and laws of its host nations, as well as its home
state through participation in political and legislative processes and
in litigation over the scope of laws that may impact Alstom’s present
and future business strategies.333
However, candor requires observing that Congress cannot be
hoped to enact ATS amendments anytime soon when it cannot even
confirm sufficient numbers of judges to the very federal courts that
are to hear cases under an amended statute.334 Thus, it is becoming

331
See Brittany A. Shugart, Relieving The Vigilant Doorkeeper:
Legislative Revision Of The Alien Tort Statute In The Wake Of Judicial
Lawmaking, 22 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOCIAL JUSTICE 91 (2012); Tyler G.
Banks, Note, Corporate Liability Under The Alien Tort Statute: The Second
Circuit’s Misstep Around General Principles Of Law In Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 227, 279 (2012); Garvey,
supra note 261.
332
See, e.g., Lauren A. Dellinger, Corporate Social Responsibility: A
Multifaceted Tool to Avoid Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation While
Simultaneously Building a Better Business Reputation, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J.
55 (2009).
333
For example, several MNEs seek to influence the U.S. Supreme
Court’s rulings on extraterritoriality, as well as corporate amenability, in
Kiobel. Brief for BP America et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2012 WL 392536, at
*1–*2 (Feb. 3, 2012).
334
See, e.g., Editorial, Courts Without Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2013, at SR10 (“Of 856 federal district and circuit court seats, 85 are
unfilled—a 10 percent vacancy rate” with “[m]ore than a third of the
vacancies hav[ing] been declared ‘judicial emergencies’ based on court
workloads and the length of time the seats have been empty.”); Geoffrey W.
Peters, G.O.P. Delays on Nominees Raise Tension, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
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more common for MNEs to take the lead in establishing the kinds of
industry standards and protocols that may prevent the kinds of
tragedies that give rise to ATS litigation, an approach most recently
exemplified by the agreement of “several of the world’s largest
apparel companies . . . to a landmark plan to help pay for fire safety
and building improvements” in the wake of the deaths of 1100
workers when a garment factory in Bangladesh collapsed in April
2013.335 An MNE like Alstom, who has so much at risk in FDIs,
should take the lead in establishing practices and compliance
programs that minimize the kinds of risks that will grow into ATS
claims if they eventuate.336

III. KIOBEL AS A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE EXAMPLE OF
CHEVRON’S DECISION TO DEFEND ENVIRONMENTAL TORT
LITIGATION IN ECUADOR INSTEAD OF MANHATTAN; OR, THE
ROAD TO CHEVRON CORP. V. NARANJO
Some commentators on Kiobel have asserted that corporate
counsel are everywhere celebrating the demise of “foreign-cubed”

2013, at A1; Carl Hulse, Blocked Bids to Fill Judgeships Stir New Fight on
Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, at A1.
335
Steven Greenhouse & Jim Yardley, Global Retailers Join Safety
Plan For Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2013, at A1.
336
For an excellent discussion of this approach, see David Scheffer
&Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of
Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a
Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 334,
334–35, 396–97 (2011) (arguing that “[t]he ultimate goal should be to make
social and human rights issues an integral part of a corporation's business
strategy in order to benefit the company and its stakeholders”); see also
David Shea Bettwy The Human Rights And Wrongs Of Foreign Direct
Investment: Addressing The Need For An Analytical Framework, 11 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 239 (2011) (advocating that “because FDI can result in
positive, though not automatic, human rights impacts, international efforts to
develop universal codes of corporate social responsibility should be
complemented by efforts to develop a methodology for objectively gauging
and predicting impacts of FDI on human rights”); Han, supra note 62
(advocating that China’s MNEs be mindful in planning FDIs of the risks of
ATS suits and make strategic plans to avoid creating the liabilities in the first
place).
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ATS suits. 337 Yet, having “freed” themselves from an American
federal courtroom, is there really cause even for optimism—let alone
jubilation—among corporate counsel and corporate boards at MNEs?
One might very well think that—until the cautionary tale of another
MNE, Chevron (which got exactly what it demanded when Judge Jed
Rakoff liberated the corporation from an American courtroom but
demanded from the corporation a written agreement “to being sued
on these claims (or their Ecuadorian equivalents) in Ecuador, to
accept service of process in Ecuador, and to waive for 60 days after
the date of this dismissal any statute of limitations-based defenses
that may have matured since the filing of the instant Complaints” ),338
is considered, compared, and contrasted.
Ecuador provided the setting where Texaco and Gulf Oil, years
before Chevron absorbed them, were busy exploring for and
exploiting the oil deposits their geologists had identified in Ecuador’s
Amazon rainforest.339 In 1992, Ecuador brought an end to the leases
that permitted exploration and exploitation, and a full panoply of
international dispute resolution arose.340 Ecuador—more precisely,
the Superior Court of Justice of Nueva Loja (Lago Agrio) and the
Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbios—also provided the setting
for the court proceedings to which Chevron agreed in return for the
forum non conveniens dismissal in New York, which have become

337
See, e.g., Julian Ku, SCOTUS Votes 9-0 that Corporations Cannot
Be Sued Under ATS for Extraterritorial Acts Without U.S. Interest At Stake,
OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 17, 2013, 11:52 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/1
7/scotus-votes-9-0-that-corporations-cannot-be-sued-under-ats-forextraterritorial-acts-without-u-s-interest-at-stake/.
338
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
see Van Detta, Justice Restored, supra note 3, at 94–102 (2003) (discussing
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated and
remanded sub nom; Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1998), forum
non conveniens motion again granted on remand, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
339
Kimerling, supra note 328.
340
Jason Burke, Defining Investor Confidence: Avoiding Interpretive
Uncertainty in Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, 34 B.C. INT’L COMP. L. REV. 463
(2011).
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known as the Lago Agrio Litigation.341 As one journalist wrote of
the litigation:
By the time the judge, Nicolás Zambrano,
issued his decision [in the suit that the Ecuadorian
plaintiffs had originally tried to file in New York
but whose choice of forum was ousted by
Chervon’s invocation of forum non conveniens],
the case had been going on for eighteen years. It
had outlasted jurists on two continents. Zambrano
was the sixth judge to preside in Ecuador; one
federal judge in New York had died before he
could rule on the case. The litigation even
outlasted Texaco: in 2001, the company was
subsumed by Chevron, which inherited the lawsuit.
The dispute is now considered one of the nastiest
legal contests in memory, a spectacle almost as
ugly as the pollution that prompted it.342
The judgment was for $9.5 billion, and in addition, Judge
Zambrano 343 ordered Chevron to issue within two weeks of the
judgment’s entry an apology to the Ecuadorian people whose
environment, families, and persons were harmed by Texaco’s
activities in Ecuador—or face a doubling of the judgment to $19
billion.344 Chevron issued no apology.345 That Chevron appears not
341

For a recently published overview discussing the Lago Agrio
Litigation and the various Ecuadorian courts and proceedings involved in the
determination, see Kimerling, supra note 328, at 73–79 & n. 74. For
Chevron’s side of the story, see http://www.chevron.com/ecuador/. For the
plaintiffs’ side of the story, see http://chevrontoxico.com/.
342
Keefe, supra note 17.
343
Lawrence Hurley, Judge at Heart of Landmark Oil Pollution Case
Unfazed by Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2011, http://www.nytim
es.com/gwire/2011/05/17/17greenwire-judge-at-heart-of-landmark-oilpollution-case-89753.html?pagewanted =all.
344
Simon Romero & Clifford Krauss, Ecuador Judge Orders Chevron
to Pay $9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/02/15/world/americas/15ecuador.html; Luis Angel Saavedra, Chevron
Trying to Avoid Historic Ecuador Verdict, NOTIEN, Mar. 24, 2011,
http://hdl.handle.net/1928/12370.
345
Chevron Wins Halt to $18 Billion Judgment in Ecuador Pollution
Case, ENV’T NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 7, 2011, http://www.ens-newswire.
com/ens/mar2011/2011-03-07-02.html.
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to have grasped, or at least to have dismissively disregarded, the
motivators, attitudes, and perspectives of the Ecuadorian
stakeholders, has been eloquently elucidated elsewhere. 346 For
present purposes, it suffices to observe that Chevron instead mounted
a multi-forum, multi-front campaign against the integrity of the
Ecuadorian courts, the Ecuadorians’ counsel,347 and the Ecuadorian
proceeding. 348 As the plaintiffs’ lawyers considered strategically
where to seek enforcement of the judgment,349 Chevron unleashed a
346

Theodore MacDonald, Amazonian Indigenous Views on the State: A
Place for Corporate Social Responsibility?, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 439 (2010). Other perspectives on the Ecuador litigation emerge from
viewing it through the three-principle framework established by John
Ruggie, Special Representative to the U.N. Secretary General, who
introduced them in a report to the U.N. Human Rights Council. See Chris
Jochnik & Nina Rabaeus, Business and Human Rights Revitalized: A New
UN Framework Meets Texaco in the Amazon, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 413, 420–21 (2010).
347
Jonathan Stempel, Chevron Grills U.S. Lawyer In $19 Bln Ecuador
REUTERS
NEWS
&
Pollution
Case,
THOMSON
INSIGHT, Apr. 16, 2013, http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/New_Yor
k/News/2013/04_-_April/Chevron_grills_U_S__lawyer_in_$19_bln
_Ecuador_pollution_case/ (discussing Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 11 Civ
.0691 LAK, (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). Published opinions in the ongoing case
include Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 840 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In
re Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd sub nom.,
Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011); In re Chevron
Corp., 736 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Chevron Corp., 749 F.
Supp. 2d 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141
(S.D.N.Y.2 010), aff'd sub nom., Lago Agrio v. Chevron Corp., 409 F. App’x
393 (2d Cir. 2010); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Donziger I”) (granting preliminary injunction); Chevron
Corp. v. Donziger, 800 F. Supp. 2d 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Donziger II”)
(granting separate trial and expedited discovery on claim for declaratory
judgment).
348
See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, The Chevron-Ecuador Dispute,
Forum Non Conveniens, and the Problem of Ex Ante Inadequacy, 1
J.
COMPLEX
LITG.
(forthcoming),
available
at
FORDHAM
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2245889.
349
To date, lawyers for the plaintiffs have filed judgment enforcement
proceedings against Chevron in three different countries: Canada, Brazil, and
Argentina. Kimerling, supra note 328, at 96–97 & nn.153–55. On May 1,
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heavy barrage of litigation on two fronts: “a lawsuit against the
plaintiffs and their lawyers in federal court in New York, and an
arbitration proceeding against Ecuador in The Hague,” and each of
the cases is “based on allegations of fraud and other misconduct by
the Lago Agrio plaintiffs’ legal team, allegations of improper
collusion between representatives of the plaintiffs and Ecuadorian
government officials, and allegations of systemic failures in the
administration of justice in Ecuador.”350 The arbitration proceeded
under a U.S.–Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), 351 and it
has yielded an interim award “directing Ecuador to ‘take all measures
at its disposal to suspend or cause to be suspended the enforcement
or recognition within or without Ecuador of any judgment’ against
Chevron in the Lago Agrio lawsuit, pending further order by the
panel,” 352 to which the Lago Agrio court has declined to follow,
because “under Ecuadorian law, based on international commitments
and constitutional law—the obligations of the state pursuant to
2013, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice denied enforcement against
assets of Chevron’s Canadian subsidiaries on the grounds of their separate
corporate identities. Linda Nguyen, Ontario Judge Dismisses $19B Ecuador
Environmental Judgment Against Chevron, THE CANADIAN PRESS, May 1,
2013,
http://ca.news.yahoo.com/ontario-judge-dismisses-19b-ecuadorenvironmental-judgment-against-235357906.html. By contrast, an Argentine
judge froze Chevron’s local assets pending the outcome of judgment
enforcement proceedings, Emily Schmall, Argentina: Chevron’s Assets Are
Frozen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at A9, a ruling affirmed by an Argentine
appeals court, Guido Nejamkis, Argentine Court Upholds Freeze On
Chevron Assets, REUTERS, Jan. 30, 2013, http://www.reuters.co
m/article/2013/01/30/us-chevron-argentina-idUSBRE90T1AI20130130,
which has prompted Chevron to threaten pulling out of a major joint-venture
with Argentina’s recently renationalized state oil monopoly, Yacimientos
Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF). See Argentina: YPF Boss Hits Out At Chevron
Embargo Order, LA NACION (ARG.), Mar. 28, 2013, 2013 WLNR 8124719.
Meanwhile, Chevron has sought leave to join in its New York lawsuit the
Washington, D.C. firm that is leading efforts to enforce the judgment. See
Mark Singleton, Chevron Responds To Legal Attacks By Washington Law
Firm Patton Boggs With Allegations Of Malicious Prosecution, Fraud And
Deceit, INT’L BUS. TIMES NEWS, May 14, 2013, 2013 WLNR 11822182.
350
Kimerling, supra note 328, at 77–78 (footnote omitted).
351
Bilateral Investment Treaty with the Republic of Ecuador, U.S.–
Ecuador, Aug. 27, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-15. For a discussion of the
role and impact of BITs and Free Trade Agreements on FDI decisions, see
Van Detta, supra note15, at 36–43.
352
Kimerling, supra note 324, at 82-84 & nn.113–21.
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human rights norms take precedence over international commercial
obligations and the authority of an arbitral panel,” and “the most
recent arbitral order directing the court to take all ‘necessary
measures’ to prevent enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment
conflicted with the court’s obligation, as part of the State, to
guarantee effective judicial remedies.’”353
Then there is Chevron’s New York litigation against plaintiffs’
counsel. Before describing that litigation, a moment’s pause is
worthwhile to reflect that one must consider the effect on all
economic aspects of a company’s sustenance and growth when there
is pending litigation and considerable uncertainty about the size of
potentially massive exposure—a problem that Chevron has faced for
many years since it acquired Gulf and Texaco.354 The litigation has
been filled with the same kinds of tactics and urgency to disengage
the MNE from the American courtroom—and the resulting,
unexpected, and potentially catastrophic challenges of litigation in
Ecuador.355
Chevron seeks to diffuse investor concern through an aggressive
RICO-based lawsuit in the Southern District of New York,356 and to
“turn” American courts “against” the Ecuadorian plaintiffs.357 The
strategy has succeeded in stalling efforts to enforce the judgment
outside of Ecuador—which the plaintiffs must, since Chevron no

353

Id. at 85.
Jason Burke, Defining Investor Confidence: Avoiding Interpretive
Uncertainty in Chevron Corp. v Ecuador, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
463 (2011).
355
Donald K Anton, Public International Law and International Civil
Litigation: From Ecuador to the United States and Back (Twice)–Chevron v.
Donziger (Nov. 15, 2011) (forthcoming), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1960251.
356
Lawrence Hurley, Chevron’s RICO Lawsuit in Pollution Case Part
of Wider Legal Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.c
om/gwire/2011/02/02/02greenwire-chevrons-rico-lawsuit-in-pollution-casepart-o-68778.html.
357
Id. (“The lawsuit fits squarely within Chevron's strategy of seeking
to turn U.S. courts against the plaintiffs.”).
354
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longer has assets in the country358 —but it may be doing as much
harm with the investing public as good, as amply evidenced by
respected media coverage of Chevron’s RICO litigation:
An environmental case that has pitted Chevron
against Ecuadorean Amazon villagers for two
decades has taken another bizarre twist, with an
American consulting firm now recanting research
favorable to the villagers’ claims of pollution in
remote tracts of jungle.
....
. . . [T]he plaintiffs claim that Chevron
pressured Stratus to retract its assessment in
exchange for dismissal of legal claims in a
countersuit filed by Chevron made against the
firm—claims that could have pushed the consulting
business into bankruptcy.
“Stratus deeply regrets its involvement in the
Ecuador litigation,” the firm said. It remains
unclear whether this development with Stratus will
have much impact on Chevron’s appeals, because
the judge also based his ruling on other
environmental assessments. The judge ruled that
back in the 1970s, Texaco had left an
environmental mess in oil drilling operations while
operating as a partner with the Ecuadorean state oil
company, and that Chevron, which bought Texaco
in 2001, must apologize for and was liable for the
damage.
....
Chevron has been playing hardball for at least
four years.
The company produced video
recordings from pens and watches wired with
bugging devices that suggested a bribery scheme
surrounding the proceedings and involving a judge

358
Professor Kimerling gives a very thorough and well-documented
account of Chevron’s New York litigation. See Kimerling, supra note 328,
at 85–98.
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hearing the case. An American behind the secret
recordings was a convicted drug trafficker.
But the oil company appeared to gain the
upper hand three years ago when it won a legal bid
to secure the outtakes from a documentary about
the case, “Crude,” in which Mr. Donziger was
shown describing the need to pressure a
Ecuadorean judge and boasting of meetings with
Ecuadorean officials.
In a sworn statement filed in an American
court, Alberto Guerra, an Ecuadorean judge who
heard the Chevron case in 2003 and 2004, accused
Nicolas Zambrano, the judge who issued the $18
billion verdict against Chevron, of taking a
$500,000 bribe from the plaintiffs. Mr. Zambrano
denied the charge, and in his own affidavit, said
that Mr. Guerra had told him that Chevron would
offer him $1 million in return for a favorable
judgment.
Chevron has denied offering any bribes.359
Even Businessweek—a publication generally sympathetic to
Chevron’s allegations of impropriety in Ecuador’s courts—has
observed:
So the case, which began two decades ago,
continues. Unable to enforce their $19 billion
judgment in Ecuador, where Chevron has no assets
to speak of, the plaintiffs are trying to get courts in
Argentina, Brazil, and Canada to allow the seizure
of company assets in those countries. Chevron is
fighting those ancillary suits tooth and nail.
Meanwhile in New York, the company has
sued Donziger and his Ecuadorian clients under the
359
Clifford Krauss, Consultant Recants in Chevron Pollution Case in
Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04
/13/business/research-recanted-in-oil-pollution-case-in-ecuador.html.
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U.S. civil racketeering law. A trial is scheduled for
October. More strangeness doubtless will ensue.
At some point, it would be nice if, apart from the
haze of judicial mayhem in Ecuador, the rogue oil
on the ground got cleaned up.360
Meanwhile, Chevron’s own tactics may eventually boomerang—as
with the Ecuadorian Judge who has accused Judge Zambrano of
bribery and complicity in taking his findings from ex parte writings
of the Ecuadorian plaintiffs’ counsel:
Kent Robertson, a spokesman for Chevron,
acknowledged in an interview that the company
has paid Guerra and has promised to pay him more.
Chevron paid the former Ecuadorian judge $38,000
“for information,” some of which was stored on
cell phones and computer drives, Robertson said.
The company has helped Guerra and four members
of his family move from Ecuador to the U.S., and
has promised to provide the former jurist and his
relatives with $12,000 a month for housing and
other living expenses for the next two years,
Robertson added. Chevron has also told Guerra
that it will pay for health insurance for the family
and for legal representation, should Guerra need it.
“Guerra asked to come to the United States out of
concern for his safety and the safety of his family,”
Robertson said. “We agreed to help.”361
What should our takeaway be from Chevron’s experience to
date? “For now,” Professor Judith Kimerling recently observed,
this new chapter in the litigation appears to be
shifting much of the focus of the legal and political
contest from allegations about Texaco’s
misconduct to allegations of misconduct by the
lawyers and activists who manage the Lago Agrio
360

Paul M. Barrett, Judicial Mayhem In Chevron’s Pollution Case,
BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 5, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/201304-05/judicial-mayhem-in-chevrons-pollution-case.
361
Paul Barrett, Payoffs To Ex-Judge Are Latest Twist In Chevron
Case, BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 28, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/articl
es/2013-01-28/payoffs-to-ex-judge-are-latest-twist-in-chevron-case.
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case, and from concern about the rights of the
affected communities to the rights of Chevron.362
Meanwhile, as the author of the Businessweek article observed,
“[t]wo things are clear amid the swirl of novelistic characters,
character assassination, and betrayal”—“[f]irst, the legal skirmishing
shows no sign of relenting anytime soon”; and “[s]econd, while the
lawyers do battle around the world, many thousands of farmers and
indigenous Indians in the Ecuadorian rainforest continue to live in
close proximity to oil contamination.”363

362
Kimerling, supra note 328, at 97. Lessons abound for putative
plaintiffs’ counsel in high-profile, FDI-based cases, too, including: Don’t
have a film crew follow you around for some 600 hours of raw footage to
make a documentary about your clients’ case, and thereby waive the
attorney-client privilege to your entire “litigation files and hard drives” after
the MNE successfully subpoenas the outtakes of the film from the
filmmaker, revealing quite a few things which you’d wish you’d never said
or done. See Kimerling, supra note 328, at 87–89.
363
Id. However, the plaintiffs and Mr. Donziger may well be
overwhelmed in the corporate equivalent of the “surge strategy” employed
by the United States in the Afghanistan Conflict. Attorney Donziger’s own
attorneys are seeking to withdraw from defending him in Chevron’s RICO
litigation set for trial next fall, due to, among other things, estimated
attorneys’ fees of $5 million for Mr. Donziger alone, extensive and
expensive pre-trial discovery taken by Chevron whose costs the federal
district court judge apparently has ordered to be shared equally between
Chevron and Mr. Donziger (along with two of his Ecuadorian clients), and
the firepower of Chevron’s own legal team, which is alleged to be composed
of 2000 legal professionals at 60 law firms, including 114 Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher attorneys alone. See Donziger & Associates, Bias of Federal Judge
and Chevron’s Abusive Tactics Prompt Law Firm to Withdraw from Ecuador
Case, CSRWIRE, May 3, 2013, http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases
/35574-Bias-of-Federal-Judge-and-Chevron-s-Abusive-Tactics-Prompt-LawFirm-to-Withdraw-from-Ecuador-Case. Many of the assertions of the selfserving news release are repeated in the Memorandum in Support of the
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, filed May 3, 2013, in Chevron Corporation
v. Donziger, Case No. 11–CV–0691 (LAK) (U.S. Dist. Ct. S.D.N.Y.)
(Document No. 1100). The author has never seen a law firm file a pleading
quite like that Memorandum. If even half of its allegations are proven true,
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CONCLUSION
For the E.U.-based MNE, the opportunities presented by FDIs in
the energy sector remain powerfully attractive, and no amount of risk
as perceived ex ante is likely to be judged as of greater weight than
the promising allure of future market advantage, yet-to-be realized
profits that seem within the corporate grasp, and the opportunity to
boldly go where no other MNE has gone before—or to go where
many MNEs have tried and failed, but with the assurance that this
time, things will be different. The complex and contradictory history
of E.U.-based MNEs trying repeatedly to find sustainable
partnerships with the Russian Federation to explore and exploit
Siberian natural gas and oil reserves, for example, encapsulates all of
these experiences.364
Similarly, the experiences of Chevron in Ecuador’s courts and
Royal Dutch Petroleum in America’s courts—where the fallout of
high-risk FDIs in the energy sector has been the subject of decades of
ongoing litigation—demonstrate the vicissitudes that come of the use
the Second Circuit will have a very interesting time sorting through the
proceedings if there is an appeal.
364
Compare, e.g., BP To Buy Back $8bn In Shares After Russian Sale,
BBC NEWS, Mar. 22, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business21893040?print=true, Angel Gonzalez, BP Executive Expects Rosneft Stake
to Yield Partnerships in Russia, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130506-707889.html, and Russian
Energy Twilight For BP In Russia, THE ECONOMIST, June 9, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21556629, with Sakhalin Island: Journey to
Extreme Oil, BLOOMBERGBUSINESWEEK MAGAZINE, May 14, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-05-14/sakhalin-island-journeyto-extreme-oil, John Stepek, Royal Dutch Shell's trouble with Russia,
MONEYWEEK, Oct. 8, 2007, http://www.moneyweek.com/investments/stockmarkets/royal-dutch-shells-trouble-with-russia, Andrew E. Kramer, Maps
and Mythmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com
/2005/12/01/business/01maps.html, Neela Banerjee, From Russia, With
Bankruptcy: A High Cost for BP Amoco’s Investment in an Oil Concern,
Aug. 13, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08
N.Y. TIMES,
/13/business/russia-with-bankruptcy-high-cost-for-bp-amoco-s-investmentoil-concern.html, and Richard W. Stevenson, Oil Companies Tread Warily
Into Russia’s Decrepit Fields, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1993,
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/26/business/oil-companies-tread-warilyinto-russia-s-decrepit-fields.html.
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of civil litigation as the weapon of choice by those who have no other
access to what they perceive as a leveled playing field with an MNE.
Chevron hoped to end environmental tort litigation it inherited from
Texaco by getting out of the U.S. federal courts on what the
corporation thought to be an empty promise to show up for litigation
in the courts of Ecuador. Chevron won that battle, only to lose the
war to a $19 billion judgment from a local court that was derided by
the company; and the American courts, when the Ecuadorian
proceedings started a decade ago in Lago Agrio—which was a
decade after the plaintiffs first brought their case to the federal court
in New York365:
That one of the biggest oil pollution trials in
recent years is taking place here, in a honky-tonk
border town known for its poverty and violence,
was never really expected. The judicial system
here is poor and archaic, based on 17th-century
French law. This week, lawyers for the plaintiffs
365

Getting to the Ecuadorian court system was a crusade for Chevron-

Texaco:
In November 1993, a lawsuit on behalf of residents
of the rain forest area known as Oriente was initiated in a
federal court in New York, close to Texaco’s
international headquarters in Westchester County. The
suit charges that Texaco dumped millions of gallons of
toxic waste into hundreds of unlined open pits and from
there into estuaries and rivers, thus exposing residents to
disease-causing pollutants. The plaintiffs seek a thorough
cleanup of the area, an assessment of the long-term
health effects of the contamination and damage
compensation that may exceed $1 billion.
Despite being sued on its own home turf,
ChevronTexaco fought fiercely to have the case
dismissed. After more than 10 years of litigation on this
jurisdictional issue alone, a federal appeals court finally
ruled that “reasons of convenience” pointed to the
jurisdiction of a rural Ecuadorean court.
César Chelala & Alejandro M. Garro, Ecuador: Taking An Oil Giant To Task
Over Rain Forest Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, http://www.nyti
mes.com/2004/01/13/opinion/13iht-edcesar_ed3_.html.
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simply presented the judge with a list of witnesses
who should be called.366
Similarly, as an editorialist wrote in 1999:
Ecuador's courts cannot handle the case or
enforce a judgment. Ecuador does not admit classaction suits, has no experience with cases like this
one and relegates all environmental disputes to an
administrative tribunal, where the largest fine has
been a few thousand dollars. This case belongs in
an American court, where the contesting claims
can be fairly weighed.367
Yet, Ecuador rose to the challenge—the provincial court
marshaled 100,000 pages of evidence and wrote a decision imposing
a devastating liability on Chevron—which had given up the layers of
procedural safeguards developed over decades of international civil
litigation in U.S. courts on the chance that neither the plaintiffs nor
the Ecuadorian courts could actually try the case.368
Chevron’s choice has proven unwise—particularly in light of
how well Royal Dutch Shell has done in its U.S. federal court
litigation—and Chevron, along with its shareholders worldwide, will
pay the price, whether the milder (but not insubstantial) millions of
dollars for attorneys’ fees, or the more painful execution of a multibillion dollar judgment.
In an altogether polar opposite experience, Royal Dutch
Petroleum has been fighting cases arising out of its ill-starred
366

Juan Forero, Texaco Goes on Trial in Ecuador Pollution Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/23/business/texacogoes-on-trial-in-ecuador-pollution-case.html.
367
Texaco and Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999, http://www.n
ytimes.com/1999/02/19/opinion/texaco-and-ecuador.html.
368
One wonders whether lawyers and corporate executives involved in
formulating and implementing the forum non conveniens strategy have the
introspection to reflect on District Judge Jed Rakoff’s observation, in
granting their motion after years of asserting the argument to get out of U.S.
courts, that “the notion that a New York federal jury is better equipped than
an Ecuadorian judge to apply Ecuadorian law to Spanish-language testimony
and documents relating to 30 years’ of activities by an Ecuador-sponsored
Consortium in an Amazonian rain forest is preposterous.” Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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Nigerian FDI for nearly two decades in the federal courts of the
United States, having settled one on the courthouse steps for nearly
$16 million—the equivalent of a mere interest service payment on
the $16 billion judgment from which Chevron is currently struggling
to extricate itself—and having won another, outright, in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Kiobel decision. Now, the face of FDI litigation in
U.S. courts will be remade, as one of the most risk-creating litigation
strategies in the American arsenal—the ATS lawsuit—can no longer
fuel the corporate doomsday scenarios pitched a decade ago in hues
worthy of a Maurice Sendak set design for a Tim Burton horror
film.369 With a stroke of the judicial pen, Chief Justice John Roberts
and a unanimous Supreme Court in Kiobel opened the metaphorical
blinds to admit the morning sun so that the MNEs, and their insurers,
feverishly haunted by such visions, could awake and see that the
nightmare was— largely—but a childish dream.
In between these wide-ranging and ambitious FDI projects that
resulted in similarly wide-ranging and ambitious litigation, a E.U.based MNE undertaking a modest infrastructure FDI by building a
modern wind farm to generate electricity on Israel’s Golan Heights
faces proportionally similar risks—heightened by the risks of
regional conflicts boiling over into war, exposure to terrorism, the
possibility of litigation in third states, and the animadversion of
substantial segments of the international community arrayed against
Israel’s territorial claims in the occupied territories.
In this article, we have walked in the shoes of a variety of
constituents to such an FDI—individuals with varying interests;
nations with competing interests; lawyers and judges in common law
and civil law court systems; diplomats, negotiators and implementers
of international trade treaties; and insurers of political and other FDI
risks. By tracing through these steps—bounded by the real FDI and
litigation experiences of Royal Dutch Petroleum and Chevron, and
the hypothesized FDI experience of Alstom in Israel—we have
woven a tapestry of perspective, insight, experience, and informed
speculation that will serve us as participants, no matter what the
capacity, in future FDI scenarios of the global economy. The end of
369

HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 16.

282

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 9.2

this journey invites us to begin another, as the permutations of
triumphs and tribulations of FDI in the modern network of legal
protections and liabilities can never be exhausted, but can be
navigated within the parameters that studies such as this one help to
establish. Indeed, on May 14, 2013, wind-energy made headlines in
media reports that “[m]ore than 573,000 birds are killed by the
country’s wind farms each year, including 83,000 hunting birds such
as hawks, falcons and eagles,” while at the same time, “wind power,
a pollution-free energy intended to ease global warming, is a
cornerstone of President Barack Obama’s energy plan,” with “a $1
billion-a-year tax break to the industry that has nearly doubled the
amount of wind power in his first term”; but at the political cost of
creating the perceptions that “like the oil industry under President
George W. Bush, lobbyists and executives have used their favored
status to help steer U.S. energy policy,” and that the supposedly
“green industry [has been] allowed to do not-so-green things,” such
as “kill[ing] protected species with impunity and conceal[ing] the
environmental consequences of sprawling wind farms.”370
One might be forgiven if this latest example of unintended
consequences conjures to mind a paraphrase of the signature
observation of Roseanne Roseannadanna, the late Gilda Radner’s
fictional characterization of an urban sage, that “[i]f it’s not one
thing, it’s always another!”371
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Dina Cappiello, AP Impact: Wind Farms Get Pass On Eagle Deaths,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 14, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/
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